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DEPRIVATIZING COPYRIGHT
Shubha Ghosht

INTRODUCTION

James Madison's tersest justifications for the proposed powers of the new federal legislature were reserved for what was to be
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, now referred to as the Intellectual
Property Clause.' According to Madison, Congress's power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for a
limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right, to their2
respective writings and discoveries" was of unquestionable utility.
For Madison this power was necessary because individual states
could not effectively protect the copyright of authors and the right
to useful inventions.3 More importantly, according to Madison, by
granting the federal legislature the power to protect authors and
public good fully coincides ... with the claims of
inventors, "the
4
individuals.",
The coincidence of the public good and individual claims
echoed the Enlightenment confidence that private vice, transformed into private interest, could be the basis for public virtue. 5
While patent law has for the most part lived up to Madison's ext Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, SUNY, Law School; J.D., Stanford; Ph.D.,
Economics, Michigan; B.A., Amherst College. I would like to thank Guyora Binder, Oren
Bracha, David Engel, Craig Joyce, Fred Konefsky, Michael Madison, Betty Mensch, Robert
Reis, David Vaver and seminar participants at the University at Buffalo Law School and the
Oxford Intellectual Property Research Center for invaluable comments and patience.
I For usage of the term "Intellectual Property Clause," see Paul J.Heald & Suzanna
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119; Edward D. Walterscheid, The Nature
of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (pt. I), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 763 (2001).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 217 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
3 Id.

4 Id.
5 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 42-48 (1977) (describing interests as a new paradigm); EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS 29-34 (2001) (describing the vision of the
state during the Enlightenment).0
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pectations, 6 the history of copyright law has been a relative disappointment. Since the enactment of the first federal copyright act
by Congress in 1790, 7 the securing of the rights of an author for a
limited time has not been guided by the invisible hand to the promotion of the public good. The history of copyright law in the
United States has involved the perfection of copyright into a private property right, rather than a means to serve the public good.
Since much cultural production occurs in corporate settings, such
as television and motion picture conglomerates or large software
companies, the protection of authors as a means of enriching the
public sphere with cultural creations has been transformed into the
protection of business interests.8 This tendency has reached its
zenith with the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
which, by upholding Congress's power to extend the copyright
term, seemingly granted perpetual rights at the expense of the public domain. 9 Furthermore, especially with the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998 and sundry post9/11 legislation seeking to limit the activities of libraries, universities, and other institutions designed to foster the development and
dissemination of knowledge, the directive to promote the progress
of science seems subservient to the need of protecting private security through the control of information flow. ° Somehow, the
public good that Madison emphasized in his brief paragraph has
6 There is a sizeable literature criticizing the patent system. Although there have been
occasional movements throughout history for the abolition of patents, much of the current patent
literature seems more focused on technical details of the patent act. Some critics of copyright,
however, state the entire enterprise is obsolete and perhaps unnecessary. For a sense of the
patent literature, see James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 56-57 (2003) (describing movements in the
nineteenth century to abolish patents in Europe and citing to works critical of patents in the
U.S.); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1496-97 (2001) (addressing several critics of patent practice). For a sense of the assault on
copyright, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272-75 (2002) (describing
technological changes that undermine copyright law's foundations).
7 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 124 (entitled "An Act for the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned"); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075 (entitled "An Act To amend and consolidate the Acts respecting copyright").

8 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-34 (2001).

9 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198, 241 (2003) (holding that while Congress cannot
establish perpetual copyright, it has the power to extend a copyright term retroactively); s,: also
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2050 (2003) (stating that
Congress cannot establish perpetual copyright).
I0 See, e.g., Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: The DMCA 's Push
to Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607, 637-39 (2001); L. Ray Patterson,
The DMCA: A Modem Version of the Licensing Act of 1662, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 33-34
(2002); Jason Sheets, Copyright Misused: The Impact of the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair & Innovative Markets, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 19-21 (2000).
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been lost, and copyright has turned into an unqualified private
right. This change raises questions not only about copyright's past
(how did we get to this point?), but also about copyright's future
(where do we go from here?).
The contemporary crisis in copyright centers on the question
of whether copyright law serves to protect certain essential private
property interests, or whether copyright law is informed by public,
regulatory values." This Article is offered as a challenge to those
who advocate the first view, and as succor to those who are persuaded by the second. To conceive of copyright as essentially private property, akin to rights in land, is to ignore the important historical and realist tradition that has envisioned real property as an
instrumental construct designed to pursue certain social and political goals, as opposed to protecting pre-social and pre-political
rights.' 2 If analogies to real property are to be taken seriously, the
realist critique of real property needs to be evenhandedly applied
to copyright's status as property. Once copyright is understood
through the realist lens, however, the social and political ends of
copyright emerge and become distinct from the ends of real property. Rights in real property aid in structuring land-based economic, social, and political systems. Copyright, in contrast, has
aided the creation of cultural products historically, and the creation
of information-based economic, social, and political systems more
recently. Understanding how the goals of copyright differ from
those of real property facilitates the second agenda of copyright as
a public minded, regulatory endeavor. These goals are summarized in what I refer to in this Article as the privatization thesis.
My thesis is that while Madison saw in copyright a coincidence of private interest and public good, historically copyright,
with its roots in the Statute of Anne, 13 originated and has developed as a devolution of the sovereign's role in cultural produc1 See, e.g.,

Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4. J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.

27 (2000) (presenting a critique of the trespass paradigm in cyberspace); Julie E. Cohen,
Lochner in Cyberspace:The New Economics Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L.
REV. 462 (1998) (describing the role of Lochner in shaping the private property interest view);
Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996)
(discussing copyright as property).
12See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 8-14 (1927);
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q.
470, 470-79 (1923); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201,
212-21 (1937). For a recent history, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 90-99 (1998).

For a recent discussion of these issues in the context of cyberspace and intellectual property, see
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
'3 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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tion.14 This devolution has, over time, led to an expansion of private rights over various forms of expressive activities, including
literary works, musical works, software, architectural works, and
emphasized in this Article, model legislation, religious texts, and
encryption technology. The contemporary debate over copyright
reflects this devolution, which has been accelerated through decades of deregulation in such diverse areas as the airlines, telecommunications, financial services, law enforcement, pollution control, education, and income distribution policy. Hence, the title of
this Article: the time has come to recognize both copyright law as
a form of privatization and the need to deprivatize copyright in
order to realize the public good that Madison envisioned.
Some readers may be struck by my assertion of "the sovereign's role in cultural production."1 5 This assumption, while per-16
haps unquestionable during the age of monarchy and patronage,
may seem less credible for modern democracies, where cultural
production is largely the activity of non-governmental entities.
The hallmark of democracy is the liberalization of the arts and a
movement away from the promotion of a national, uniform culture
as in the former Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. I am not, however, using the word culture in this paper synonymously with nation or people, as the word is sometimes used. 17 Instead, the term
culturalproduction refers to the creation of cultural artifacts such
" The argument I propose in this Article exemplifies Professor William Fisher's fourth
justification for intellectual property: the use of property rights to share and foster "the achievement of a just and attractive culture." William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property,in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 172 (Stephen R. Munzer ed.,

2001). As Professor Fisher points out, this justification is ends-oriented, like utilitarianism, but
incorporates "visions of a desirable society richer than the conceptions of 'social welfare' deployed by utilitarians." Id. Professor Fisher is critical of this fourth justification, which he calls
the "social-planning perspective," because its application rests on ultimately indeterminate
questions about the social good. Id. at 192-94. I am not sure that the social-planning perspective is any more or less indeterminate than the utilitarian perspective, which also requires
determinations of what constitutes social welfare. Much of the literature on cultural economics
addresses some of the difficult questions raised by Fisher, and also enriches the utilitarian approach with a consideration of values other than utilities. See DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS
AND CULTURE 19-41 (2001) (discussing the meaning of value in economic theory and its
relationship to culture).
15See TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 36-40 (1998) (arguing that

government, in its role as a consumer of arts, leads to bureaucracy and a decline of dynamism);
WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS: ART, ARTISTS, AND ECONOMICS 205-31 (1989)
(making the claim that government funding for the arts is rent-seeking). Neither Professor
Grampp nor Professor Cowen address the issues I raise in Part I, infra. Instead, they each start
from a presumption of market efficiency, and ignore institutions other than the market and values other than efficiency.
16For a discussion of the varied meanings of patronage, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 57-60 (1991).
17See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 18-19 (1995) (using "culture" to mean a nation or a people); THROSBY, supra note 14, at 3-4 (analyzing the evolution

and different usages of the term "culture").
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as written texts, visual icons, musical arrangements, and other embodiments of social and communal meaning. When cultural production is understood as the creation of cultural artifacts, the sovereign's role in cultural production becomes more compelling in
democracies in particular, as my discussion of public goods theory
and the theory of democracy indicates in Part I.
My broad point is that the sovereign's role in cultural production in democracies has its roots in the battles over cultural production, particularly the creation of literary texts, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These battles culminated in the
passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710, the foundation of modern
copyright law. The enactment of this statute represented a devolution of the role of the sovereign in cultural production. As Professor Mark Rose states, "The passage of the statute marked the divorce of copyright from censorship and the reestablishment of18
copyright under the rubric of property rather than regulation."'
Democratic governments continue to have a role in cultural production, a role implied by Madison's reference to the "public
good" with respect to copyright. This role, as I elaborate below, is
to address the need to subsidize the arts financially, provide cultural infrastructure, such as libraries, schools, and other fora for
public discussion, and protect minority representation in cultural
productions. 19 In a democratic culture, this role is a controversial
one, and to the extent that this role is carried out through copyright, the controversy is exacerbated by copyright's roots in the
Statute of Anne and the debates over literary property and publishing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Recognizing these
roots will aid in addressing many of the tensions in copyright today.
Recently, privatization has drawn the attention of several legal scholars committed to understanding the proper forms of regulation, markets, and state institutions. 20 These scholars specifically
I8

MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 48 (1993).

19See CRITICAL CULTURAL POLICY STUDIES: A READER 13-42 (Justin Lewis & Toby

Miller eds., 2003) (analyzing policies intended to develop cultural works); JAMES HEILBRUN &
CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 219-50 (2001) (providing reasons
why government should fund the arts); TOBY MILLER & GEORGE YUDICE, CULTURAL POLICY

1-34 (2002) (describing the history of cultural policy in the United States); THROSBY, supra
note 14, at 137-52 (discussing the rationale for government-funded cultural policy); Margaret J.
Wyszomirski, Background on Cultural Policies and Programsin the U.S., in COMPARING CULTURAL POLICY: A STUDY OF JAPAN & THE UNITED STATES 13, 113-202 (Joyce Zemans et al.
eds., 1999); Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Philanthropy and Culture: Patterns, Context, and
Change, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 461, 461-80

(Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Erlich eds., 1999) (discussing the overlay of philanthropy on
cultural production).
20See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS 7-22 (2002). The March 2003 Harvard
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have focused on different ways in which privatization can occur,
such as private contracting for government services, the reliance
on non-profit private associations for the delivery of social services, and the use of private charitable donations in lieu of taxation
as a means of fiscal finance. Professor Freeman, in reviewing the
movement towards privatization, makes an argument for a "counterintuitive way to view American privatization trends.'
According to her argument, privatization, instead of shrinking government, allows government's reach to expand. As she states, "privatization can be a means of 'publicization,' through which private
actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals
as the price of access to lucrative opportunities. ,,22 By developing
a theory of copyright as privatization in this Article, my goal is to
revive a public-spirited copyright law in ways that I explicate below.
Copyright, as an example of privatization, seems distinct from
more traditional examples, such as trash collection, electricity generation, and prison management. Nonetheless, there are both historical
and doctrinal bases for viewing copyright through the lens of privatization.
The historical support for considering copyright within the
theoretical structure of privatization is provided by copyright's
roots in the English system of licensing and the guild system of
publishing and bookselling. Even though it would be inaccurate to
call these systems "privatization" in the contemporary sense, 23 I
discuss this early history to show the connection between sovereign power and private right that marked early English copyright.
In fact, this intimate connection between governmental power and
private property is ignored both by writers who see the birth of
copyright as the creation of property and by writers who see copyright as a pure regulatory system. I argue that the privatization
theory reconciles these two conflicting interpretations of English
history. I further argue that American copyright history also supports my privatization thesis. The language of the Intellectual
Law Review dedicates its pages to a symposium on privatization and the ideas raised by Professor Minow's book. The symposium is entitled "Public Values in an Era of Privatization." I will
cite various ideas from articles in this symposium, but the article by Jody Freeman, infra note
2 1, is the most apposite to mention in the introduction.
21

Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.

REV. 1285, 1285 (2003).
22

Id.

23

See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-priced Free Lunch: The Intel-

lectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's Controlof Government,

30 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000) (discussing different tools of government used by the crown
and adopted by the United States).
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Property Clause supports the conclusion that private property
rights were intended to be a means towards a public end, and not
an end in themselves. My thesis is also supported by the reflection
of republican conceptions of property in the debate over international copyright in the 1830s. In short, the early English and
American copyright history suggests that copyright originally was
not simply a private property right.
Three current doctrinal problems in copyright further illustrate my privatization thesis. The first is the debate within copyright over granting a property right to drafters of model codes and
standards that are eventually enacted into legislation or regulatory
rules. 24 As I have described in a previous paper, there is currently
a split among the federal circuits on the issue of the copyrightability of law. 25 The controversy illustrates one way in which copyright serves to privatize the most basic of governmental functions - the drafting of laws. The second example involves several
controversial cases arising from intra-denominational disputes
over biblical and other sacred texts. 26 Scholars of privatization
have noted with caution the increasing blurring of the line between
church and state, particularly in the areas of school choice and care
of the indigent.2 7of8The involvement of federal courts in these disputes of copyright provides another example of this blurring.28
The third, and final, example of the relationship between copyright
and privatization is the role of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act and other legislation that regulate encryption and decryption
24 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the law of municipalities could not be copyrighted; therefore copying the codes would not be
considered copyright infringement).
25 Shubha Ghosh, Copyright and Functional Expression, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
71, 86-87 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d I 110 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a religious organization had no implied license to use a book written by
the pastor of another religious organization, and that its copying and distribution of the book
constituted unfair use). For an excellent recent survey of cases involving copyright and religion,
see Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious Pluralism,91

CAL. L. REV. 323 (2003).

27See MINOW, supra note 20, at 68-84; Martha Minow, Public and PrivatePartnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2003); David Saperstein,
Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1353, 1354 (2003); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1398 (2003).

28Furthermore, copyright's role as a tool in contemporary religious disputes has roots in
the controversies surrounding the drafting of the King James Bible in the seventeenth century,
and the authorship and ownership of religious texts. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, copyright is critical in determining whether a religious organization can publish and
sell its religious texts in order to generate revenues to fund its many activities, including those
that have been devolved from the government. See ADAM NICOLSON, GOD'S SECRETARIES:
THE MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE 65-70 (2003); ROSE, supra note 18, at 49-66.
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technologies.2 9 In many ways, the DMCA marks a return to the
pre-Statute of Anne days where control of publishing was largely a
means of censorship and regulation, as described by Professors
Patterson and Rose. By creating a private cause of action against
decryption, the act provides a third illustration of the devolution of
the government's censorial role to a private entity in a manner that
circumvents the state action requirement of the First Amendment.
My argument to deprivatize copyright law is organized as follows. Part I presents a theoretical framework for understanding
the government's role in cultural production and privatization.
Part II examines the historical record described above in light of
this framework. Part III's focus is on three doctrinal examples of
privatization: model codes, religious texts, and the DMCA. Part
IV develops the implications of the theory and evidence for three
elements of copyright: copyrightable subject matter, fair use, and
the First Amendment.
I. COPYRIGHT AND THE THEORY OF PRIVATIZATION

Although much has been written about privatization, a general
definition of the term in the scholarly literature is elusive. 31 Pro29

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-

76 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)). Under the DMCA, "[n]o person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access" to a copyrighted work. Id.
§ 1201(a). The DMCA has been a source of controversy because of its use against hackers and
academics who engage in decryption research to break the code that controls access to entertainment media such as DVDs and electronic books. The DMCA creates a private cause of
action allowing a party who uses a technological measure to protect a copyrighted work to go
after the circumventor, and also creates what can be described as a private subpoena power. See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (motion picture studios
brought an action under the DMCA to enjoin websites from posting software that could decrypt
digitally encrypted movies on DVDs); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (manufacturer of printer toner cartridges sued manufacturer of replacement cartridges under DMCA); In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (action brought under DMCA involving the downloading of songs from an
Internet Service Provider), rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d
I ll I (N.D. Cal. 2002) (defendant was indicted for alleged violations of DMCA anticircumvention provisions); Felten v. RIAA, No. 01-CV-2669 (GEB) (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001)
(action brought by researchers to challenge DMCA and determine that publication of research
was protected speech), information available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-v_RIAA.
30 See Patterson, supra note 10, at 35; ROSE, supra note 18, at 12-13.
31 Professor John Donahue, in his classic study of privatization, divides the definition of
privatization along two dimensions, finance and performance, and concludes that the privatization decision requires "fidelity to the public's values." JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION
DECISION 7-12 (1989). Two political scientists have recently defined privatization as "the use
of nongovernmental organizations to run government programs," but they limit this definition
by stating that it applies "in most cases," not all cases. MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN
GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 202-03 (2002). A recent collection of readings on governance refers to the
term several times without offering a definition. Instead, the collection of readings characterizes
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fessor J.G.A. Pocock characterizes privatization as a state of mind.
Privatization, as he describes, entails a movement from a condition
under which an individual, as political animal, engages in "reasserting his own civic being, or renewing its principles" to a condition under which an individual's world "will be primarily conventional and subjective, and only experience (and the state of the
market) will tell him how far his opinions concerning reality are
founded upon truth. 3 2 In other words, privatization marks a shift
from the centrality of the political and civic spheres to the centrality of the market and individual experience.
Professor Pocock' s description captures the spirit of privatization and aids in devising an operational definition. For the purposes of this Article, I define privatization as the delegation of the
decision-making function historically assigned to a governmental
entity to a non-governmental entity. This definition emphasizes
two important elements in the privatization debate: the locus and
the mechanism for decision making. For example, when a democratically elected state government delegates the management of
prisons to a corporate, for-profit entity, what is key is that the locus of decision making shifts from a democratically accountable
body to an institution that bases its management decisions on the
maximization of profit. Analogously, when I speak of the privatization of the government's role in cultural production, what is key
is that private entities interacting through contract and exchange
privatization among the many tools available to government. Lester Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A
GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2003) [hereinafter TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT]. The lack of a definition reflects two problems: (I) the blurring of a distinction
between privatization as a means and privatization as an end, and (2) the difficulty in drawing a
distinction between public and private. As to the first problem, note that the scholars discussed
in this paragraph sometimes describe privatization as an end in itself, and sometimes as a means
to achieve public goals such as efficiency or transparency. The second problem is well studied
in the literature. See supra note 12.
A recent contribution to this literature by philosopher Raymond Geuss highlights the several difficulties. The first is the problem of defining the public in universal terms that somehow
finds a common set of interests among disparate sets of groups, such as cyclists, gardeners, land
developers and hunters. RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBuIc GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS 95-96 (2001).
The second is recognizing that private is often seen in terms of what should be protected from
interference by the state, suggesting the public as a residuum category. Id. at 80. Finally, these
tensions are exacerbated by the fact that public and private are not discrete categories, but a
continuum based on more rudimentary notions of ownership and control. Id. at 7-8. As Geuss
states, "[the distinction between private and public] concerns the modes of access, control, and
ownership of property or information, with special reference to the issue of whether this access,
control, and ownership is restricted or limited in any way." Id. at 6. The description is tantalizing in its ambiguity. From whose vantage point (an individual or a state institution?) are the
notions of ownership and control defined, and what institution or entity is the source of the
limitation or restriction on control, access, and ownership?
32 J.G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 460 (1975).
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replace deliberative or authoritarian bodies in the creation of culture.
Three concepts - culture, market, and government - comprise
the heart of this Article. As I explained in the introduction, the
word culture is used here to refer to cultural artifacts, as opposed
to national or other forms of identity. Many cultural artifacts, such
as television programs, movies, or songs, are familiarly created
and distributed through the market. However, government plays a
role in many of these markets presumably to correct market failures. Copyright is one example of such intervention. To say that
government facilitates the market for culture is not to say that government creates culture. The creation of particular artifacts and
their consumption by the public is undertaken by actors outside the
sphere of the government. It would be equally mistaken, however,
to say that creators and consumers of cultural artifacts are acting in
a purely private manner, regulated solely by the rules of the marketplace. Copyright law determines the manner in which the market operates, and hence affects the types of cultural artifacts that
are created and the manner in which they are distributed. It is this
relationship among culture, market, and government that is the focus of this Article.
A simple example may illustrate this point. Imagine a world
without copyright, meaning a world in which creators of works
could not prevent others from appropriating their work either
through reproduction, adaptation, or performance.33 There is no
reason to think that absent copyright, cultural artifacts will cease to
exist. But the types of cultural artifacts created and the manner of
distribution would be different. It is conceivable that absent copyright, there would be much more imitation. Creators, instead of
expending effort to develop highly original and creative works,
would copy the latest cultural fashions. It is equally conceivable
that little would be published at all, especially by those who feared
ready imitation and copying. Publishers would rely on first entry
into cultural marketplaces in order to make the venture profitable,
creating works that are difficult to imitate. Entry barriers would
also be created through technological limitations or through the
creation of customer loyalty to known and tried celebrity authors.
In some ways, the landscape without copyright would look similar
33 For examples of such thought experiments, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 17-19 (1994); Stephen Breyer,
Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L.

REV. 281 (1970); Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationalefor Copyright Protectionfor
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. I 100 (1971).
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to the current world, but in many ways, we could expect the landscape to be altered. The point is that copyright law, as regulation,
shapes the marketplace for cultural artifacts. Government, markets, and culture are intimately linked.
The current debate in copyright is over the proper alignment
of the government, markets, and culture in properly structuring the
entitlements granted by copyright law to creators. For many, the
current structure grants too broad a scope of rights to copyright
owners without any tractable limiting principle. In practice, the
Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft allows Congress to
extend the duration of rights indefinitely, if not perpetually. 34 Decisions in the areas of derivative work rights and fair use also
broaden the set of new works that a copyright owner can enjoin or
allow to exist upon licensing. Optimal market design has been
touted as one source of limitation. For example, Wendy Gordon
has classically argued for fair use as a resolution to the problem of
market failure in transacting over certain types of spontaneous or
high transaction cost uses.35 Robert Merges, in writing on parodies
and other derivative works, has seen the need for a robust market
as a reason for allowing fair use for parodies.36 His test for parody
as fair use would recognize fair use when the copyright owner has
seemingly irrationally refused to license the creation of a value
added work. Finally, Paul Goldstein has argued that the limiting
principle is market incentives; the scope of the copyright entitlement should be broad enough to incentivize the creation of new
works and no broader.37 The end that the market serves acts as a
governing principle to regulate the creation of cultural products.
The problem with the market baseline is that it rests on the assumption that private interest working through market transactions
will lead to public good. But there are many reasons to think that
the invisible hand will not be operating in the arena of cultural
production. The invisible hand operates best in competitive environments, but cultural production may not occur through competition. Certain cultural forms will dominate, and although cultural
tastes change, cultural transition does not occur through the price
regulated, market-clearing mechanism of the invisible hand. A
deeper problem is that the market principle, whether in the form of
14

537 U.S. 186 (2003).

35 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic Analy-

sis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
36 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failureand the
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 305 (1993).
37 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 209 (1983).
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market failure or adequate incentives, provides no limiting principle at all for copyright. For example, according to Professor
Gordon's formulation, once transaction costs are removed (perhaps
through more service markets, such as the creation of copyright
intermediaries, or through technological advances), fair use would
become unnecessary. Furthermore, while Merges' formulation of
fair use assumes that economic value is all that a copyright owner
should care about, it may be perfectly reasonable for an artist to
protect the integrity of a work. Finally, the incentive-based limitation offers little limit at all on copyright's scope because it is not
possible to say how much is too much to incentivize the creation
of works, particularly in the current milieu where multi-million
dollar blockbusters are the ideal. Why shouldn't the copyright
owner have the world if people are willing to pay? While markets
are certainly important for the creation and dissemination of cultural products, finding a limit to copyright in the goals of the market is illusory.
Neil Netanel has offered a similar critique of market theory in
copyright. I am probably more sympathetic to markets than he is,
but I agree wholeheartedly that current market theorists in copyright do not offer an adequate answer to the question of how broad
the copyright owner's rights should be.38 Professor Netanel offers
the values of democratic pluralism as a substitute for the marketbased values of other copyright scholars. Democratic pluralism
limits copyright by emphasizing copyright's goal of fostering open
and diverse discourse that supports the development of markets
and government. 39 The argument I develop in this Article offers
support for Professor Netanel's claims by developing a coherent
theory of copyright that takes into consideration culture, markets,
and government. Copyright provides broad public functions that
inform the private right of copyright owners. By placing copyright
law in the broader skein of privatization, 4° I hope that copyright
policy makers will recognize the public values that form the basis
for copyright law.
To make the case that copyright is a form of privatization, I
need to show that, through copyright law, the state is delegating a
government function to a private party. Two obstacles confront
this argument. The first is identifying the government function
that copyright law is facilitating. I have described this function as
38 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 306-11 (1996).
39 See id. at 324-35.
40 See MINOW, supra note 20, at 68; Salamon, supra note 31, at 1.
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cultural production, and for some, categorizing cultural production
as a government function would be seen as an error. As the
scholar David Throsby points out, the production of cultural works
in the United States is understood in libertarian terms: The activity
is purely private. 41 This description, however, may in fact be a
reflection of my argument that copyright is a means of privatization, especially since other countries, including many Western democracies, relegate a large role to the government for the promotion and creation of the arts. Furthermore, Professor Throsby's
description of the United States ignores the role that both federal
and state governments play in subsidizing and regulating cultural
activities. 42 This role includes the construction of theaters and museums, grants to artists and performers, and art promotion. Needless to say, state and federal governments have reduced their role
in the United States over the past decades, but the government's
involvement, even in the supposedly libertarian United States,
suggests that cultural production has been in part a government
function. The purpose of this section is to provide more theoretical bite to this reality. In Parts L.A and I.B, I develop a theory of
government functions that critiques the economic theory of public
goods as applied to copyright, and I develop an alternative foundation for copyright in the theory of democratic governance.
The second obstacle to my characterization is identifying the
mechanisms through which copyright privatizes the government
function of cultural production. Political scientists and public policy analysts point to two principal ways in which government carries out its functions: through direct production and through financing by taxes and subsidies.43 When the government devolves
41 THROSBY, supra note 14, at 145-46; see also JOHN W. O'HAGAN, THE STATE AND THE
ARTS: AN ANALYSIS OF KEY ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 811 (1998) (describing the evolution of government spending on the arts in the United States).
42 See MILLER & YUDICE, supra note 19, at 35-71 (discussing cultural policy in the
United States); O'HAGAN, supra note 41, at 11-13; RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE,
AND REWARD: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION

AGE 167 (2001) (discussing the pervasiveness of art subsidization in the United States); Dick
Netzer, Non Profit Organizations, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 331, 331-41
(Ruth Towse ed., 2003) (describing non-profit organizations' involvement with the arts); Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Background on Cultural Policies and Programsin the U.S., in COMPARING CULTURAL POLICY: A STUDY OF JAPAN & THE UNITED STATES 113, 113-202 (Joyce Ze-

mans et al. eds., 1999).
13 See DONAHUE, supra note 31, at 53-55; Christopher Howard, Tax Expenditures, in
TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, at 410; Steven J. Kelman, Contracting, in TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, at 282; Mark H. Moore, Introduction, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1212,
1213 (2003); Lester M. Salamon, The Tools Approach and the New Governance: Conclusion
and Implications, in TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, at 600; David E. M. Sappington &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information and Incentives, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
567 (1987).
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a government function, the government either contracts for the
production of an activity that it once directly produced, or the government seeks funding from private sources. An example of gov44
ernment contracting is provided by the privatization of prisons.
The appeal to charitable giving and funding of voluntary services
for the indigent by religious, non-profit, and corporate groups is an
example of the devolution of the financing activity of government.45 Copyright, I argue, is a hybrid of the production and the
financing roles of government. By the grant of a copyright, the
government protects private production of cultural products. The
protection granted to private parties allows for the collection of
economic rents, which in turn can finance creative activities.46 In
Part I.C, I present the mechanisms through which copyright law
privatizes the government functions identified in the theory of democratic governance.
The lesson to be drawn from the theory is that copyright is not
purely a private right. It is a private right secured to further a public purpose. The theoretical analysis I develop in this section helps
in identifying the public values that inform copyright.
A. A Critiqueof Copyright's Foundationin Public Goods Theory
The current justification for copyright law is grounded in the
economic theory of public goods. 47 Public goods theory provides a
justification for copyright law as a response to market failure. In
this section, I argue that the economic theory of public goods is
inadequate for defining the government's role in cultural production for two reasons. First, public goods theory is applied in a
categorical manner by legal scholars without proper consideration
of the underlying legal rights at tension in copyright and in public
goods theory. Second, the theory starts from a presumption that
markets are the appropriate baseline for social allocation of resources. As I argue, an equally compelling benchmark is one of

44 See MINOW, supra note 20, at 151-52.
45 Id. at 50-120.
4 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law.
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989).
47 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC

GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 10-13 (1986); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic

Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS 67, 67-81 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds.,

1970). For the importance of this concept in contemporary discussions, see the set of essays
published in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

(Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) and PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZA-

TION (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003). Both of these volumes were prepared for the United Nations
Development Programme.
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democratic governance.48 Such a benchmark, while not rejecting
markets, provides a more comprehensive approach to the theory of
government and cultural production, grounded in the values of
autonomy and participation. The approach is more comprehensive
because it permits consideration of both efficiency and nonefficiency goals, as well as of institutions other than markets. The
benchmark of democratic governance does not reject the economic
approach I critique here, but introduces a more institution-minded
view of economics that addresses the gaps in public goods theory. 49
1. Efficiency Goals and the Theory of Public Goods
In this section, I address public goods theory, a body of economic scholarship that is often cited as a foundation for intellectual property law generally and copyright specifically. I argue that
the application of public goods theory is not satisfactory because
of implicit assumptions about markets and a lack of consideration
of the institutional details pertinent to government and the creation
of markets. In contrast to the public goods approach, I propose an
institutional approach that focuses on the relative advantages of
different types of social, political, and economic arrangements for
cultural production. This approach, I argue, asks the relevant legal
question in understanding government functions: What should be
the rights and obligations of parties in the domain of cultural production?
Textbook economics justifies government policy on grounds
of market failure. When a private, unregulated market cannot be
trusted to allocate commodities in a way that maximizes efficiency, measured usually by the surpluses earned by consumers
and producers in the marketplace, the argument for government
policy of some form is made. Much of the debate in copyright law
scholarship is grounded in the notion of a public good.5 ° In fact,
many economics textbooks illustrate a public good with the exam48 For an argument similar to the one developed here, see PETER DRAHOS & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 189-92

(2002) (advocating the creation of democratic property rights that recognize the values of representation, full information, and non-coercion); Netanel, supra note 38, at 341-44.
49 The institutional economics approach I speak of here is influenced by the work of Professors Edward L. Rubin and Neil K. Komesar. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 98-122 (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY

AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 42-60 (2001). For a distillation and extension of Professor Komesar's
ideas, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393-95 (1996).
50 For a recent exposition of the literature, see Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation,
and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 546 n.35 (2003) (citing to literature
on copyright and public goods).
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ples of national defense, natural resources, and a song. 5 1 The juxtaposition of these three examples, however, conflate their many
crucial differences. But from the perspective of traditional economics, national defense, natural resources, and a song have one
thing in common: because they are examples of public goods, the
government must be involved in their provision.
The term public good by itself creates difficulties. For those
who hear the phrase for the first time, public good may be understood as synonymous with public welfare or well-being. But the
word good is being used in the sense of a commodity, either a
product or service. When a good is public, according to textbook
economic theory, the good cannot be allocated through a decentralized price mechanism. 52 Instead, the public realm must be involved in the good's allocation. The concept of a public good is
understood in relationship to a price system, and the failure of a
price system to function is a reflection of the conditions necessary
for a market economy. Therefore, the category of a public good is
by itself not useful. To call something a public good is in some
ways to resolve the question of government provision without
53
looking at more basic institutional and technological issues.
Textbook economics posits two primitive concepts in defining
a public good: rivalry and excludability.54 Rivalry means that my
consumption of one unit of a commodity precludes your consumption.55 Excludability means that a commodity has an owner who
can keep others from consuming the commodity.56 According to
economic theory, a market can allocate a commodity if the commodity is both rival and excludable in consumption. If one of
these conditions fails, then the market fails as an institution for
promoting an efficient allocation of resources.
Standard examples illustrate these ideas. A loaf of bread is a
commodity that is both rival and excludable. A buyer's consumption of a specific loaf of bread precludes others from consuming
51 See, e.g., STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION 3-4, 10-11 (199 1) (describing ubiquity of the public goods problem and providing
an example of a song as a public good). For an excellent discussion of public goods from a

theory of distributive justice, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 45-48 (2002).

See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 47, at 6-7; Arrow, supra note 47, at 67-81.
For a good criticism of the use of public goods theory in copyright from a rights perspective, see I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog
Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purpose, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211, 224-26
(2001).
54 See SHMANSKE, supra note 51, at 6-7 (defining public goods in terms of rivalry/nonrivalry and excludability/non-excludability).
55 Id. at 9.
56 Id. at 7-8.
52

53

2003]

DEPRIVA TIZING COPYRIGHT

that same loaf. Similarly, if the buyer chooses not to consume the
loaf he has purchased, he can exclude others from possessing that
loaf through legal or other means. A natural lake located within a
subdivision is excludable because access to the lake can be restricted (by trespass law or by a fence) to residents of the subdivision. But among the group of people who can utilize the lake, the
lake is not rival. My swimming in the lake does not prevent your
ability to make use of the lake. Notice that the concept of rivalry
deals with competing uses, but not necessarily conflicting uses.
My swimming in the lake may interfere with your fishing, but we
can still use the lake in a non-rivalrous manner. Fugitive property,
such as underground oil or water, is an example of a commodity
that is rival but non-excludable. Since the resource flows across
many property lines, it would be difficult for one landowner to
prevent another landowner from accessing the resource. However,
one's consumption of the resource can limit another's consumption, as can be seen when one landowner pumps the entire amount
of the resource from underground. Finally, the last category involves goods that are non-rival and non-excludable, the textbook
case of the public good.
Theorists use the concepts of rivalry and excludability to create a taxonomy of goods that aids the policy maker in determining
the appropriate institutional arrangement for the allocation of a
commodity. 57 The categorization of a commodity as private means
that a decentralized market mechanism is appropriate. Categorization as public supports government provision. Categorization in
one of the other two categories means a mixed public-private system is required. Through these categories, the proper role of government is understood to be the provision of public goods and intervention into the marketplace when a commodity is either nonrivalrous or non-excludable. Many analyses of copyright law, for
example, are based on the categorization of the subject matter of
copyright (songs, books, computer software, etc.), as being either
non-rivalrous, non-excludable, or both.
The taxonomy approach, however, is far from satisfying in
identifying government functions in cultural production. The concept of a public good presumes a decentralized market as the de-

57 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-15 (1990) (critiquing the taxonomical approach for reducing the
problem of provision to a choice between Leviathan and privatization); Charlotte Hess & Elinor
Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 11I, 118-21 (2003) (arguing that scholars sometimes confuse the taxonomy
of the commodity with the problem of property rights).
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fault.58 In other words, the concepts of rivalry and excludability
are used to determine when a market is not an appropriate institutional mechanism for allocating commodities. However, it would
make just as much sense to start out with the government, the family, or some other non-market institution as the default provider of
products and services, and ask when the market is an appropriate
institution by which to allocate goods. One reason why the problem is not posed this way in economic textbooks is because of the
sophisticated models and theories that have been developed by
economists over the past one hundred years to analyze market systems and price mechanisms. 59 Prices are easy to quantify and represent in mathematical terms. 60 The types of command and hierarchical arrangements that describe the functioning of governments
are more difficult to quantify, although recent developments in
game theory and information economics permit a more sophisticated treatment of government agencies as a means of allocating
goods.6 ' While the taxonomic approach to identifying government
functions appears useful, the bias towards decentralized allocations
calls into question its value, especially for those who may believe
that governments in fact do more, and in theory should do more,
than correct markets.
Furthermore, the taxonomy is misleading in its ability to
cleanly sort out the functions of government from those of other
institutions. In illustrating rivalry and excludability, I deliberately
chose examples from property law. My point is to show that rivalry and excludability rest upon assumptions of legal rights and
obligations. Since the structure of legal rights and obligations determine rivalry and excludability, and legal rights and obligations
rest upon government, it is circular to view the concepts of rivalry
and excludability as primitives that determine when a particular
commodity falls within the domain of the government.6 2 One way
to resolve this circularity is to define rivalry and excludability in
purely technological terms. For instance, in the example of the
lake, the lake could be made rival by placing buoys on it in strate11See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975, 988 (2002) (discussing presumptive efficiency of markets in market failure analysis).
59 See DONALD E. CAMPBELL, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 39-64 (1987) (pro-

viding an overview of the area of economics known as general equilibrium theory).
6 See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 3-8 (1995) (examining the importance of objectification for the efficacy

and validity of policy making).
61 KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 49, at 3-4; see OSTROM, supra note

57, at 7-8 (discussing information economics).
62See OSTROM, supra note 57, at 50-55 (describing the problem of public goods as one of
defining appropriate rules and rights in a specific institutional setting).
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gic locations, making it difficult to swim. Furthermore, a fugitive
resource could be made excludable if one property owner injected
a secret chemical into the water or the oil, making the resource
worthless to anyone who could not identify the chemical and remove it. But these technological means of defining rivalry and
excludability do not resolve the logical problem. The ownership
of these technological means would still be a legal issue of rights
and obligations, based perhaps on trade secret or patent law.
The circularity problem in defining a public good strongly
echoes the realist critique of the private/public distinction and the
critical legal studies critique of neutrality.63 My purpose in raising
these issues is not, however, to trash the literature on public goods
theory, particularly as it has been applied to copyright and other
areas of intellectual property. Rather, my goal is to distill the economic understanding of government function into the primitive
questions of rights and obligations that are an important part of the
institutional approach to law and economics. The institutional approach is not concerned with the question of creating a taxonomy
that maps onto a set of existing institutions. The aim of the institutional approach is to understand the function of institutions in implementing rights and obligations instrumentally to reach certain
goals. 64 Instead of asking when governments should intervene into
the market to promote efficiency, the institutional analysis would
focus on the structure of rights and obligations in various institutional settings, which would include not only market institutions,
but also state agencies, as well as non-governmental institutions
such as families, churches, and voluntary associations.
In the area of copyright, the work of Elinor Ostrom on "the
commons" provides a good example of the institutional economics
approach I am endorsing here. 65 The institutional approach teaches
us to focus on how to structure rights and obligations over various
types of resources that can be allocated through institutional arrangements broadly labeled "the commons." 66 The example of a
song illustrates the contrasting approaches. According to the economics textbook, a song is non-rival and non-excludable, and
hence a public good. Since a song is a public good, it must be
provided with government support, perhaps through copyright law
63 See FRIED, supra note 12, at 23 (discussing Kantian and Lockean views of property
rights); Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction: Approaches to the Critique of Legal
Ideology, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 801,801-02 (1988); supra text accompanying note 28.
64See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 49, at 20-21 (critiquing the single institution focus of law and economics scholars such as Judge Richard Posner).
65 OSTROM, supra note 57, at 29-57.
66 Id. at 1-28.
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or perhaps through a subsidy to the songwriter. My critique of this
analysis recognizes that a song could be made rival and excludable
if one person was given the exclusive right to sing or listen to the
song. In other words, claims of rivalry and excludability rest on
the background legal rights and obligations. Under an institutional
approach, we would ask a different question that focuses on these
rights and obligations: What are the implications for various rights
and obligations over a song that are embodied in institutional arrangements, such as a market or a government agency? Once
these implications are analyzed, they need to be assessed in terms
of whatever policy, social, or legal goals the decision maker needs
to consider.
What are the various goals of copyright? Inge Kaul, in her
critique of public goods theory, offers three values that undergird
most public goods arguments, such as the ones that have been traditionally made for copyright.6 7 According to Kaul, arguments
based on public goods theory rest on three public concerns: (1)
publicness in distribution of benefits, (2) publicness in consumption, and (3) publicness in decision making.68 In applying these
concerns to copyright, I make some slight modifications. First,
what Dr. Kaul labels publicness in distribution of benefits also entails a question of distribution of costs, particularly the large fixed
costs associated with large-scale creation. I analyze these public
concerns in Part I.A.l.a under the label of the fixed cost problem.
Second, her category of publicness in consumption is what I refer
to as the issue of sharing, and is discussed in Part I.A. 1.b. Finally,
the question of publicness in decision making entails the issues of
democratic values, the subject of Part I.B.
a. Public Goods Theory and the Fixed Cost Problem
In explaining why the government plays a role in cultural production, many scholars point to the ease with which many cultural
products can be duplicated once produced. The cost structure of
public goods is canonically described in two parts. 69 The first is
67 Inge Kaul, Public Goods: Taking the Concept into the Twenty-First Century, in THE
MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN? GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER

255, 258-65 (Daniel Drache ed., 2001).
68 Id. at 265.

69See Basil L. Copeland, Jr. & Alan Severn, Price Theory and Telecommunications Regulation: A Dissenting View, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 71 n.78 (1985) (discussing public goods in
terms of "non-rival consumption and high exclusion costs"); Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into
Green: Some Comments on Napster, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 567-69 (2001);
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An HistoricalPerspective,38 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 23-24 (1992) (discussing fixed costs and public goods rationales for copyfight in the writings of Adam Smith).
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the high fixed costs of production that result in declining average
costs of production. The second is the low marginal cost of distribution. Put in less technical terms, while a creator may incur huge
costs in creating a work of art, anyone, absent legal or technological protections, can listen to a song, memorize the notes, and write
them down to be played back later or distributed to others. Similarly, books can be read, plays can be watched, and paintings studied for reproduction at a later time. Because of the almost negligible marginal cost associated with distribution, the creator of cultural products, it is argued, needs to be protected from unauthorized appropriation. It is this argument that is often couched in the
language of public goods theory. Since a song can be reproduced
at a low marginal cost, consumption of the song is non-rival and
non-excludable, and therefore government intervention is needed
to protect the interest of the creator.
This argument, however, is not wholly a public goods argument. The argument is about declining average costs and low
marginal costs, and originated in the late nineteenth century in the
legal and economics literature as the "fixed cost controversy. 7 °
The issue arose in the context of the inefficacy of unbridled competition in industries, such as the railroad, which had high fixed
costs. In such industries, it was argued, the high level of fixed
costs, relative to production dependent costs, resulted in low marginal costs. Unbridled competition, with its tendency to reduce
price to marginal cost, would result in the price within high fixed
costs industries being brought down to zero, forcing most firms
into bankruptcy until one dominant firm emerged in a natural monopoly. Because of this problem, some form of government intervention was needed in high fixed cost industries, either through
relaxed antitrust standards or through direct regulation. The fixed
cost controversy became the basis for much government regulation, particularly rate regulation, in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
In the context of cultural products, the relevance of the fixed
cost controversy becomes apparent when scholars juxtapose the
existence of low marginal costs of distribution with the existence
of high fixed costs of production. Government intervention of
some form is needed because the low marginal cost of distribution
creates adverse incentives to produce the cultural product in the

70

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 308-22

(1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization,
68 TEx. L. REV. 105, 125-26 (1989).
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first place. 7 1 For example, the potential creator of a television
miniseries of Bleak House or White Teeth may not embark on the
endeavor if someone can copy the final product and distribute it
via videotape or the Internet. The fear of unrestricted copying, the
argument goes, reduces incentives to produce the miniseries. Unbridled competition through copying would result in destructive
competition and the failure of creators to produce works.
Recognizing certain types of public goods arguments as arguments based on fixed costs illustrates one primary function that
the government has in cultural production: cost allocation.72 Even
if cultural production is viewed purely as a private matter - the
result of individual, decentralized initiative - the government has a
role in underwriting the cultural activities financially. 73 The patronage of the Medici and other monarchs illustrates the role the
government plays in addressing the financial risks associated with
cultural production. The continuing funding of the arts through
grants and other financial support, even in democracies, demonstrates the importance of the government's role in allocating costs
for cultural production.7 4 Furthermore, once the financial role of
the government in cultural production is recognized, the devolution of this function through copyright law can be better appreciated. But before the process of devolution is explored, one other
important government function must be recognized, a function that
is very different from the financial role described here.
b. Public Goods Theory and Shared Consumption
While one strand of public goods arguments involves fixed
costs, another strand entails arguments about the value of sharing.
Sharing in the context of cultural production refers to the benefits
that arise from consuming or enjoying a particular commodity in a
group, rather than individually.7 5 The term sharing captures the
71 See TOWSE, supra note 42, at 10-15 (asserting that ease of distribution affects economic
incentives of production).
72 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Economics of Athenian Drama:Its Relevance for the Arts
in a Small City Today, 85 Q.J. ECON. 365, 365-76 (1971); William J. Baumol, Panel Discussion: Public Support for the Arts, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 214, 220-22 (1984) (describing
three social benefits government considers when determining the budget for the arts); Mervi
Taalas, Costs of Production, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 152-60 (Ruth Towse
ed., 2003) (discussing cost allocation among various cultural institutions).
73 See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573-77 (1998) (describing the history and role of the NEA).
74 See JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE

219-49 (2d ed. 2001); O'HAGAN, supra note 41, at 30-32 (discussing economic spillover of
government-funded arts).
75 See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF

AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48-64 (2000) (discussing sharing); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
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difference between a holiday dinner consumed in a group and a
meal consumed alone in one's private home. Many cultural products are valuable precisely because they are consumed by other
people. While I may enjoy reading Thomas Pynchon or Margaret
Atwood by myself, I benefit from knowing that others have also
read their works. These benefits include the ability to converse
about the works to gain deeper insights, and the possibility of
communicating new insights and understandings that I may have
missed in my private reading. Sharing does not mean that there is
a unity of interest or understanding; my reading of Gravity's Rainbow or The Blind Assassin may be radically different from yours.
It is the communal aspects of reading and consumption that create
important values for cultural products.
Textbook economics would characterize what I call the values
of sharing as either consumption externalities or network effects.
There are problems with each of these concepts. A consumption
externality arises when one individual's consumption choices affect another individual's well-being. 76 Cases from the law of nuisance provide examples of consumption externalities. According
to economic theory, the presence of consumption externalities requires market intervention through some form of regulation. The
key to resolving the problem of consumption externalities is permitting the correct pricing of these external effects so that they
become internalized into private decision making.77 The values of
sharing that I envision cannot be readily captured by pricing. For
example, a coffee klatch could be understood through the lens of
consumption externalities. There are external benefits from drinking coffee in a group and conversing. But it would undermine
many of the social functions of coffee klatches if the members had
to pay each other for every bon mot or insight that was shared.
The value of sharing that arises from cultural production stems
largely from providing an alternative to the arms' length relationships of contemporary markets. A framework, such as that provided by consumption externalities, which reduces social relations

and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 132-40 (2001) (discussing the economic
effects of sharing).
76 See, e.g., HEILBRUN & GRAY, supra note 74, at 223-38 (discussing benefits from culture as externalities); William J. Baumol & W.G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy
of Their Economic Problems, 55 Am. ECON. REV. 495, 495-502 (1965) (presenting a seminal
study in the economics of art and culture identifying external benefits arising from shared consumption).
71 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 47, at 69-72 (discussing public goods as externalities); Arrow, supra note 47, at 67-81 (discussing externalities with market and non-market
allocation).
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to pricing relations, is not helpful for identifying the government
role in cultural production.
The concept of network effects is closer to what I am describing, but is also inadequate. A network effect occurs when individual consumption is enhanced by others also consuming a particular
product. 78 The concept is closely connected to a consumption externality, but permits consideration of consumption that occurs in
groups. The problem with the concept of network effects is that
much of the economic literature focuses on the technological basis
for network effects. 79 The standard textbook example is that of the
telephone. A telephone has value only if it is used by a network of
individuals. As many have quipped, a single telephone is an
elaborate paperweight; two users of telephones provide the start
for a network. The concept of network effects is also applied to
computer operating systems and computer networks. Although
there is some mention of social networks, the economics literature
seems largely, if not exclusively, focused on technological networks. Economic scholars who have looked at network effects
socially have essentially resorted to the concept of consumption
externality .80
Attempts to understand the values of sharing through the concepts of externalities and network effects suffer from the same
problems as public goods justifications for government provision
of services. They assume a baseline of private, individual consumption mediated through a price system. The question, under
this approach, ultimately becomes one of how to create a market
for cultural products. But the more pertinent question of rights and
obligations attendant to the market is ignored or assumed away.
Sharing illustrates this problem. Coffee klatches, reading groups,
singing groups, open source software, scholarship networks,
listservs, online bulletin boards, and chat rooms are all ways in
which expressive activity is consumed and shared. These institutions exist outside the sphere of the market and the government.
Instead of reducing these institutions to market relationships, serious analysis requires understanding these institutions in relation78 See Jacco Hakfoort, Copyright in the Digital Age: The Economic Rationale Reexamined, in COPYRIGHT IN THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 63, 70-74 (Ruth Towse ed., 2002)

(discussing the benefits of network externalities on consumers).
79 See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 87-89 (1999); Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS
OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 1-6 (2001). For a discussion of technical standard networks in law,
see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479,488-94 (1998).
80 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 8-11 (2000).
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ship to market and government alternatives. 81 Recognizing the
value of sharing highlights the importance of private associations
in cultural production, and raises the question of the government
function in protecting rights and obligations that make these private associations possible.82
A simple answer to this question would be one of laissezfaire, fostering sharing through private associations. The First
Amendment right of association, for example, promotes the creation of private groups within which the values of sharing can be
realized.8 3 But the government has an important role to play in
facilitating a culture of sharing through the creation of cultural infrastructure. First, the government can establish cultural infrastructure through the creation of public spaces. 84 Public libraries
are one example of such infrastructure. Creating a forum in television media, such as local access stations, is another example. Second, the government can create cultural inputs that benefit private
associations. Examples of such inputs would include museums,
which provide not only a public space, but also archive and preserve cultural products that are accessible to individuals and
groups.85 Finally, the government can aid in establishing rules that
facilitate private associations.8 6 For example, the promotion of
bilingualism, or at least the toleration of bilingualism, can support
certain associations, such as communication among ethnic groups
81 See sources cited supra note 48.
82 The concept here is akin to Professor Stewart Macaulay's notion of private government,
organizations that are not affiliated with a formal state apparatus but "attempt to take over only
some of the functions of public government and mimic only part of the public legal system."
Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445, 447 (Leon

Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). For a discussion of intellectual property rights in institutional economics terms, which implicitly recognizes the role of private associations, see
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New InstitutionalEconomics, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1857 (2000).
13 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,650 (2000) (finding that the right to
association is "expressive activity" under First Amendment). For a critical perspective on rights
of association, see Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The
Intellectual Propertizationof Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143 (1996).
8 See THROSBY, supra note 14, at 71 (discussing the creation of public libraries); Robert
C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and
Public-Space Zoning, 105 Yale L.J. 1165, 1170 (1996) (discussing First Amendment rights in
public places); Robert Wedgeworth, Copyright and Libraries:Act 11, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 417, 420 (1993) (discussing copyright law and public libraries). The Supreme Court
described the government's role in financing libraries in its recent decision upholding Congress's power to require libraries to filter content on the Internet. United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (2003).
85 See HEILBRUN & GRAY, supra note 74, at 187-92 (discussing art museums); see also
MILLER & YUDICE, supra note 19, at 147-62 (discussing public museums); O'HAGAN, supra
note 41, at 164-66 (discussing the functions of museums); THROSBY, supra note 14, at 27 (discussing the cultural value of art).
86See PUTNAM, supra note 75, at 402-04 (prescribing the creation of social capital).
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in the workplace or other fora.87 The establishment of a poet laureate, albeit controversial, can also be instrumental in creating cultural products that can eventually be shared through intimate associations. 8
Needless to say, many of the government functions I have
listed have been provided by markets. Libraries and museums
have been privatized. 89 These trends, however, are illustrations of
the privatization of government functions. My point here is that
there is an economic argument in support of a government role in
the production of culture.
2. Summary of Economic Arguments
In this section, I have examined the economic arguments for
identifying government functions for cultural production that are
grounded in the theory of public goods and have found them lacking. In their place, I have proposed an institutional analysis of the
public goods problem that focuses on the question of rights and
obligations of parties engaged in cultural production. This inquiry
helped to identify two specific problems that are often subsumed
under the theory of public goods: the fixed cost problem and the
value of sharing. Focusing on these two problems aided in deriving through economic analysis two central government functions
in cultural production: financing of the production of cultural activities and the creation of cultural infrastructure. Economic
analysis is helpful in identifying these two efficiency-ended roles
of government. But the theory of democratic governance offers a
more comprehensive benchmark for gauging government functions
that includes not only these two governmental roles, but other important ones based on non-efficiency ends. 90 The theory of democratic governance, developed in the next subsection, provides a replacement for the theory of public goods criticized above.

87 See Jeffrey Church & Ian King, Bilingualism and Network Externalities, 26 CANADIAN
J. EcON. 337 (1993) (presenting model that demonstrates impact of bilingualism on
communication); Edward P. Lazear, Culture and Language, 107 J. POL. ECON. S95-S126, S124
(1999) (concluding that governmental programs can influence assimilation into communities);
Madeline Zavodny, The Effects of Official English Language Laws on Limited-EnglishProficient Workers, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 427 (2000).

88 For a discussion of poet laureates, see Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 73 (1996).
89 THROSBY, supra note 14, at 146; Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Philanthropy and Culture:
Patterns, Context, and Change, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANG-

ING AMERICA, supra note 19, at 461-80 (discussing private funding of cultural institutions).
90 See Paul Burrows, Justice, Efficiency, and Copyright in Cultural Goods, in CULTURAL

ECONOMICS AND CULTURAL POLICIES 99-108 (Alan Peacock & Ilde Rizzo eds., 1994) (arguing
that efficiency alone cannot foster creative talents).
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B. The Theory of DemocraticGovernance and Cultural Production
Despite the prevalence of public goods theory in discussions
of copyright and cultural production, the theory is inadequate first
because it fails to analyze the set of entitlements that underlie
markets and other institutions associated with copyright, and second, because it assumes a market institution as the benchmark for
gauging cultural production. In this section, I argue that government's role in cultural production can better be understood from
the benchmark of democratic governance, and specifically from
the twin goals of participation and autonomy. The theory of democratic governance, by defining the primary set of entitlements
and by proffering a broader baseline, addresses the two gaps in
public goods theory. Furthermore, the theory of democratic governance can incorporate markets and some of the insights that can
be gleaned from public goods theory regarding the problems of
fixed costs and shared consumption.
Grounding copyright in a theory of democratic governance
may seem inconsistent with copyright's history in censorship and
the crown's control over the press, a history I discuss in Part II.
Recognizing the intimate connections between the growth of copyright and the growth of democracy resolves this inconsistency.
While it is true that prior to the eighteenth century, copyright existed as a printer's right rather than an author's rights, after the
Statute of Anne, copyright was vested in the author and represented, in part, a triumph over the censorious power of the Stationer's Company, the printers' guild in England. This shift from
printer's right to author's right heralded, in part, a democratic shift
in culture and politics towards a regime of free expression. 91 The
debate over copyright in the early American republic, particularly
Madison's statements about the public good, reflected the debate
over the role of copyright in a democratic polity. Copyright debates in the nineteenth century were infused with questions of democratic values and representation, particularly as the freedoms of
press and speech were implicated. Copyright's development in the
twentieth century and current debates over copyright and developing countries are intimately connected to the establishment of accountable government institutions and reliable, independent media.
Copyright theory has intimate links with broader theories of democratic governance.
Y1 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 209-12 (2002) (discussing
the shift in culture and politics toward a regime of free expression); Neil Weinstock Netanel,

Asserting Copyright'sDemocraticPrinciples in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 23338 (1998) (analyzing Western-based copyright efforts on an international scale).
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Some evidence for a democratic governance theory of copyright can be found in discussions of copyright and the police
power. Although Madison was not speaking in terms of the police
power, his reference to the public good in his support of copyright
indicates the importance of copyright law in promoting the public
welfare.9 2 William Novak's study of the police power and the
people's welfare does not mention copyright, but his various descriptions of government's role in creating a well-regulated society
provide a basis to build a case in support of copyright's ability to
promote the public good. 93 For example, Novak cites a 1722 treatise on the police power by Nicolas Delamare that lists, among the
categories of police regulation and administration, the sciences and
the liberal arts, and manufactures and the mechanical arts. 94 According to Novak, Nathaniel Chipman, in his 1833 treatise on government, included the facilitation of the diffusion of useful knowledge as part of the salus populi.95 Furthermore, Novak points to
the importance of the creation of communication networks by the
government in the promotion of a well-regulated economy.96
These examples support the government's role in cultural production as part of its police power. To the extent copyright law regulates science, the liberal arts, and the establishment of communication networks such as newspapers, books, and libraries, the law
fulfills a public purpose.
But the case for the public purpose of copyright is not unequivocable. Ernest Freund's treatise on the police power in the
nineteenth century United States discusses copyright in the section
on monopoly and special privileges.97 This categorization suggests
that copyright does not fit neatly into the government's goal of
furthering public welfare. Freund divides government activities
into the three spheres: (1) safety, order and morals; (2) proper production, distribution and wealth; and (3) moral, intellectual and
political movements. 98 According to Freund, the first sphere is
conceded to the state, the second category is doubtful as an object
of the police power, and the third is exempted from the police
92See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Originsof the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 909, 923-26 (2002) (discussing Madison's
comments on copyright and patent in The Federalist Papers).
93 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 9-17 (1996).
94 Id. at 14.
95 Id. at 49.

96 See id. at 115-21 (arguing that government control over roads, parks, and rivers secured
a means of public communication).
97 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
686-88 (1904).
98 Id. at II.
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power. 99 To the extent that copyright is an economic activity fitting into the second sphere, or a type of intellectual movement fitting into the third, the case for copyright law as an exercise of the
police power is weakened. Freund's discussion of copyright as a
common law right also weakens the case, although he recognized
that both U.S. and British jurists had rejected the common law basis of copyright.1 °° The case, however, is strengthened when
Freund mentions at the end of his discussion of copyright that the
monopoly privilege of copyright (and patent) are granted with "a
duty to exercise the privilege for the public benefit."' O' Although
he refers to this duty as a creature of foreign systems of law, he
does mention one
example from the United States where this duty
10 2
was exercised.
The equivocal basis for copyright in the police power can be
explained by the lack of a strong theory of the government's role
in cultural production and the importance of this role to the formation of democratic institutions. 103 Where public goods theory fails
to aid us in understanding the legal entitlements underlying copyright, the theory of democratic governance grounds copyright and
99 Id.
,00
Id. at 686.
'01Id. at 687.
Io2Id.

at 688 (discussing New York's copyright statute that imposed price controls on

books).
103There are a few exceptions to this statement. Alexis de Tocqueville briefly commented
on the relationship between democracy and the fine arts, noting "[a]ristocracies produce a few
great pictures, democracies a multiple of little ones." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 468 (George Lawrence trans., 1969). According to Sheldon Wolin, Tocqueville
found in America "a democracy with strong traditions of learning and an unsatisfied appetite for

knowledge." SHELDON S. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A
POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL LIFE 358 (2001). For another exception, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 121-23 (1916). Dewey's focus, however, seems primarily to be on

education, one facet of what I am referring to here as cultural production. Henry Gans expresses skepticism about the ability of the arts to enhance democracy but sees a role for democracy to inform the arts. See Herbert J. Gans, Democracy and the Arts: Adversary or Ally?, in
THE ARTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 114-17 (Dennis Alan Mann ed., 1977).

For another

example of the ambiguous relationship between culture and democracy, see Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 314-35 (1999) (commenting on the
conflicting aristocratic tendencies and democratic possibilities of poetry). For an important
discussion of the relationships among democracy, technology, and the creation of "communicative and cultural systems," see RICHARD E. SCLOVE, DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY 15-16

(1995). For a general discussion of the interrelationship of democracy and the arts, see Dennis
Alan Mann, Introduction to THE ARTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, supra, at 13-15. The best

literary defense for the relationships among democracy, the arts, and culture is provided by Walt
Whitman. See DAVID S. REYNOLDS, WALT WHITMAN'S AMERICA: A CULTURAL BIOGRAPHY

474-84 (1995) (discussing Whitman's work on the poem "Democratic Vistas"). Public monuments, particularly those to controversial subjects, provide an excellent example of the relationship between the state and public art. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC
MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 35-38 (1998) ("[M]onuments or even street names and

the like ... are thought to play some role in inculcating particular understandings of society
within future generations.").
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cultural production in the twin values of autonomy'04 and participation.10 5 Autonomy, or respect for individual liberty, is often
recognized as the keystone of democracy, and its value in copyright and cultural production is manifested in the values of selfexpression and creativity.1°6 While often associated with artistic
expression or entertainment, self-expression and creativity are
equally critical to political expression and innovation. Political
treatises, news reporting, and fact gathering depend upon the ability of the creator of these types of information to be free to research and express opinions and ideas just as much as the creator
of a song, novel, or poem.107
Autonomy alone is meaningless unless expression has some
audience, and therefore must be understood in conjunction with
participation. At a minimum, the value of participation requires
that individuals be allowed to communicate their expression to
others.10 8 While there is arguably no obligation that a targeted audience listen or respond, the autonomy accorded to the creation of
expression, whether artistic or political, is meaningless unless the
expression can be shared with others.°9 Consequently, democratic
governance requires that institutions facilitate participation by not
"mSee ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 138-39 (1989) (discussing selfdetermination in collective decisions); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 53-54 (1998) (discussing self-determination in the decision-making process); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948) (discussing limits
on free men and free speech); ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION
CONTROL: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 107-08 (2001) (suggest-

ing that sovereignty and autonomy underlie justification for possession through laboring on an
object); Robert Bechtold Heilman, Democracy and the Arts, in ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY 97,
97-98 (Robert Bechtold Heilman ed., 1941) (discussing art as form of self-expression in a democracy); Arthur M. Melzer et al., Introduction to DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTS I, 2 (Arthur M.
Melzer et al. eds., 1999) (noting individual liberty is a traditional issue in politics and art); Steven Wall, Radical Democracy, PersonalFreedom, and the TransformativePotentialof Politics,
in DEMOCRACY 225, 248-53 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000) (discussing discursive autonomy in democratic politics).
05See BAKER, supra note 91, at 129-53 (describing different forms of participatory democracies); TERRI LYNN CORNWELL, DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTS: THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION 49-82 (1990) (asserting that artistic endeavors help individuals participate in the political
process); DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 104, at 228-29.
I(*See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 104, at 39; T. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expres-

sion, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 154-55 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (recognizing free speech as
a form of expression); Wall, supra note 104, at 229 (asserting that self-expression changes and
refines one's own interests).
07
' See BAKER, supra note 91, at 154-58 (arguing for the intrinsic benefit of knowledge);
PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 147-66 (2001) (discussing the utility of

disseminating subversive truths); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 104, at 15-16 (presenting the fundamentals of free speech).
10 8 See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 104, at 339 (arguing that facilitating participation through discussions is one good of suggested innovations); DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 104, at 37.
109See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 104, at 24-27 (arguing that effective self-government requires free speech).
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unduly excluding voices from different fora or by imposing disparate burdens based on perspective." 0 Needless to say, the values
of autonomy and participation may come into conflict. For example, in concentrated media markets, the right to participate may be
In
diluted by the rights of media owners to control their outlets.'
copyright law, the tension often appears as one between the rights
of copyright owners and the rights of copyright users, such as in
cases involving parodies, news reporting, or critical works." 2 In
each of these cases, the autonomy of the copyright owner is pitted
against the autonomy of the user and her right to participate in the
relevant community of expression.
Having identified the values of autonomy and participation,
the next question for the theory of democratic governance is how
to give effect to these values in the structuring of institutions.
Public goods theory, as pointed out above, assesses the validity of
institutions in terms of their ability to resolve market failures.
Democratic governance theory, in contrast, sees the market as only
one of a set of institutions through which the values of autonomy
and participation can be realized." 3 Markets certainly are not unimportant, but the efficacy of markets is to be measured with respect to other institutions, such as private associations and nonprofit entities. In the case of sharing, discussed above, I gave several examples of these non-market institutions: coffee klatches,
museums, libraries, and universities. The problem posed for democratic governance theory is to create the set of institutions that
are grounded in the values of autonomy and participation.
The government's role in creating the requisite institutions for
democratic governance is instrumental in defining government
functions. To the extent that markets are among these institutions,
the government functions of financing cultural production and facilitating sharing, both discussed above, are relevant here. Also
relevant, particularly for non-market institutions, are three other
government functions necessary for cultural production: (1) the
creation of public fora for participation, (2) the development of
cultural infrastructure to facilitate autonomy and participation, and
10 See CORNWELL, supra note 105, at 165-85 (recognizing the value of art in fostering
participatory democracy).
I See BAKER, supra note 91, at 155-56 (discussing the effect of monopolies on news reporting).
112See id. at 66-67.
3
1 See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRriCS, supra note 104, at 220-22; DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 104, at 167-69 (discussing democracy in a non-market economy);
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, How IT WORKS, AND WHAT To

MAKE OF IT 226-32 (2001) (discussing whether a market system is necessary for democracy).
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(3) the creation of open systems that permit transparency and access to cultural artifacts.
My arguments for the government's role in the creation of
public fora are different from my arguments about facilitating
sharing made above. In the previous context, my focus was on
recognizing the economic efficiency of certain transactions that
would be ignored by the market. The creation of public fora has
non-economic values as well, such as providing venues for participation and the exercise of creative pursuits. 1 14 I have several
things in mind here. First, at the level of local government, public
fora can be created by shared spaces, such as sidewalks and parks,
in which open speech with minimal regulation is permitted."15 At
the national level, the creation of public fora would be facilitated
through regulation of media such as newspapers, television, radio,
and, with the expansions of the Internet, telephony." 6 First
Amendment law also plays a key role in the creation of public fora
through protections for certain types of speech,'' 7 protections for
certain speakers," 8 and, most relevantly, protection for speech in
certain places.' 19
The government provision of cultural infrastructure occurs in
many ways, from income distribution programs that support the
arts to the creation of institutions for the collection of cultural artifacts. The Work Projects Administration ("WPA") provides a
unique example of the government's efforts to promote cultural
production in order to redistribute income. 120 Under the WPA, unemployed authors and mathematicians were hired to produce important cultural works, including tables of logarithms, tables of
"4See ANTHONY G. WILHELM, DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL LIFE IN CYBERSPACE 14-15 (2000) (advocating the need for a public sphere for democratic politics); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons,
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 488-94 (2003) (recognizing public parks and streets as a forum for expression and exchange of ideas); Carroll William Westfall, Architecture and Democracy, Democracy and Architecture, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTS, supra note 104, at 73, 85-86.
15 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 19-23 (2001); Hunter, supranote 114, at 488-90.
"6See BAKER, supra note 9 1, at 288-95 (discussing context regulation of media); LESSIG,
supra note 115, at 23-25 (describing these media as examples of commons).
117See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (providing an example of when
"conduct" constitutes "expression").
118See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (providing an example of the
protection of government employees' fight to speak).
19See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (providing an example of distinguishing private and public fora).
120For a discussion of the redistributive goals of cultural production, see HEILBRUN &
GRAY, supra note 74, at 240-41; THROSBY, supra note 14, at 54, 155. For a good discussion of
WPA artistic projects and their lack of copyright protection, see Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 513 n. 109 (1999).
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integrals, and what has been as described as exemplars of premier
regional writing - the WPA Guides to various states, documents
that recorded the history and culture of all the fifty states.' 21 While
these projects could be seen as "make work" efforts in order to
move the United States out of the Great Depression, the government's involvement in creating important cultural artifacts should
not be overlooked. The projects allowed unemployed authors to
create works that would otherwise not have existed.
The goal of providing cultural infrastructure is also facilitated
by government involvement in preserving minority cultures, such
as through statutes like the Native American Grave Repatriation22
Act and policies to repatriate or preserve cultural artifacts.
These preservationist goals are important to democratic culture in
many ways. They permit the preservation and archiving of a national history that establishes an identity for citizens and a common reference point for deliberation and discussion over national
issues. 12 3 For example, museum exhibits about the Japanese internment, or museums that record atrocities against Native Americans, serve as a reminder of the abuse of private and state power
that can temper arguments about how to deal with minority
124
populations in times of renewed racial and ethnic conflict.
Furthermore, democratic governments have an obligation to ensure
that minority populations are protected from the exercise of abuse
by majorities. 125 By supporting minority cultural production,
democratic governments promote inclusiveness and allow for
many interests to be voiced in the marketplace and other public
fora.The point should be made that much of what I describe can
take place, and in fact has taken place, through private associations. For example, the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.,
and the Civil Rights Museums in Memphis and Birmingham were
built with a mix of government and private funds. 126 These three
121 See, e.g., THE WPA GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY (Fed. Writer's Project of the Works
Progress Admin. in N.Y. City ed., 1992); THE WPA GUIDE TO 1930S OKLAHOMA (Fed. Writer's
Project22of the Works Progress Admin. in the State of Okla. ed., 1986).
1

23

1

JOSEPH SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 182-84 (1999).
1d. at 197 (drawing attention to the ownership problems associated with artifacts and

antiquities). For a critical perspective on this point, see Robert Brustein, Democracy and Culture, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTS, supra note 104, at 1I, 19-21 (arguing that the emphasis on
culture ignores or supplants movements for political voice and representation).
24
1 THROSBY, supra note 14, at 65, 125; see also O'HAGAN, supra note 41, at 53.
- See, e.g., A. B. Yehoshua, Modem Democracy and the Novel, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
ARTS, supra note 104, at 42, 53-54 (arguing for the need for minority artists to challenge and
expand26the literary canon); SAX, supra note 122, at 182-84 (discussing cultural heritage law).
1 See Mission Statement, United States Memorial Holocaust Museum, at
http://www.ushmm.org/museumcouncil (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (describing the history of
museum);
History
of the
Museum,
National
Civil
Rights
Museum,
at
http://www.civilrightsmuseum.org/about/history.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (describing the
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examples further support the argument that the government has
played an important role in cultural production, developing a cultural infrastructure which protects the participation and autonomy
values of members of minority cultures.
Finally, according to the theory of democratic governance,
government can pursue the values of participation and autonomy
by carrying out its function of creating open systems that facilitate
transparency and access. 127 This function entails more than creating public fora. Understanding this function requires understanding the term cultural artifact broadly. My examples of cultural
artifacts have included items in museums, literary works, music,
and other creations of the human mind, such as the WPA regional
guides. Other examples of cultural artifacts would include legal
rules (whether judicial opinions or code), the products of university research (whether in the humanities or in the sciences), textbooks, population data, and other types of information. To include
the creation of these items as cultural production serves two purposes. First, some of these items are primary cultural materials
that are necessary for the operation of the other two government
functions. 128 For example, the Native American Grave Repatriation Act carries out the government function of creating cultural
infrastructure. If the underlying law is inaccessible to the groups
and interests that it is trying to protect, then the goal of creating
cultural infrastructure is undermined. Second, these items of cultural production are themselves important cultural records that can
inform the creation of cultural artifacts. 129 Records of population
movements and historical records of seemingly banal items like
shipping manifests can serve as the basis for creation of cultural
products, as any student or practitioner of history or historical fiction would attest. Open systems of recording and preserving information are important ends for the government under the theory
of democratic governance.130
history and funding for the museum).
127See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 91, at 201-02 (discussing access rights); DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 104, at 38 (discussing agenda control); KITCHER, supra note 107, at 11819 (discussing agenda setting in the context of the search for truth).
128
See, e.g., Christopher W. Morris, The Very Idea of PopularSovereignty: "We The People" Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY, supra note 104, at I, 3 (describing law as "actiop guiding").
129See, e.g., SAX, supra note 122, at 173 (describing cultural artifacts as intermediate
works used as inputs to create final works).
130See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE

HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 38-45 (discussing and critiquing the development of the
cadastral system for mapping and land recording). Professor Scott has a very pessimistic take
on government's involvement in creating systems of recording, characterizing them as means of
social control. For a more optimistic perspective, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF
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In conclusion, the theory of democratic governance provides
an alternative to the theory of public goods by incorporating some
of the ideas from public goods theory and filling in its gaps. The
theory identifies two principal legal entitlements - autonomy in
expression and creativity, and participation - and derives several
government functions necessary for creating institutions that protect these two entitlements. Since these institutions include markets, the functions of financing cultural production and creating
cultural infrastructure to promote sharing are implicit in the theory
of democratic governance. In addition to these two functions, the
theory aids in identifying three other functions: (1) the creation of
public fora, (2) the creation of cultural infrastructure to promote
autonomy and participation by minority cultures, and (3) the creation of open systems. Having identified the functions of government for cultural production, I now turn to explaining how copyright can be understood as a privatization of these functions.
C. Copyrightand the Mechanisms of Privatization
My working definition of privatization is the delegation of
governmental decision making to a non-governmental entity. I
have shown, based upon my criticism of the economic theory of
public goods and the development of a theory of democratic governance, that there are five roles that government decision making
plays in cultural production: (1) the financing of cultural production, (2) the creation of cultural infrastructure for sharing, (3) the
creation of public fora, (4) the creation of cultural infrastructure
that protects minority cultures, and (5) the creation of open systems. In this subsection, I show how the government delegates the
execution of these functions to non-governmental entities through
the creation of copyright.
1. Privatizationof CulturalProduction Through Copyright
Privatization typically occurs in one of two ways. The first is
by contracting out with a private party for the provision of a historically governmental service.13' The second means of privatization is private financing of government activities through charitable donations and funding by private associations such as churches
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHED IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE

46-47

(2000) (explaining the importance of recording and other systems of preserving title for the
development of markets). For a philosophical treatment of these issues, see JOHN R. SEARLE,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 1-30 (1995) (discussing symbolic and referential
systems as the building blocks of social reality and the starting point for the creation of institutional facts).
13'See Moore, supra note 43, at 1213-14.
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or non-profit entities. The second means is considered more radical than the first because the government in many instances cedes
control over a program to a private association, and the government loses the power to regulate an activity through the power of
the purse. 132 Under contracting, the government can in most instances retain control of the activity through the terms of the contract. 133 As a matter of fact, however, most government contracts
cede much control to private entities, such as with the private
management of prisons, and thus privatization through contract
may be just as troubling as privatization through voluntary donations. 34
In the area of cultural production, the government has devolved its role both through contract and through reliance on voluntary donations. In some countries, museum management is privately governed. 135 Funding for the arts has shifted from government grants and subsidies to the donations and activities of private
benefactors. 136 Greater reliance is placed on private associations to
generate interest in cultural activities and to generate nongovernment financing. 137 Within this broad scheme of devolution
can be found copyright, which combines elements of contracting
out and voluntary financing. By creating a private right in the output of cultural production, copyright allows the government to devolve both the production and financing of cultural activities to
private parties through private negotiations.
Copyright law can be recognized as a form of private financing of cultural production. Although privatization through financing has often entailed reliance on private voluntary donations as a
substitute for taxation, it should not be ignored that one of the
chief goals of the creation of a property right through copyright is
allowing the copyright owner to market her work and extract the
available rents from exclusivity. The size of these rents will vary
32
' See id. at 1215-16 (explaining the difference between privatizing production and privatizing financing).

1331d. at 1214.
14See MINOW, supra note 20, at 137 (explaining the constitutional limits of privatizing

roles via contract).
government
35

1 See HEILBRUN & GRAY, supra note 74, at 200-02 (explaining the difficulties faced by
museums in selling off certain art in order to afford new acquisitions); THROSBY, supra note 14,
at 146 (describing the privatization of the arts in European and formerly communist countries).
136Peter S. Johnson, Museums, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS, supra note
42, at 315, 318-19.
37
1 See MILLER & YUDICE, supra note 19, at 68-69; THROSBY, supra note 14, at 145-46;
Volker Kirchberg, Corporate Arts Sponsorship, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS,
supra note 42, at 143, 143-45; Michihiro Watanabe, Background and Cultural Policies and
Programs in Japan, in COMPARING CULTURAL POLICY: A STUDY OF JAPAN AND THE U.S.,

supra note 42, at 61, 88-90.
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depending upon the market for the work, but exclusivity permits
the distribution of the work through the marketplace and the accumulation of rents that can finance investments in cultural activities. Although rents are retained by the copyright owner, rather
than donated to a public cause, the rents earned by the copyright
owner functionally serve as a substitute for government grants and
other subsidies financed by tax revenues. In this regard, one needs
to remember Prime Minister McCauley's famous description of
copyright law as a tax on readers to benefit authors. 38 To the extent that the copyright tax finances the ability of authors to produce cultural artifacts, copyright law substitutes for a governmental function.
Copyright law, however, does not fit as neatly into the model
of privatization by contracting. First of all, by the grant of a copyright, the government is not contracting for the production of a
service or product. Expression that is copyrightable may already
be produced, or would have been produced, absent any prodding
from the government. In a loose sense, however, copyright law
does create a quid pro quo that can be analogized to a contract.
The exclusivity given by copyright is exchanged for the publication of the work and eventual dedication to the public domain after
the term expires. 39 But this quid pro quo is different from the
government contracting with a private entity to manage prisons or
provide welfare services. The crucial distinction is the underlying
rights of the author implicated by copyright. The copyright
owner's rights are vested in a way that the rights of private parties
to government contracts are not. In the prison management context, the government is granting a contract right; in the copyright
context, the government is granting a property right. The key difference between the two rights has to do with the scope of the
grant from the government. In the prison case, the contract right
creates claims only against the government. In the case of copyright, the property right creates claims against the whole world.
This claim allows the copyright owner to more efficiently exercise
his market exclusivity to generate rents to finance cultural production.
138THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULEY, SPEECHES ON POLITICS AND LITERATURE 176-89

(1841). 3 9

1 See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal"for Copyright in the Information Age,

100 MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1496 n.34 (2002); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copy-

right's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D. 37, 40-41 (2002) (explaining the quid pro quo of copyrights and their tradition). For a good example of this quid pro quo, consider a bill recently
introduced by Representative Martin Olav Sabo (D-Minn.) requiring certain works resulting
from scientific research to be excluded from copyright if the research was substantially funded
by the federal government. See Public Access to Science Act, H.R. 2613, 108th Cong. (2003).
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1 40
The distinction between contract rights and property rights
does make a difference for assessing the benefits and costs of privatization.14 ' By granting contract rights to a private party, the
government retains some control over the activity, at least in theory, through specifying the terms of the contract and forcing renegotiation. To the extent that privatization can be quantified, the
granting of property rights to private parties entails a greater devolution of government power than the granting of contract rights.
More importantly, a comparison of property and contract as tools
of privatization should consider the government function being
devolved into private hands. In the case of prisons, the government is devolving in part its function to punish violators of the law
to a private party. The general enforcement of criminal laws
through the court system is still under the government's control.
The difficulty with privatizing prisons is that the government also
has a role in protecting the rights of prisoners and ensuring that the
terms of their incarceration are not cruel and unusual. The fear is
that this government function is being ignored and devalued
through the privatization of prisons unless the government monitors the administrator of prisons through contract. In the case of
cultural production, the government's function is to allocate fixed
costs appropriately, build cultural infrastructure, and pursue redistributive goals. The devolution of these functions through property results in the government losing control over the financing of
cultural products, the creation of cultural infrastructure, and the
protection of minority cultures.
The differences between privatization through contract and
privatization through the grant of a property right illustrate what is
at stake in the privatization debate more broadly. Privatization
changes the institutional structure through which decisions are
made, and influences the values that are represented and rewarded.
If the government produced cultural works directly, or funded their
production through general tax revenue, then the types of cultural
works that are produced becomes a function of a polity's form of
government.142 Totalitarian governments produce one type of culture; democratic governments yet another. To the extent that a
government aggregates or shapes the preferences of its citizens,
government involvement in cultural production represents the

14See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789-97 (2001) (providing a functional basis for distinguishing between
property and contract based on information costs).
141See Moore, supra note 43, at 1225-28 (assessing various means of privatization).
142Cf. THROSBY, supra note 14, at 132-33 (arguing that cultural objects and value should
be weighed in trade negotiations).
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preferences of its citizens broadly. Privatization makes cultural
production an individual decision. 4 3 Copyright law per se does
not discriminate among expressions based upon viewpoints. Artistic works with Christian themes have as much protection as artistic
works with Buddhist themes. But copyright law does relegate the
production and distribution of works to the marketplace and reduces the process of cultural production to a matter of private,
market choices. The point is to recognize how privatizing cultural
production through the creation of a property rights shapes the
manner in which decisions about cultural production occur.
2. Responses to PotentialCriticisms
There are two potential criticisms of my argument that copyright can be viewed as an example of privatization. First, theorists
of privatization have not spoken about copyright. Their focus has
been on areas that have traditionally been seen as governmental,
such as law enforcement, education, and income redistribution policy. Copyright, as I have argued, has been viewed as a private
right, and cultural production is often seen as a private activity the product of individual creativity or of private associations. Of
course, this assumption assumes away the role of the government
in cultural production, particularly the functions of financing the
arts, creating cultural infrastructure, creating public fora, protecting minority voice, and creating open systems. The absence of
copyright from the privatization discussion does not reflect the
irrelevance of my thesis, but more likely reflects assumptions
about copyright as a private right and cultural production as a
purely private activity.
Professor C. Edwin Baker's scholarship has partly filled the
void.' 44 His writings on the media, copyright, and democracy present a useful discussion of copyright's importance in preserving
democracy in increasingly concentrated media markets. His work
also demonstrates how copyright has led to market concentration. 145 While Professor Baker engages public goods theory, what
the privatization thesis adds is a conceptualization of how copyright fits into the government's role in cultural production, whether
through newspapers, television, book publishing, music, or the fine
143See Minow, supra note 27, at 1246-48 (raising concerns that privatizing social services
may dilute public values and bypass constitutional protections); Moore, supra note 43, at 1216
(explaining that privatization is the individualization of value judgments); see also Michael J.
Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422,
1424-30 (2003) (concerning the pursuit of profits).
144See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 91.
45

1 1d. at 15-19.
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arts. 146 In other words, the story of copyright and democracy is not
solely about the media. 147 It is about the relationships among government, democracy, and cultural creation.
The privatization thesis is also controversial because copyright scholars have always talked about public values in copyright
without mention of privatization. 148 In other words, since public
values in copyright have been defended without the privatization
thesis, the question is what value does the privatization thesis add?
The privatization thesis, I contend, offers a degree of coherence
that may be missing from other public interest theories of copyright. The thesis recognizes the intimate relationship between the
government and individuals that can be traced back to the crown's
relationship with the printers' and booksellers' guilds, and continues on with the instrumental view of copyright in the early American republic, and today in international copyright. By recognizing
the intimate relationship between public and private, the thesis
would protect public values not by simply turning off private
rights, but by regulating and restricting private control over copyrighted materials. In short, under the thesis I have developed,
copyright's status as an individual right is replaced with copyright's role as an instrument to facilitate the creation and dissemination of private creative output to the public.
The thesis also supports an economic and utilitarian theory of
copyright. Much of the scholarly discussion of copyright has centered on defending either a Lockean theory or a personality theory
of copyright. 149 Both theories assume that copyright is a private
right. Neither theory, however, provides much basis for protecting
public values or answering questions such as how long copyright
duration should be, and what are the appropriate parameters of fair
use. Appeal has been made to John Locke's admonition that property can be made private only to the extent that the commons is left
"enough and as good" as before the appropriation.' 50 Such lan146Id.
at 189-90.
47

' See RONALD V. BETrIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 33-78 (1996) (discussing the control of culture and information through

media).
148See, e.g., James Boyle, The Opposite of Property, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-3
(2003) (arguing that the public domain is often neglected in intellectual property scholarship);
Boyle,49supra note 6, at 34 (tracing the history of English privatization of common land).
1 See Wendy J. Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556-57 (1993) (describing
Lockean theory); Justin Hughes, The Philosophyof Intellectual Property,77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296,
230 (1988) (characterizing both Lockean and personality theory).
'50JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN

LOCKE 261, 274 (David Wootton ed., 1993). For an application to copyright, see also Alan L.
Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy,44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569,570
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guage strongly implies that there are limits to private appropriation, but the language is too general to aid in defining what those
limits are. Similarly, personality theories lack precision in confining the scope of private rights under copyright. While personality
theories would support some limit on the commodification of creations through copyright law, it is not clear what those limits would
be. Seemingly, a personality theory would support a strong moral
rights view of copyright at the expense of values of public access.1 51 The privatization thesis aids in identifying the specific
functions copyright achieves and frames copyright within an economic, utilitarian framework that accommodates the market, the
government, private rights, and public values.
The sharpest criticism of economic, utilitarian approaches is
one of naivet6. Economic theories, it is argued, justify the status
quo with a bias towards laissez-faire. Utilitarian theories, it is
said, permit the abrogation of private rights in the pursuit of public
welfare through what could be described as totalitarianism. But
the privatization thesis (and the privatization debate more broadly)
illustrates the complexity of economic and utilitarian arguments.
Theorists of privatization acknowledge an intimate relationship
between the public and the private. As Professor Minow states,
privatization makes the state and the market partners.152 That partnership may be pernicious, or that partnership may be beneficial.
The challenge for legal theorists and policy makers is to structure
the terms of that partnership. This challenge is a matter of balance, a matter of recognizing the need for government and for
markets, and cautions against laissez-faire or totalitarian positions.
The privatization thesis, to return to Madison, emphasizes the coincidence between the public good and private claims.
D. Summary
This section has developed an understanding of copyright
based on the theory of privatization. I am not suggesting that the
privatization thesis is the sole explanation for copyright. I am not
even suggesting that it is necessarily the best. But it is a thesis that
recognizes the dual public and private dimensions of copyright,
and it respects copyright's complex history and acknowledges
(2002); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 413 (2002)
(discussing term extensions to the copyright laws).
I-"See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests
of ConstructedPersonas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprintfor the Twenty-First Century, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 152-54 (applying a moral rights perspective to the copyright protection of a
constructed persona).
152See MINOW, supra note 20, at 3 (describing the partnership created by privatization).
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copyright's current crisis. The strength of this thesis rests on how
well it aids in introducing public values into the copyright debate
and how well it serves in understanding copyright law. I turn to
specific applications from copyright history and copyright doctrine
in the next two sections.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND COPYRIGHT HISTORY
I have made the case for conceptualizing copyright as a form
of privatization in theoretical terms. But, does the theory fit the
historical facts? One potential objection to my theory is that copyright law protects a private right in activity that would occur absent the government. For Blackstone, the identity of a literary
composition, and the attendant rights to prevent others from conveying or transferring the work, rested entirely in the sentiment
and the language in the work. 153 Adam Smith referred to copyright
as a "real right" that can be injured through unauthorized copying
and distribution. 154 Conceptually, the argument would go, since
creation is a private activity, copyright protects private rights that
exist prior to the state.
This characterization of copyright, however, ignores the government's role in cultural production, and fails to recognize how
copyright historically has been used to further governmental interests. Blackstone speaks of copyright not only as an individual
155
right, but also as one arising from the sovereign's prerogative.
Smith, while recognizing the injuries that can emerge from unauthorized copying, clearly stated that copyright was not a natural
right and was necessary as a monopoly privilege to reward creative
production.156 The historical evidence I present here illustrates
that copyright has never been a purely private right. Copyright
debates, from the inception of copyright in early English history to
the political and legal battles over international copyright in the
United States, have always pitted private rights and interests
against public values. Therefore, the record does not support
copyright's status as a purely private right secured by the government.
1532 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*406.

(R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1978)
(1762).
55
1 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at *410 (explaining the king's copyright prerogative). 56
I See SMITH, supra note 154, at 82-83. Smith also conceived of copyright in narrow
terms as the right to first publish, a notion often attributed to Justice Stephen Breyer. See
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 33, at 298-300 (proposing lead
time advantage as adequate incentive for the creation of new works).
154ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE II
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A. Copyright, the CensorialPower of the Crown, and the
Creationof a Literary Marketplace
Copyright's origins in British history are well-recorded and
analyzed. 57 The organization of publishing in the fifteenth century rested on a grant of a printing privilege by the crown, a privilege that had its origins in Venice. 58 Owners of printing presses
were given exclusive rights to publish certain materials deemed as
having their source in the sovereign. 159 Individual authors would
also have their works published through private negotiation with a
publisher. In England, the publishers and booksellers were organized in a guild called the Stationer's Company, which was established in 1557 by royal prerogative. 160 Members of the Stationer's
Company would negotiate with individual authors for the right to
print the author's "copy," or manuscript.' 6 1 The term copyright
was first used by the guild to indicate which publisher had the exclusive right to publish an individual author's work. 16' Thus,
copyright had its origins as a right of the publisher rather than a
right of the author, and represented a private agreement among
members of the guild. 6 3 Beginning with the Star Chamber Decree

of 1586, continuing with the Parliamentary Edicts of 1643, 1647,
and 1649, and culminating with the Press Acts of 1662,64 the institutions of the printing privilege and the guild were together used to
control the publishing of blasphemous and scandalous works, administered through the Star Chamber. 165 The censorial use of the
publishing system triggered a reaction from many authors of the
157
See, e.g., J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 515-17 (1990);
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-38 (1967); see also LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-179 (1968) (providing a thorough
history of English copyright); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 19-31 (1991); HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST
COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710,
at 17-94 (1956); ROSE, supra note 18, at 9-30 (giving a general history of copyrights); BRAD
SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE
BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 9-60 (1999).
58
1 PATrERSON, supra note 157, at 80-90; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 157, at 2327; ROSE, supranote 18, at 20-21; SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 157, at 120-21.
59BAKER, supra note 157, at 515; PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 79 (describing the
source of English printing patents); ROSE, supra note 18, at 11.
160BAKER, supra note 157, at 515; KAPLAN, supra note 157, at 3-6; ROSE, supra note 18,
at 35-36.
61
1 ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING

311 (1998).
162KAPLAN, supra note 157, at 4-5; ROSE, supra note 18, at 58.
63

1 PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 47-49; ROSE, supra note 18, at 14-15; SHERMAN &
BENTLY, supra note 157, at 170.
164
JOHNS, supra note 161, at 232-33.
165See PATrERSON, supra note 157, at 119-26 (explaining the Star Chamber Decree);
ROSE, supranote 18, at 22.
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time, particularly after the passage of the Licensing Act of 1662
that required a license to publish any work. 66 John Milton's Areopagetica was a manifesto for author's rights, which were recognized under the Statute of Anne in 1709.167 The Statute of Anne
marked a victory for authors against publishers and censorship by
the state. 168 Although the battle between authors and publishers
continues, even into the present, the censorial model of publishing
was exorcised by the statute.
The early history of copyright demonstrates that cultural production and its regulation was not purely a matter of private rights.
The sovereign and private entities were intimately aligned in the
establishment and protection of rights in the business of publishing. The early history also demonstrates the sovereign's key role
in cultural production. For example, in the 1667 case of Stationer's Company v. Seymour, the court examined the question of
whether the king had the power to grant a printing patent to Gadbury's Almanac, a popular publication containing information on
weather, holidays, and religious celebrations, originally published
by Seymour, a printer who was not a member of the guild. 69 The
court ruled that the king had this power because an almanac had no
specific author, and therefore the king "held the property in the
copy and might grant it to anyone."'' 70 Sovereign prerogative to
grant printing rights were found in two other seventeenth century
cases involving the publication of law books and legal reporters. 171
While, in the case involving law books, the court did find an author's right in the books, the prerogative triumphed and the patent
was found valid. In the case of the legal reporters, the court found
for the sovereign's prerogative because the king "paid the judges'
' 72
salaries and . . . had a special interest in the reporting of law,"'
reasoning echoed in United States cases addressing the question of
copyright in judicial opinions. These cases are often noted for the
166PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 134-38 (describing the Licensing Act of 1637).

167 See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (John W. Hales ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1961)
(1644).
wrFor a description of the Statue of Anne as protecting free speech values and correcting
prior regimes of censorship, see L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay
Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article L Sec-

tion 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 942-43 (2003). For a general
discussion of the censorial power of the crown, see RICHARD D. ALTICK, THE ENGLISH COMMON READER 53-54 (1957); JOHN BREWER, THE PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION: ENGLISH
CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 133-34 (1997); PA'TERSON, supra note 157, at 12;
ROSE, supra note 18, at 47; SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 157, at 36.
169ROSE, supra note 18, at 23.
70
1 Id.

171Id. at 23-25.
172Id. at 25 n.7.
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discussion of an emerging notion of authors' rights, and we do
note a narrowing of the sovereign's prerogative in the development
of these cases. 173 For the purposes of this Article, they demonstrate the sovereign's role in cultural production and the gradual
transfer of culture production from the sovereign to authors.
The most impressive example of the sovereign's role in cultural production is provided by the project of writing the King
James Bible. This project was motivated by the need to publish a
version of the Bible that could be made accessible to the contemporary population. 174 The project also served as a means of healing the wounds among Protestants and Catholics under the reign of
King James 1. 175 The Bible project has hints of the government
functions I have asserted. The translation project was a group effort consisting of a committee of translators overseen by a commit76
tee of bishops who worked under strict rules and regulations.
Because of the drain on the crown's coffers during the reign of
Queen Elizabeth, the translation was largely privately financed
through parishes and through licenses for preaching. 177 There was
no author associated with this project. The translation has been
described as a product of "the mind of England," and as a form of
cultural infrastructure, akin to a cathedral. 78 While this description underscores the project's role in creating a national culture, it
also demonstrates the joint effort behind its drafting. Like the almanac or the court reporters, there were no authors. The King
James Bible was a cultural product that had its origins in the sovereign, and illustrates that the sovereign's role in this period was
greater than that of censor. 179
173Id. at

24-25.
See NICOLSON, supra note 28, at 236-37.
75Id. at 120-30.
76
1 Id. at 70-72.
177Id. at 67, 96-97.
178
Id. at 70.
179Discussion from oral argument in Wheaton v. Peters illustrates the role of the sovereign's prerogative in cultural creation of law and religion:
The cases that have been decided in England have, as it should seem, turned
on a question of prerogative, and not of copyright.
Such was the point in the Company of Stationers v. Seymour, I Mod. 256.
"Matters of state, and things that concern the government, were never left to any
man's liberty to print that would. And particularly, the sole printing of law books,
has been formerly granted in other reigns."
The case in I Vern. 120 (Anonymous), was a motion by the king's patentees
for an injunction to stop the sale of English bibles, printed beyond sea. The lord
keeper then referred to the circumstance, that a patent to print law books had been
adjudged good in the house of lords.
In the case of Company of Stationers and Parker, Skinner 233, Holt arg.:
"agreed that the king had power to grant the printing of books concerning religion or
law, and admits it to be an interest, but not a sole interest." The court inclined for
'
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While copyright existed prior to the Statute of Anne, the important question is how the statute transformed the nature of copyright. Several cases involving the Stationer's Company held that
these rights were subject to the sovereign's prerogative in granting
the printing privilege, but others acknowledged the right of the
authors to be compensated for their work by the publishers. 80
More importantly, the statute marked a break with the censorship
system that was supported by copyright in the 1600s. Coming less
than a hundred years after the Statute of Monopolies, which weakened the sovereign's prerogative in granting exclusive patents,' 8'
the Statute of Anne liberalized publishing by taking it outside the
licensing and censorship model. But two conflicting accounts
muddy the implications of these changes - a liberal, market theory
endorsed by Professor Rose, 82 and a regulatory theory endorsed
by Professor Patterson. 83 As I elaborate below, the privatization
thesis mediates between these two opposing positions.
Professor Rose describes these changes as a transition from
regulation to property. 84 By securing authors' rights, the Statute
of Anne made possible the category of literary property, or rights
in books and literary works akin to rights in land. The case law
following the Statute of Anne is filled with the metaphor of real
85
property as conflicting claims over literary works were resolved.
These cases represented attempts by the booksellers to regain their
exclusive rights from authors in order to maintain their market position against publishers in Scotland. The publishers' legal stratthe defendant, (who had pleaded the letters patent of the king, which granted to the
University of Oxford to print omnes et omni modo libros which are not prohibited to
be printed, &c.) and they said that "this is a prerogative of power which the king
could not grant so, but that he might resume it, but otherwise it is of a grant of an interest."
In Gurney v. Longman, 5 Ves. 506, 507, Lord Erskine declared that he
granted the injunction (as to publishing the Trial of Lord Melville) "not upon any
thing like literary property, but upon this only, that these plaintiff are in the same
situation, as to this particular subject, as the king's printer, exercising the right of the
crown as to the prerogative copies."
The cases of Bell v. Walker, 1 Bro. C. C. 451, and Butterworth v. Robinson, 5
Ves. 709, are not sufficiently developed, to show whether they turned upon copyright proprietorship, or a proprietorship derived from a prerogative grant.
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 649-50 (1834).
80 ROSE, supra note 18, at 9-12 (describing the regulatory structure of the day); see also
JOHNS, supra note 161, at 230-31.
181See BAKER, supra note 157, at 510-17 (explaining the attack on monopolies); PArrERSON, supra note 157, at 86 (explaining the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies).
2
18 See ROSE, supra note 18, at 113-29 (explaining property, originality, and personality).
3
18 See PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 222-30 (discussing copyright in historical perspective).
184See ROSE, supra note 18, at 48 (explaining the shift in the context of the Statute of

Anne).
185See id. at 69-70.
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egy was to argue that the authorial rights created were common
law rights that lasted in perpetuity, like a fee simple. Through this
style of argument, the booksellers attempted to reassert their monopoly. The case of Donaldson v. Becket represented the success
of the concept of literary property, ironically by rejecting the
bookseller's claim that the author's right was a common law
right. 186 Once the author's right was established as a statutory
right, it became possible to strengthen the rights of authors in the
marketplace as publishers' profitability rested on the publication of
new works, protected by copyright.187 By creating incentives for
the introduction of new books, the recognition of copyright as a
statutory right (and not a perpetual right) reduced the publishers'
monopoly in the publication of the old, most profitable works.
Countering this tendency to re-establish old monopolies is the
use of the property metaphor to develop new markets. The equating of literary property with real property also served to empower
authors, both in their battles against publishers and booksellers,
and as a way of securing their own place in the emerging literary
marketplace. Professor Rose documents the arguments of John
Milton, Daniel Defoe, and Samuel Johnson, whose respective
criticisms of the old system of licensing and advocacy of the Statute of Anne and the creation of literary property were motivated by
the goal of rewarding authors. 188 Defeating monopoly interests
was key to promoting competition and allowing authors to reap the
benefits of their creation. The case of Samuel Richardson's attempt to control the dissemination of his anonymous novel Pamela
illustrates the importance of securing authors' rights for the emerging competitive marketplace for books. As Professor William
Warner states, "Richardson can only defend this commodity adrift
on the open work [viz, the novel Pamela] by presenting himself as
its author."' 89 The creation of literary markets was made possible
through a transformation in publishing from a right to print to a
liberal property interest vested in authors.
Professor Patterson, on the other hand, downplays the Statute
of Anne's creation of authors' rights as property. "The purpose of
the Statute of Anne, then," argues Patterson, "was to provide a
copyright that would function primarily as a trade regulation de86

1 See id. at 95-97 (discussing Donaldson v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774)).

187 See id. at 110-12 (discussing the rise in authorial copyrights); WILLIAM B. WARNER,
LICENSING ENTERTAINMENT: THE ELEVATION OF NOVEL READING IN BRITAIN, 1684-1750, at
134-35, 280 (1998) (discussing the increased need to protect authors as novel reading becomes
more prevalent).
8

'8 See ROSE, supra note 18, at 34-37.

189WARNER, supra note 187, at 229.
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vice - acting in the interest of society by preventing monopoly,
and in the interest of the publisher by protecting published works
from piracy, as did the stationer's copyright."' 90 Contrary to Professor Rose's claim that the statute marked a shift from regulation
to property, Professor Patterson claims that the Statute of Anne
was just another form of regulation. There is much support for
Professor Patterson's position. As he points out, the statute did not
exclusively grant rights in new works to authors, but to authors
and proprietors, and the preamble to the statute speaks of rights in
authors and purchasers.191 Furthermore, he contends correctly, that
the statute was modeled on the private regulation of the Stationer's
Company, 192which recognized a copyright, albeit one held by the
publisher.
Two conclusions follow from Professor Patterson's analysis.
First is the identification of elements in the statute that make the
author's right fall short of a real property interest. By allowing the
right to rest in parties other than the author, the Statute of Anne
seems to envision property rights that were mutable by contract.
To use modern language, the Statute of Anne established default
(as opposed to immutable) rules that contracting parties could reassign through agreement. Secondly, Patterson's analysis points to
the regulatory functions of the statute. The purpose of divesting
the stationers of some rights and putting them in the hands of the
diverse individuals was to protect the public from the harmful effects of monopoly. According to Patterson, the statute did not
merely protect private interests, but sought a broader public purpose.
Professors Rose and Patterson offer contrasting interpretations
of the Statute of Anne. One sees the statute as protecting and defining private interests; the other identifies a public purpose. Neither interpretation seems consistent with my privatization thesis.
Professor Rose would see no government function being carried
out through copyright. In a recent article, he points to several
missed opportunities in English copyright history for recognizing
the law's role in fostering the public domain. 93 While the
Donaldson decision could be seen as supporting the public domain
by recognizing that private rights in literary property expire and
divest to the public, the decision was actually read as a compromise between the interests of authors and the interests of read19oPATrERSON, supra note 157, at 14.
19,See id. at 143.
192See id. at 145-46.

193Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric
of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77-78 (2003).
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ers. 194 Once the statutory right was seen as a compromise, defenders of a perpetual copyright urged that this compromise be withdrawn in Parliament towards a longer duration of protection for
authors. 95 The transformation of literary property into real property occurred, post-Donaldson, as a matter of legislation rather
than common law adjudication.
Furthermore, Professor Patterson's position is also contrary to
my privatization thesis. While he does see a public purpose to
copyright in its challenge to monopoly, he would argue that this
pursuit of a public purpose occurred not through privatization, but
through regulation. Rather than divesting a governmental function
to private parties, the Statute of Anne marked regulatory control
over publishing by Parliament. The shift was from monarchical
control and censorial goals to legislative control and market regulation. Private rights were created by the statute, but these rights
represented a divestiture of monopoly power, not governmental
power. Viewing copyright as a form of privatization or deregulation would arguably be inconsistent with the view of the Statute of
Anne as a new form of regulation.
The privatization thesis, while inconsistent with the two positions independently, reconciles the two contrasting characterizations of the statute as securing and regulating property rights. One
element that neither author directly addresses in their work is the
creation of modem literary markets that coincided with the debates
over literary property and the Statute of Anne. The example of
Richardson's Pamela was given before to illustrate how authors'
rights were instrumental in the development of a literary marketplace. 96 The Statute of Anne, by acknowledging the author's
right, provided authors with a foothold into the marketplace, although often still at the whim of publishers and booksellers. Success in the marketplace required that authors establish their own
voice and identity. Furthermore, the Statute of Anne and the
Donaldson decision served to structure and bolster the literary
marketplace in other ways. Once the copyright was viewed as
statutory rather than perpetual, the need arose for publishers and
booksellers to find new content that could be marketed once the
copyright expired and the work fell into the public domain. 197 The

194See
'

95

id. at 82-84.
See ROSE, supra note 18, at 110; CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM

IN EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 1842 COPYRIGHT AcT 15 (1999).
96

1 See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 188-89; WARNER, supra note 187, at

200-09.
197WARNER, supra note 187, at 134.
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198
demand for new content spurred the demand for new authors.
As novels diffused into all levels of society, economies of scale in
the production of books could be realized, resulting in greater
profits for publishers. 99 In short, the Statute of Anne helped to
foster a literary marketplace through which the tradition of the
novel was established.
Once the developments in the literary marketplace are juxtaposed with the legal developments outlined by Professors Rose
and Patterson, the case for the privatization thesis is stronger. The
recognition of the author's right created a marketplace in which
certain interests could be pursued. By challenging traditional monopolies, the statute helped to establish a marketplace through
which cultural works, such as the novel, could be produced and
distributed. Professor Patterson's public minded copyright and
Professor Rose's privately interested copyright are intertwined.
By allowing the playing out of authors' interests against those of
printers, booksellers, and readers in a competitive marketplace, the
Statute of Anne permitted the realization of the public good (i.e.,
cultural production, the novel) through the creation of private interests. 20° When the emerging literary marketplace of the eighteenth century is recognized, Madison's observation of the coincidence between the public good and individual claims in copyright
law can be understood. The pursuit of private interests that the
statute allowed by both recognizing authors' rights and defeating
monopolies permitted the pursuit of the public good through the
cultural production of the novel. The nineteenth century debates
over copyright reform illustrate this point.
The key issue for copyright reform in nineteenth century Britain was the term of copyright. Several authors, led by a barrister
and playwright named Sarjeant Thomas Noon Talfourd, spearheaded the campaign to expand the copyright term from the
twenty-eight year term implemented in the 1814 Act to a term of
1 The case of Donaldson
the
life played
of the author
sixtydebate,
years. 2standing
v.
Becket
a role plus
in this
for the proposition

198Id.
199Id.

2

0fThe creation of a literary market introduced important questions of the ability of the
market to produce works of merit. The debate in early and late Victorian England was precisely
over copyright's ability to generate quality works, rather than works of rubbish. See, e.g., ALTICK, supra note 168, at 309-11 (discussing "yellow back novels," or cheap works designed for
railway reading during the mid-nineteenth century as a response to the high price of first editions); N. N. FELTES, LITERARY CAPITAL AND THE LATE VICTORIAN NOVEL 62-64 (1993) (dis-

cussing controversies over international copyright that were framed as issues of free trade and
culture).
201ROSE, supra note 18, at 110-1I1; SEVILLE, supra note 195, at 16-19.
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that the copyright term represented a compromise that could be
renegotiated in the author's favor. The need to protect authors and
their families against the threats of the marketplace, particularly
piracy by unscrupulous booksellers, domestic and foreign, was the
primary rationale to expand the term. In the Copyright Act of
1842, the term was extended to the life of the author plus seven
years, with a minimum of forty-two years from the date of publication. 2 The conflicting interests leading to this result illustrate
how copyright had transformed from a regulatory scheme to control censorship into a system of interests which played out in the
political arena.
While authors were the chief supporters of copyright extension, critics reflected a range of interests. Radical members of
Parliament who were opposed to property, particularly those in
literary works, spoke out against proposed bills. Publishers and
booksellers, who a hundred years earlier argued for a perpetual
copyright, now were hesitant to meet the licensing demands of authors for use of their content and opposed extension. 0 3 Workers in
publishing were also not supporters of the authors' interests.2 °4
Perhaps the most interesting group of opponents were private associations such as the Religious Tract Society, the Society for the
Promotion of Christian Knowledge, and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, whose primary concerns were the
availability of cheap publications and the creation of a reading
public that was not weaned on the popular novel.20 5 Supporters of
the authors came from segments of society that viewed authorship
as a means of developing British national culture, as well as
groups aligned with the creation of an international copyright, requiring each country to recognize copyright in the works of foreign authors.2 °
Victorian copyright reform suggests a blossoming of copyright law from its roots as a narrow tool of censorship into the subject of public discourse. At issue, in part, was the regulation of
publishing. But broader issues of access and equity came to center
stage. Opponents of extension analogized the proposed reform to
the infamous newspaper stamp in the 1830s that was widely condemned as a "tax on knowledge., 20 7 It was in the context of the
copyright term extension debates that Lord Macauley famously
202SEVILLE,

203

supra note 195, at 259-60.

1d. at 101-05.

204
See id. at 81-84 (detailing the petition patterns of the workers in publishing).
205Id. at 105-09.
2
061d. at 153-59.
207
id. at 46-48.
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remarked that copyright "is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. ' 2°8 Macauley's reference to tax was an
assault on the copyright as monopoly. It is perhaps ironic that authors' rights, once seen as a cure to monopolies through the Statute
of Anne, became the root of monopolies in Victorian copyright. 209
This shift can be explained by a change in focus from the rights of
authors to the rights of readers. However, the tax metaphor has a
different meaning when copyright is contrasted with what
Macauley sees as a potentially more troubling alternative - patronage.21 The copyright tax is not simply a monopoly surcharge, but
a means of financing the author - a substitute for a generous patron or a public fisc. 21 The twin meanings of tax illustrate the dilemma of copyright. On the one hand, copyright creates undesirable monopolies; on the other, it provides a means of rewarding
and funding authors. The famous statement illustrates the conflicting public dimensions of copyright that continue today.
In conclusion, English copyright developed from a means of
censorship into a means of creating and defining interests in the
literary marketplace and in debates over regulation of the marketplace. While we cannot find a single moment in which government functions in cultural production were devolved to private parties, we can see in the history (1) the use of private rights to further the sovereign's goals of censorship through the Stationer's
Company, (2) the sovereign's role in cultural production in the
drafting of the King James Bible, and (3) the creation of private
rights that were transformed into private interests in the literary
marketplace and the political arena. The conclusion is that copyright law is not purely a matter of private law, but is imbued with a
public purpose that has changed from censorship to production and
dissemination. With the British history as background, I turn next
to the experience of the United States.
B. U.S. History and the Instrumental View of Copyright Law
Copyright's history in the United States, rooted in the eighteenth century, shows a continuation of English copyright history at
the time. The Statute of Anne served as a model for state copy208

MACAULAY, supra note 138, at 182; see also SEVILLE, supra note 195, at 60-67.
supra note 195, at 28-30 (discussing copyright opponents' view that
copyright was a monopoly, and also describing politicians' opinions that copyright law in England was unsatisfactory).
21 Id. at 26 (noting that Macaulay "rejected patronage with striking vehemence").
21,See id. at 62-63 (stating that Macaulay acknowledged the need to compensate authors in
order for a society to have good books, and copyright was the "least objectionable way to remunerate authors").
2o9See SEVILLE,
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right law under the Articles of Confederation, and for federal
copyright law under the U.S. Constitution.2" 2 At the same time,
the framers of the Constitution and drafters of various copyright
statutes were cognizant of copyright's roots in licensing and publishing monopolies, and were wary of repeating the mistakes of
England. 2 3 Copyright law in the early American republic did not
mark the ascendancy of private property, but rather a recognition
that "individual rights give way to the demands of the social" and
"private ownership of a printed text as the temporary alienation of
public property. '21 4 What developed in the United States was an
instrumental view of copyright law through a discourse that
framed copyright at times as a matter of property, and at times as a
matter of economic interest. But whatever the basis, whether stable property or rootless economics, copyright in the United States
was viewed in instrumental terms from the very beginning. This
instrumental view is consistent with my privatization thesis.
The case for privatization can be made from what has been
described as the utilitarian basis for United States copyright law
that explicitly did not rest on authors' rights. The Intellectual
Property Clause speaks of the copyright as a means to the end of
promoting progress in science and the useful arts;215 private rights
are a means, not an end, as the Supreme Court itself has recognized. 21 6 Likewise, Madison emphasized the public functions of
copyright in The FederalistPapers. The first Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, promoted the development of the free press and the
distribution of knowledge by providing protection to maps, charts,
212

See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 92, at 921-23; PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 199.
See PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 214-17 (describing Congress's discontent with the
copyright laws due to the difficulty of administration and the danger of abuses); Ochoa & Rose,
supra note 92, at 912 (describing Queen Elizabeth's practice of dispensing monopoly patents as
rewards for political patronage).
214Meredith L. McGill, The Matter of the Text: Commerce, Print Culture, and the AuthorState in American Copyright Law, 9 AMER. LIT. HIST. 21, 22 (1997).
ity
of the
21
5Itis worth pointing out that the records of the Federal Convention include an early draft
of what was to be Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, that included the following proposed Congressional powers:
To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time; To establish an University; To encourage by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries; To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences; To grant charters of incorporation; To grant patents
for useful inventions; To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time; To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture,
commerce, trades, and manufactures.
Record of the FederalConvention, in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 40 (Philip B. Kurland
& Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). It is clear from this early draft that the Intellectual Property Clause
was seen as supporting the broad public purpose of promoting knowledge and the creation of
described as cultural infrastructure.
what I216
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
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and books, and was "very important from the beginning for .. .
such publishers of educational materials as Noah Webster.217
Publishing was crucial for developing democratic systems that
would challenge hierarchies both in science 218 and in religion. 219
Copyright's development in the nineteenth century was intimately
connected with the development of American nationalism and cultural identity. 220 In the twentieth century, Madison's sentiments
are echoed in 1961 in the words of the Register of Copyrights: "As
reflected in the Constitution, the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is a means to that end."22 ' Over thirty years after these
words were written, the vision has been reversed. Scholars decry
the death of the public domain; private interests appear triumphant.
The natural question is what has happened? A related question is
whether or not the contemporary U.S. experience falsifies my argument for viewing copyright as a privatization of a government
function. Is copyright, after all, just a private right?
The standard explanation for current developments is one of
public choice. 2 Copyright legislation has been captured by powerful copyright interests, such as players in the entertainment,
computer, and telecommunications industries. While the copyright
industries are certainly dominant lobbyists in copyright reform, the
public choice explanation ignores the fact that copyright law was
initially enacted in 1790 at the behest of "booksellers rather than
authors in an effort to encourage the publishing trade by assigning
limited and alienable ownership rights without either creating monopolies or allowing unauthorized reprinting.' 22 3 What is different
217

DAN LACY, FROM GRUNTS TO GIGABYTES: COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY

56

(1996). For a discussion of the early history and spread of the printing press and its influence on
spreading democratic values, see Richard D. Brown, Early American Origins of the Information
Age, in A NATION TRANSFORMED BY INFORMATION 39 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & James W.

Cortada
eds., 2000).
21

8See NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 29-30
(1989) (discussing challenges to establishment medicine posed by Thomsonian medicine, a
controversial advocate of natural medicines in the 1830s).
219
See generally id. at 62-66 (describing the role of the popular press in the early nineteenth century in splintering American Protestantism).
220MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 118-19, 127 (1990); see also CORNWELL, supra

note 105, at 97-103 (describing the slow development of arts participation in Jacksonian America); GRANTLAND S. RICE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUTHORSHIP IN AMERICA 74 (1997)

(discussing the utilitarian bases for the enactment of copyright law in the United States).
221HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm. Print 1961).

222
See LITMAN, supra note 8,at 22-34; Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 775, 798 (2003); Liu, supra note 150, at 448-49; Samuelson, supra note 139, at 1494.

223RICE, supra note 220, at 74.
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about contemporary copyright discussion is not the influence of
business interests, but the shift from a public-spirited view of
copyright to a view of copyright as private economic protection.2 24
Early American copyright debate assumed copyright to be a
means to public ends, whether promoting the press, education, or
the charting and mapping of the new republic.225 As Grantland
Rice points out, the nineteenth century debate over perpetual copyright was informed by utilitarian conceptions of copyright as a
means of shaping the contours of the American nation much in the
same ways as Manifest Destiny justified its expanding geographic
boundaries.22 6 While Professor Rice notes the growing prevalence
of Lockean notions of labor and property to support copyright in
the early American republic, he also reports "clear evidence of an
antebellum writer's discomfort with the whole idea of literary
property. ,,227 He elaborates:
[D]espite the fact that most writers in antebellum America
argued publicly and vociferously for the relative independence afforded by the Lockean notion of "perpetual" copyright," there was some anxiety over the making over - in law
and public consciousness - of public expression into, alternatively, property or commodity. In other words, even though
writers generally endorsed Lockean constructions to protect
themselves from the vicissitudes of the market, many also
harbored concomitant anxieties about acceging. . . an economic rationale for their rhetorical activity.
We find no hint of such anxieties in current copyright discourse. Although there are efforts to reform copyright to protect
public values, 229 the problem is a lack of public-spirited copyright
discourse. Early American copyright history, in many ways, provides the basis for such discourse by demonstrating how copyright
is an instrument to reach certain social ends.

224For a discussion of the general shift in discourse from public mindedness to private centeredness, see CRENSON & GINSBERG, supra note 31, at 241; PUTNAM, supra note 75, at 27784; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 317-21 (1996).
225See, e.g., LACY, supra note 217, at 56 (describing copyright as an inherently national
concern); WARNER, supra note 220, at 127 (writing that the debate assumed that well-read
citizens would be useful to a country).

226RICE, supra note 220, at 86-87.
227

Id. at 78.

228 Id.

229For a discussion of some responses, see Weiser, supra note 50, at 545-49; and Pamela
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, III YALE
L.J. 1575, 1649-55 (2002) (describing reverse engineering as a policy lever).
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My call for public-spirited discourse is resonant of the schol230
arship on civic republicanism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This body of scholarship looked to early republican theory, particularly the debate between the Court Party and NeoHarringtonians in England, and its influence on the formation of
the American republic.2 3' Such scholarship discovered a rhetoric
of property in the Harringtonian tradition that was public-spirited,
viewing property as a means towards establishing civil society.
The Harringtonian tradition contrasted with the Court Party vision
of society as one based on exchange and the exercise of the passions through commerce. Copyright was never mentioned in the
civic republican literature for one simple reason: Harrington meant
land when he used the word property, and the civic republican literature was largely a response to the conservative arguments in the
1980s against redistributive policies and regulation, arguments that
had their strongest expression in Professor Richard Epstein's Takings.232 But as my arguments suggest, copyright should also be
seen in civic republican terms, particularly with the increasing
need for identifying a public basis for a body of law that is becoming wholly private.
Needless to say, copyright does not fall so neatly into the debate between Harringtonian and Court Party traditions. Copyright
is different from real property. Although some claim it to be a
common law right, copyright's roots are a mix of sovereign privilege and private regulation.
The contemporary view, after
Donaldson v. Becket, is that copyright is purely a creation of statute and no longer has common law roots. 233 Another view, following Professor Patterson, would place copyright in the category of
regulation. 234 Copyright would not be a property right, but rather,
an economic interest that is rewarded in the marketplace and can
be modified by the state. None of these views seem to match Harrington's vision of property as fixed and stable, guarding against
230See, e.g., William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335,
1338 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-49
(1988) (describing republicanism in both the founding period and in contemporary society); cf.
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 85479 (1993) (criticizing scholars' embrace of civic republicanism).
231

232

See POCOCK, supra note 32, at 507-08.

See generally Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the

Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. I (1986); see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 7 (1997) (criticizing pseudo-history or property in Supreme Court

takings
jurisprudence).
233
PATtERSON, supra note 157, at 7-8 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court followed
Donaldson, which limited the protection of published works to the statutory copyright, and
viewed American copyright as a descendant form of the Statute of Anne).
234See id. at 223-24 (discussing copyright statutes as trade-regulation devices).
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the corruptions of government. In some ways, copyright, as the
child of monopoly privilege, would reflect the kind of corruptions
235
that Harrington sought to exorcise from the body politic.
Even if copyright does not neatly fit into the stable, fixed notion of property, and is more akin to intangible interests such as
credit and money, of which the Harringtonians were suspicious,
the discussion of copyright in the early American republic has
much in common with the role of land in the Harringtonian
scheme. The irony is that early republican thinkers recognized the
evils of copyright, with its roots in monopoly and censorship, but
also understood its necessity in the development of a literary and
cultural marketplace necessary for the growth of the new republic. 236 Copyright, as an economic right, was instrumental for the
creation of republican culture.237 Even those who argued for treating copyright as property, reviving the common law right in literary property as a perpetuity, did so in instrumental terms. In fact,
Harringtonian-type arguments were made for copyright in terms of
removing copyright altogether from the legislative realm and restoring its common law origins. The tension between monopoly
and markets is demonstrated by the early debates over copyright
that were part of the Constitution drafting process.238 These debates culminated in the first U.S. Supreme Court case about copyright, Wheaton v. Peters,239 often described as the Donaldson v.
Becket of the United States, but more accurately characterized as
endorsing an anti-monopoly view of copyright.
The quasiHarringtonian arguments for copyright can be found in the debates
in the 1830s over international copyright. These pieces of history
from the early republic illustrate the instrumental thinking that informed copyright, which saw the creation of rights as necessary for
the building of a republic. 240 This conception of copyright reinforces Professor James Willard Hurst's description of property
theory in the early nineteenth century as facilitating "the release of

235
See POCOCK, supra note 32, at 459-60 (describing the belief that a society was better
off as2a36 fixed society, with institutions, order, and value).
See AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINE-

TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 25-28 (1960); PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 214-15; SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 6 (2001); Ochoa & Rose, supra note 92, at

916-17.
2 37

See WARNER, supra note 220, at 115-17.
8 PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 192; Ochoa

23

23933

240

& Rose, supra note 92, at 912-14.

U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).

See CLARK, supra note 236, at 50-51 (describing the belief that international copyright
would help America develop a national body of literature); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 236,
at 51; Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership: Or, How I Learnedto Stop Worrying and Love
Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 468-70 (2002).
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energy" which "coupled concern for vested rights with a high regard for keeping open the channels of change. 2 41
At the heart of the debate was the question of recognizing
copyright in the works of foreign authors, essentially repealing
Section Five of the Copyright Act of 1790, which permitted pirating of non-U.S. works.242 The debate was three pronged, consisting of advocates for the international copyright, a group opposed
to the international copyright, and a third group that advocated the
creation of a perpetual, common law based copyright instead of the
international copyright. Each set of advocates emphasized different effects of the copyright system, but they all shared an instrumental vision of copyright as the creation of private right to meet
public ends.
Spearheading the initiative for an international copyright was
Senator Henry Clay, who introduced several bills during the
1830s, none of which passed.2 43 Senator Clay analogized copyright piracy to theft of personal property:
A British merchant brings or transmits to the United States, a
bale of merchandize, and the moment it comes within the jurisdiction of our laws, they throw around it an effectual security. But if the work of a British author is brought to the
United States, it may be appropriated by any resident here,
and republished without any compensation whatsoever being
distinction in the two descriptions of property
made. This
244
[is] unjust.
The analogy between literary works and bales of merchandise
indicates the attempt to classify copyright within the conventional
categories of property, whether as real property, or, as in this case,
as personal property. Senator Clay's rhetoric effectively turns
copyright into a commodity. In addition, copyright becomes a
241JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-

CENTURY UNITED STATES 27 (1956). Mention of copyright is noticeably absent from the vested
rights debate. The single reference to copyright in the context of vested rights that I could discover is in a book review by Professor Alfred Brophy. See Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the Understanding of the Importance Of Race: Evaluating the Significance of Race and the Utility of
Reparations, 80 TEX. L. REV. 911, 927 n.62 (2002). This lack of interest could be in part a
reflection of copyright's status, until recently, in the backwaters of academic discourse. But the
discussion in the text demonstrates the importance of the vested rights debate to copyright in the
nineteenth century. Another explanation for the lack of interest is copyright's status as a govemnment created "property right" as opposed to the regulation of property. But, of course, the
central debate in copyright, then and now, is the extent and stability of this right. The nineteenth century debate over international copyright has relevance for how we conceive of copyproperty today.
right as
242
PATTERSON, supra note 157, at 198.
243See CLARK, supra note 236, at 42-43; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 236, at 51.
244
Literary Property, 4 N.Y. REV. 273, 293 (1839).
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commodity of international trade, suggesting another instrumental
goal for copyright law as furthering global commerce. The emphasis on commercial interests, particularly international ones, are
consistent with Senator Clay's vision of the "American system," or
the use of government power for nation building through economic
expansion and growth.245 The role of copyright in building the
American system is further demonstrated by a common argument
that was made in support of international copyright: the importance of recognizing rights in foreign works in order to promote
American authors in the marketplace. 2 4 Piracy, the argument
went, gave British authors an unfair advantage in the marketplace
by allowing their works to be marketed at a cheaper price than the
works of American authors protected by copyrights. International
copyright allowed British and American authors to compete on a
level playing field. This argument often construed the international copyright as a tariff on the works of British authors, restricting their entry into the American marketplace.24 7 Copyright as
personal property, copyright as internationally traded commodity,
and copyright as tariff are the three major turns that the conception
of copyright took during the 1830s. Each supported an instrumental use of copyright to further the American economy and American culture.
The opponents of the international copyright were equally instrumental. The strongest opposition came from publishers and
booksellers who thrived on cheap copies of English books.248 The
international copyright as tariff only hurt their interests by pushing
up the price of books that they would buy at wholesale, and by reducing the quantity they could sell at retail. In addition to the economic criticism of the international copyright, opponents offered a
cultural argument. International copyright, according to the opponents, would not necessarily enhance American literary culture.2 49
Cultural enhancement required access to English works so that the
American reader could keep up to date on the latest developments
in the Old World in all fields of knowledge. Furthermore, cheap
English books were important for American authors so that they
245

See MAURICE G. BAXTER, HENRY CLAY AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 57-58 (1995);

see also CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION 290 (1991) (describing the use of tar-

iffs to provide funding for internal improvements such as roads and canals).
246 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 236, at 60-61 (writing that American authors' books
were too expensive to compete with the pirated copies of foreign authors); International Copy-

right,244 7S.Q. REV. i, 2-3 (1843).
InternationalCopyright,supra note 246, at 3.
248See CLARK, supra note 236, at 108-09; InternationalCopyright,supra note 246, at 6-7.
249 Philip

(1838).

H. Nicklin, Literary Property, 2 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 289, 291-92
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could learn (and implicitly copy from) the style and accomplishments of their British peers. These arguments, although not utilizing the term public domain, anticipate many modern arguments
about the importance of access and copying to the dissemination of
culture and the creation of culture through accretion. Finally, the
opponents argued that the promotion of American culture required
a healthy publishing industry and book trade, without which authors' works could not be published or disseminated at all.25 ° Mirroring the arguments of advocates, the opponents were equally instrumental in their vision of copyright.
Finally, the opponents who supported a perpetual copyright
rather than an international copyright offered a particularly interesting and complex perspective that deserves detailed attention.
This group represented a range of interests, including proponents
of a stronger American culture, advocates for authors, and Southerners skeptical of the publishing industry and book trade that was
almost wholly concentrated in the North. 251 For this group, the
debate over international copyright missed the real issue. Although they accepted, for the most part, arguments about the importance of protecting authors' rights in the marketplace, they contended that the only meaningful way to protect those rights was by
recognizing a common law right of perpetual copyright, much like
a fee simple interest in land.252 By recognizing a perpetual right in
every author, wherever a resident, the international copyright issue
would become effectively moot.
It is important to note how the arguments for a perpetual
copyright in the United States compared with those made in seventeenth century Britain. For while the booksellers looked to the
common law right to ensure their monopoly, and based the common law right on natural law notions, proponents of a perpetual
copyright in the United States of the 1830s were supporting authors' rights in order to promote a national culture. The American
proponents assuredly made natural rights arguments. As one
writer explained: "What then is the principle of right on which the
present appeal to our liberality is founded? It is the sacredprinciple of property.' 253 The author continues:

m"Id. at 291.
25 See generally InternationalCopyright, supra note 246; Literary Property, supra note
244, at 273; Nicklin, supra note 249.
2See InternationalCopyright, supra note 246, at 7-8 (stating that literary property in
some countries is treated like real estate, belonging solely to those who produced it); Literary
Property, supra note 244, at 275-76; Nicklin, supra note 249, at 293-94.
253
Nicklin, supra note 249, at 293.
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The principle of PROPERTY is the key-stone of the arch of
society. It is the first, deepest, and most sacred, of the principles of social order and law - those at least which are
purely human in their nature and relations .... The right of
property in the creations of original individual effort . . . is
unquestionably a natural moral right, antecedent and superior
to legislation; being the object and motive of social union,
rather than its effect and consequence. 254
Grantland Rice cites this same passage as evidence of the triumph of "individualism and private sovereignty" and "the indissolubility of a Lockean notion of property. ' 55 His conclusion is
unwarranted for two reasons. First, a Harringtonian tradition existed within Locke's theory that supported private property not as
an end in itself, but as a means to republican citizenship.2 56 Furthermore, the natural rights language, represented in this passage,
is accompanied by instrumental objectives to promote the broader
public welfare. For example, one advocate spoke of the need for a
perpetual right to allow literary culture to flourish in the United
States, tracing the poverty of American literary culture to the lack
of a strong property right, and hence incentive, in works. One author stated the point with particular passion:
We want, in a word, a home literature - fresh, original, and
vigorous in its tone, and such as we may have, if we are left
to ourselves, free to work out the problem of our country's
fame with our own American energies, fearing, all the while,
no intrusion either from abroad or at home, except what results from a fair competition of mind struggling with mind on
equal ground and with honorable weapons. In order that we
may have such a literature, nothing more is necessary, than
that we should avail ourselves of our opportunities, and
maintain and protect our own rights by the very simple process 2of
yielding, in all good fellowship, their rights to oth57
ers.
The common law copyright promoted cultural development.
The recognition of a right in perpetuity fully rewarded authors and
would permit them to devote their energies to creation. The de2

54Id.at 294.

supra note 220, at 89.
is not clear that Locke meant to attack the Neo-Harringtonian critics of society, and
there is little sign that they felt the need to assail him." POCOCK, supra note 32, at 451. For a
fuller discussion of the relationship between Locke and the Harringtonian tradition, see POCOCK, supra note 32, at 450-56.
-57International Copyright, supra note 246, at 45.
255RICE,
256"It
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fense of common law copyright in the United States was not based
on natural rights, but on instrumental goals. Responding to the
instrumentalism of international copyright advocates and opponents, defenders of perpetual copyright responded in kind in order
to turn the copyright debate from a matter of statute to one of
common law.
The combination of natural rights and instrumentalist arguments created a unique theory of copyright, one that demonstrated
the tension between copyright and real property. When Harrington
spoke about stability and order through property, he was referring
to land and thinking largely about an agrarian society. His concern, like that of his contemporary John Locke, was with "the engrossment of land by a privileged class" which "threatened the
natural rights of those left landless. 25 8 Harrington proposed
"agrarian law limiting the size of estates in order to prevent the
monopolization of land by a privileged class., 259 The early advocates of perpetual copyright in the United States had an analogous
concern for copyright. By limiting the duration of the creator's
rights, statutory copyright engrossed publishers and booksellers
who were able to obtain works from the public domain. While
Harrington proposed limiting the size of estates for a more equitable division of land, copyright reformers sought to make the period
of copyright perpetual. Ironically, American agrarian land reformers who followed Harrington were themselves accused of confiscating property through the redistribution of estates. One author
noted the tension:
"Agrarianism," in the sense of disregard to the sanctity of the
principle of property, is one of the courteous epithets with
which the political school in which we belong is commonly
assailed by its opponents. We are certainly no friends to restrictive legislation and the creation of partial interests and
so-called vested rights, in derogation of... equality of rights;
we should be glad, however ...where the sacred principle of
true, rightful, natural property is distinctly involved, if those
who assail us would vie with us in redeeming it from its long
abused state of contempt and violation. 2 °

8

2 JEFFREY SKLANSKY, THE SOUL'S ECONOMY: MARKET SOCIETY AND SELFHOOD IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1820-1920, at 121 (2002).

2-9
260 Id. at 30.
Nicklin, supra note 249, at 296-97.
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In other words, agrarian reform is about equality; copyright reform
is about liberty through the restoration of "true, rightful, natural
property," property that is created through one's labor. 26
The comparison of agrarianism and copyright reform demonstrates the distinction between real property and copyright. This
distinction can be seen in the response to the claim that copyright
is a monopoly. The author who spoke of agrarianism responded to
the monopoly argument by identifying a reductio ad absurdum. If
copyright is a monopoly, then all property rights obtained through
the fruits of one's labor are monopolies and therefore all property
rights should be time limited. Other authors simply distinguished
copyright as a monopoly when recognized as a publisher's right, as
under the Stationer's Company, and copyright as a right in the
fruits of one's labor, when recognized as an author's right. For the
agrarian-minded reformers, however, real property, when concentrated, would be a monopoly, needing to be divested. Copyright,
according to their argument, could never be a monopoly since the
product of copyright was the fruit of one's labor, and one had a
natural right to exclude others from such fruits.
Another distinction between real property and copyright
emerges from the writings of the perpetual copyright proponents.
The Southern defender of perpetual copyright acknowledged distinctions between land and copyright even while invoking real
property metaphors:
[A] person may light his candle at another's lamp, may warm
himself at a fire which another has kindled, may admire a
house that another had built, and may smell flowers that others have planted, without doing injury to the owner of the
lamp, the kindler of the fire, the builder of the house, or the
planter of the flowers: and it will be as readily conceded that
the principle of Property is not so exclusive, as to forbid the
unlimited diffusion of a blessing which God has chosen one
man to be the minister of to the race - provided this diffusion
does not diminish each man's special
262 enjoyment of his own,
or in any manner interfere with him.
The passage begins with examples unrelated to real property
and ends with an endorsement of property that evokes the absolute
right to exclude associated with real property. The fire, the house,
the flower, and the light are all creations, products of effort. The
author of this passage recognizes that there is no objection to the
261
262

Id. at 297.

International Copyright, supra note 246, at 29.
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shared use of these creations. Shared uses do not justify piracy,
however, because piracy is a violation of one's right to enjoy the
fruits of one's labor. Piracy interferes with the creator's "enjoyment of his own." What is important about this passage is that it
recognizes copyright as exclusion from a use and the ability of this
use to be shared by multiple parties, unless there is interference
with the right to enjoy the fruits of one's labor. The passage demonstrates, despite the analogies to land, the differences between
copyright and conventional forms of property, whether real or personal.
While the Harringtonian notions of property are evident in the
writings of the defenders of the perpetual copyright, so too are the
cracks in the notion of property. Land could be redistributed when
monopolized, while the copyright could not be taken from the author, and hence was not a monopoly. Furthermore, the copyright is
allied to use rights and intangibles, such as style and sentiment,
while land is tangible. Each of these conclusions demonstrates the
complicated views of property emerging during this time, and the
peculiar role that copyright played as property necessary for a stable order. What is interesting about these authors is that no one
seemed to see a tension between copyright as a perpetual right of
the author and the copyright as a use right. While the Southern
advocate acknowledges copyright may be shared, he does not see
how making a copyright into a perpetual right might limit sharing.
If the kindler of flame or builder of a house were given a perpetual
right in their creation, how is sharing to be protected and permitted, other than through the whim of Prometheus or Sir Christopher
Wren? This question is an admittedly modern question, one
steeped in twentieth century developments in economic, political,
and legal theory. But the question reflects the difficulty of the
Harringtonian theory as it appears in the international copyright
debate, and particularly the difficulties posed by trying to fit discussions of copyright into real property thinking.
As may be gathered from this discussion, the advocates of
perpetual copyright lost. They were in many ways peripheral to
the debate. After Wheaton v. Peters,2 63 the copyright debate remained statutory, a matter for Congress to legislate and negotiate
through international treaties. 264 European countries entered into
the Berne Convention that came into force in 1897, which was the
26333 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
264See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT

§§ 2.1.2.1-2.1.2.3 (2000); see also
Netanel, supra note 91, at 233-38 (discussing the WIPO and the Berne Convention as well as
other agreements).
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first significant international copyright treaty. The United States
did not join Berne until 1989, but did grant limited rights to nonU.S. authors in 1891 through the enactment of the Chace Act.265
With the accession to Berne in 1989, the United States recognized
international copyright through negotiation of a multilateral
treaty. 266 The passage of TRIPS in 1994 as part of the Uruguay
Rounds marked the further ascendance of international copyright.267 The possibility of perpetual copyright seemingly has vanished with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 268 holding that Congress cannot grant perpetual duration
for copyright although it can, in theory, perpetually extend
terms.2 69 Despite these defeats, I would contend that the ghosts of
the perpetual copyright advocates roam among us even now. Arguments about copyright as property, about copyright as a reward
for labor, and about the importance of copyright for creating social
stability each are echoes of the obscure writings from the 1830s.
What also remains is an instrumental view of copyright, one
that sees the creation of private rights as a means of expanding
public welfare. The instrumental vision comes out of not only the
writings of the advocates of common law copyright, but also from
the writings of proponents and opponents of international copyright. Copyright instrumentalism provides a basis for informing
copyright theory and doctrine with public values. The difficulty is
that copyright does not fit neatly into civic republican property.
Harringtonianism, grounded in an agrarian system with land as the
principal asset, does not carry over into the world of copyright,
which embraces intangibility and markets in a way inimical to
Harrington's vision of a stable order. The current challenge is to
recognize public values in the privatized world that is created by
copyright. The notion that copyright could be used to promote
American culture and the American republic is a common theme
running through many authors' works during the early part of
American republic. While these thinkers differed in the mechanism through which copyright was supposed to effect advancements in culture, they shared an instrumental vision of copyright.

26

-1Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
266The signing of the Berne Convention followed the passage of the Berne Convention

Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(Supp. 2002)).
267Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
268 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
269
Id. at 198, 241.
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In short, copyright evolved from a means of censorship in England
to a tool of advancement and progress in the United States.
C. Summary
Copyright has had many faces through history: as a tool of
censorship, as a check on monopoly, as a means of developing a
national culture, and as an instrument for democratization and
market creation. I have argued in Part I that copyright can be seen
as a means of devolving government functions in cultural production to private hands. I have suggested this conception of copyright permits the recognition of the public values that inform copyright. The analysis of this section has not shown a perfect match
between theory and historical fact. But there is some support in
the historical record for my privatization thesis. Before the Statute
of Anne, copyright existed as means of carrying out the censorial
role of the crown through a private guild. After the Statute of
Anne, copyright in England served to create a literary marketplace
through the recognition of authors' rights. The experience of the
United States provides an instrumental vision of copyright as a
means to promote learning, to regulate monopoly, and to develop a
distinctively American culture. The history I have discussed illustrates copyright's balance among the government's functions, private creators, users, private regulators of content (such as publishers) and the marketplace. The privatization thesis presents a model
to organize and understand the varied faces of copyright.

III. PRIVATIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
My thesis is that copyright can be understood as a devolution
of several principal government functions in cultural production:
financing, the provision of cultural infrastructure, and distributional goals. In this Part, I focus on three sets of cases that both
echo historic problems and test the boundaries of copyright: copyright disputes involving the use of model code, disputes involving
copyright in religious texts, and disputes arising under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. The first two examples neatly fit into
my thesis. In the model code cases, the government is devolving
the government function of drafting laws to a private party.27 ° In
the religious text cases, copyright is being used to promote th, development of religious cultural artifacts that can be marketed by a
The
religiously affiliated organization to fund its activities .27
270

See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002); see also
Ghosh, supra note 25.
271See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000);
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DMCA's place in the privatization skein is more complicated for
two reasons. First, the DMCA serves to devolve the government's
function in providing security by deputizing private parties to police against the hacking of security systems using decryption technology that can crack encrypted codes used by both the government and private entities.27 2 In this way, the DMCA parallels the
pre-Statute of Anne use of copyright. However, the DMCA also
marks a privatization of copyright law itself by permitting owners
of copyrighted materials to protect their works through technologi27 Through these three examples, I
cal, rather than legal, means. 273
show how my privatization thesis can aid in understanding current
copyright disputes. This understanding will support my proposals
for revitalizing copyright law through recognition of the public
values that have been devolved into private hands.
A. Copyright's Role in PrivatizingLaw Making
The model code cases provide strong support for my privatization thesis. The cases share a common fact pattern.274 A private
standard-setting or code-drafting organization has had its standards
or code enacted into a regulation or statute. The defendant has
copied or made other use of the standard or code, either as enacted
or in its draft form. The organization's claim in copyright is that
the copying, or other use, interferes with its ability to market the
code and undercuts the incentives for engaging in code drafting.
Several types of draft standards and codes have been the subject of
litigation, including county tax maps, classificatory schemes for
medical practices, and model building and plumbing codes.2 75 The
use of private entities to draft standards and codes, of course, are
not limited to these areas.276 The Uniform Commercial Code is
see also Cotter, supra note 26 (discussing the needs of religious organizations to disseminate
their religious texts).
272See supra notes 10 and 29.
273
See supra notes 10 and 29.
274There are four principal cases: Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791
(5th Cir. 2002); County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir.
2001); Practice Mgmt. nfo. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Bldg.
Officials and Code Adm'r v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
27. For the treatment of county maps, see County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d 179. For classificatory schemes, see PracticeMgmt. Info., 121 F.3d 516. For building codes, see Veeck, 293 F.3d
791, and Bldg. Officials, 628 F.2d 730.
271For a history of the development of legislation and codification in the United States, see
GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, LEGAL RESEARCH: HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC

AGE 145-92 (1994) (describing the shifts in publication and dissemination of legislation from
the independent colonies through the early republic, the nineteenth century, and the movement
towards model codes in the twentieth century); see also Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissionerson Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233,
237 (1965) (describing the need for uniformity and the protection of state law-making authority
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one familiar example of a model code drafted by a private body
and enacted into public law. Portions of federal health, safety, and
environmental regulations provide other examples. The development of private standard and code drafting can be seen as a reflection of the expansion of the administrative state during the twentieth century and the consequent growth in legislation and regulation. 277
However, many of the issues in the model code cases parallel
those in Wheaton v. Peters,2 78 the first copyright case heard by the
Supreme Court. At issue in the Wheaton case was the copyrightability of federal judicial opinions. The Court held that federal judicial opinions were not copyrightable because judges, as
paid bureaucrats, did not need the incentive to create opinions.279
The Court extended this holding to state judicial opinions in
1888,280 and several lower federal courts in the late nineteenth century held that state legislation, when drafted by the state, similarly
was not the subject of copyright. 281 Federal legislation has been
from federal power); Herbert F. Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951
WASH. U. L.Q. 283, 286 (1951) (describing the need to aid attorneys in searching the vast body
of state and federal law for authority). For a general history, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 46-81 (1950)

(detailing the uses of the

legislature in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries). Several studies have
analyzed the process of standard setting and rle making more recently. See Ross E. CHEIT,
SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 149-207

(1990); Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory FederalStandardsAffecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1329, 1366 (1978)
(discussing local plumbing and building codes); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programsand U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10162 (2001) (arguing that environmental standards set by non-governmental
organizations are becoming increasingly more important in today's society).
277See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 83-85 (1982)
(discussing the statutorification of American law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 403-06 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the codification movement in America);
MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 117-21 (1992) (discussing the codification movement in the nineteenth
century); id. at 211-12 (discussing the Uniform Commercial Code); Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal
Panopticon:The Idea of a Modem Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 59-67 (2000)
(discussing the background to the drafting of the Model Penal Code); Allen R. Kamp, Betweenthe-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in
Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 329-34 (1995) (describing the goals of modernism in legal reform); G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4-16 (1997) (describing the crisis in jurisprudence during the
early twentieth century).
...
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 649-50 (1834).
279
2

Id.

80Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
281See Howell. v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) (holding that Michigan statutes were
not copyrightable); Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866) (holding that Minnesota state statutes could be freely copied but that the reporter could obtain a copyright in compilation and analysis); Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 260 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1979) (considering the challenge by a private publisher of state authorization granting the publication
rights of statutes to the Michie Company).
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exempted from copyright since 1909.282 The model code cases
present a novel question for the courts: Is privately drafted legislation or regulation subject to copyright? The courts are split on this
issue, with the Second and Ninth Circuits holding that copyright
does apply, and the First and Fifth Circuits holding that it does
not.283
The legal treatment of privately drafted codes reflects policy
conflicts over the values of privatization in the context of legislation. As legislation and regulation grow more complex and technical, the need for expertise increases. 284 Such expert knowledge
can be gleaned through the testimony of experts in committees or
as part of public hearings. 8 5 Federal notice and comment rule
making is one means of obtaining the requisite input of experts.286
Governmental bodies, like the National Academy of Science, can
be commissioned or can commission private bodies to research and
report on specific issues pertinent to policy. 287 Of course, legislators themselves may become expert in relevant areas, and experts
may seek legislative positions to aid in the drafting of difficult,
technical statutes and rules. Private code drafting, in theory, addresses many of these concerns by permitting a wider set of expert
voices to be heard and to assist in the actual writing of the statutory language. The legislature can then review the privately
drafted code and choose to enact it or not enact it after deliberation
over the effectiveness of the draft.
Private code drafting, it is argued, also allows for uniformity
in the law and for the voicing of a broader set of interests in the
288
legislative process. 8 The Uniform Commercial Code, as the
28217 U.S.C. § 8 (as amended Dec. 31, 1977). Section 8 excluded works of the United
States Postal Service, an exclusion that continues today under the Postal Reorganization Act of
1970. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976); Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).2 3
8 See Ghosh, supra note 25; cases cited supra note 274.
284See CHEIT, supra note 276, at 202-05 (discussing the procedural difficulty of adopting
as knowledge evolves).
public2 8standards
5
See CORNELIUS M.

KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES WRITE

LAW AND MAKE POLICY 65-70 (1994).
286
See id. at 52 (setting out core elements of rule making: information, participation, and
accountability); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 195-96 (2d ed. 1983) (pointing
out that agencies seek informed views of those affected by policy making).

287
See About the NAS:
History, National
Academy of Sciences,
at
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/nas/nashome.nsf/(Ieftnav)/AboutTheNAS-History?Open
Document (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (noting that the NAS was created to perform government
studies).
2

11See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25

YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (2000). For excellent discussions of the current legal issues, see Irina Y.
Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 81, 109-19 (2000) ("State governments have several incentives to claim copyright in
primary law materials.... [and miost states still claim some copyright interest in their statutory
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name implies, is perhaps the best example of the value of uniformity through private code drafting. Once the code has been drafted
many legislatures can study it and deliberate. The model code
serves as a template from which a specific legislature can borrow,
alter, or adopt verbatim. Even if each legislature adopts a variant
of the code, the model serves as a reference point for comparison
and interpretation. One can imagine that a market for codes now
becomes possible as different code drafting services offer alternate
models and vie for adoption by the legislature. The creation of
this market for codes, in theory, permits a more open process for
the enactment of legislation. Instead of relying on hearings, which
may be open or closed, and the opinions of a few, select experts,
the legislature can rely on a wider group of opinions either expressed within a code drafting organization or across different
code drafting organizations. Consequently, democratic deliberation and law making are enhanced by the market.
But of course this is the ideal theory behind private code
drafting. Opponents fear that the market may actually supplant
democracy as legislatures are captured by code drafting organizations.289 The horrors of government contracting, such as cost overruns and inefficient service, are recounted by critics of code drafting through the market. 290 The defense of privatization assumes an
ideally competitive market for the drafting and dissemination of
code. But markets can become concentrated, and private law making would be the product of a closed process. Support for this fear
can be seen in recent consolidations among private code drafting
organizations in the field of building and plumbing codes.29'
codes, court reports or administrative regulations."); Sharon K. Sandeen, Preserving the Public
Trust in State-Owned Intellectual Property: A Recommendation for Legislative Action, 32

McGEORGE L. REV. 385, 17-418 (2001) (surveying how states treat their intellectual property
and concluding that states should dedicate their intellectual property to the public trust unless
there is a clear showing that the public interest is benefited by an exception to that policy); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Configurations of

Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95, 99 (1989) (defending the codification movement in Georgia);
Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 192-208 (1998) (describing the economics of the legal
database industry and governing law); Andrea Simon, Note, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 465-66 (1984) (questioning copyrights in government commissioned works on First Amendment grounds).
289
As one attorney, supporting Veeck, put it: "[C]opyrighting the law puts the citizens in
the position of the Romans of Caligula's time, when certain taxes had been proclaimed but not
published in writing." Ted Wendling, Veeck Builds Case in Copyright Fight, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 12, 2003, at Al.
29°See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatizationand SubContracting,60 MD. L. REV. 249 (2001).

291In October 2002, SBCCI consolidated with two other code developing organizations to
form the International Code Council (ICC). The consolidated entity has launched an Internetbased subscription service to grant access to the model codes. Code Update, CONSULTING-
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Copyright's role in this scheme of privatization is apparent.
By giving a copyright in the model code to the drafters, the private
organization can finance its activities through sales of copies of
the code, possibly to state legislatures, but more likely to lawyers,
libraries, and practitioners who need the code for their profession.
The model code serves as a form of public infrastructure, providing a reference point for deliberation, criticism, and reform. Finally, copyright, by allowing drafters to secure rights in their
model code, aids in expanding the set of voices heard in the drafting process, since anyone can enter the market for model codes
and be secure that his or her draft code will not be misappropriated. In the case of model codes, copyright is used as a tool to privatize the government function of law making.
Private code drafting organizations defend their copyright
over model codes precisely in these terms.292 Absent a property
right in the code, they argue, the organizations cannot recoup their
investment in code drafting, and the business becomes unprofitable.293 The private organizations recognize the public values at
issue, particularly issues of due process arising from access to the
law. But the organizations also assert that there are no due process
issues raised because the private entity is not denying access to the
law, just the ability to make unauthorized uses of the text of the
law.294 As long as the code is available in public libraries or
county entities, denial of access has not occurred.2 95 This argument rests on two assumptions about the alleged due process violation. The first assumption is that the citizen has to look to action
by the state in the management of its libraries and offices for a due
SPECIFYING ENGINEER, Summer 2002, at 6.

292
See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 806 (5th Cir. 2002);
County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2001);
Bldg. Officials and Code Adm'r v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734-37 (1st Cir. 1980).
293See cases cited supra notes 271 and 274.
294See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 802; County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 195.
79- A telling example illustrates some of the potential problems with the due process argument. A colleague recently sought permission from the American Bar Association ("ABA") to
reprint fifteen provisions from the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct for use as
teaching materials in an overseas summer program. She received a letter denying permission.
The letter explained the denial in terms of "the policy of the ABA and its Center for Professional Responsibility not to permit the reproduction of more than 25% of the entire texts of
publications it is selling itself." Letter from ABA (April 28, 2003) (on file with the author).
The letter also explained that "these publications are valuable sources of revenue for the ongoing services of the Center in promoting professional standards in the fields of legal practice.
ABA editions in attractive but inexpensive formats are kept up to date and discounted prices are
set to make them appealing for group uses." Id. Interestingly, in light of the business model
proposed by the majority opinion in Veeck, the letter indicated that permission could not be
granted "to reprint just the black letter Rules without the accompanying comments and comparisons." Id. Eventually, my colleague received permission from the ABA for reprinting the de-

sired materials gratis.
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process violation. The private drafting organization is not the state
for due process purposes, and is therefore absolved. The second
assumption is that citizens do have access because the market will
provide the code to public entities, who make the decisions about
access to citizens, or to those citizens who are willing to pay for
copies of the code. In effect, there is a notion of market due process that removes any due process concerns from recognizing copyright in the model code.
I have made the argument against copyright in model codes
elsewhere, and here I will just summarize the problems with this
"market due process" argument.296 Privatizing law making ignores
the values of deliberative democracy. Even for technical matters,
law making better represents the interests of the public if done
through an open process of discussion and sharing of ideas. The
pursuit of these values does not mean that a legislature cannot rely
on private organizations for input, or even for draft model codes.
But turning the drafting process into a market one potentially turns
a democratic process into a discrete transaction between a demander of laws (the legislature) and a supplier of laws (the drafting organization). Furthermore, the financing of law making
through public means also undermines democratic values. In most
private code drafting cases, the organization allows the state to use
the model code without charge. The organization finances its enterprise through sales of the draft code to libraries, law firms, and
other interested parties. In other words, general tax revenues are
not used to fund law making. To the extent that tax revenues serve
to maintain government accountability, the power over the purse
strings is lost in the process. Although citizens could still hold
governments accountable by voting with their feet, this mechanism
is not likely to be effective. In conclusion, copyright law should
be applied to limit this practice and correct its abuses.
I originally made the above argument outside of the context of
the privatization model I am espousing in this Article.29 7 The privatization thesis only strengthens my claim. First, copyright in the
code drafting context is being used not to protect individual liberties, but to protect the rights of a group that is comparable to the
Stationer's Company, establishing a troubling parallel with copyright's early history. Private code drafting organizations are
largely professional associations, akin to guilds. Therefore, the
argument that copyright protects liberty interests in speech and
296See Shubha Ghosh, Manufacturing Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 297
Id.
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cultural production seems inapposite here. Second, copyright
permits the devolution of an activity that is central to the state's
police power. Private code drafting is different from the state
commissioning a song or a mural, and allowing the creator to
maintain a copyright. In the second example, the state has privatized one strand of its power. With private code drafting, the state
has privatized the key tool it has for exercising its power - the
drafting of legislation. The devolution is analogous to the issues
raised by the privatization of prisons that I discussed in Part I.
Through privatizing prisons, the state devolves a part of its law
enforcement power. Through privatizing legislation, the state devolves a central function necessary for executing all other powers.
Such a devolution requires special scrutiny.
By placing copyright into a privatization framework, my goal
is to revive the importance of public values in copyright law.
Once copyright is understood as a devolution of a public function,
the public dimension of copyright should be apparent. In resolving
the model code cases, courts have recognized these public values
(although, as I have argued elsewhere, perhaps not in the most effective manner). For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the
American Medical Association ("AMA") could copyright its standardized taxonomy for health care procedures adopted into federal
Medicare and Medicaid regulations. However, the court also limited the ability of the AMA to enforce its copyright against a
health maintenance organization that adopted the taxonomy in order to comply with federal law. 98 The court viewed such enforcement as copyright misuse, or an inequitable extension of the
copyright owner's right. 29 In reaching its decision, the court recognized the public values in having a taxonomical system that can
be shared by health care providers and managers. 300 The First Circuit protected public values when it denied copyright in a building
code drafted by a private organization because the drafters did not
need the incentive to draft the code, and because there were potentially serious due process concerns with access to the code if the
copyright was recognized.3 ° '

298

Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 517 (9th Cir. 1997).

29 Although the Ninth Circuit had found that the coding system was protected under copy-

right law, the court decided not to enforce the copyright because of a finding that AMA, as
copyright owner, had misused its copyright "by licensing the [the coding system] to HCFA
[Health Care Financing Administration] in exchange for HCFA's agreement not to use a competing coding system." Id. at 520.
300Id.
301See Bldg. Officials and Code Adm'r v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
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The Fifth Circuit has preserved public values through copyright in the most novel way by denying copyright to a model code
when the code is enacted into law. Once the model code is enacted
into law, the enacted law is now owned by the citizens who effectively "author" the law through the legislature. °2 The "citizenauthor," as owner of the law, controls the law collectively, meaning that the law is in the public domain. I have criticized this reasoning (but not the conclusion) of the Fifth Circuit extensively in a
separate article.3 °3 Whatever the problems with the application of
the concepts of authorship and ownership to law, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning illustrates how public values can be realized in
copyright. By taking enacted law out of copyright altogether, the
court recognizes the public need to use the law. Through the language of the "citizen author," the court explicitly recognizes the
public functions of law making that are at stake in the case. The
"citizen author" concept echoes the sovereign's prerogative to
grant patents over law books which defeated private rights of authors.3 °"
Note that recognizing public values in copyright does not
mean making all works public. The Fifth Circuit acknowledges
private incentive and financing issues when it concludes that even
though the private code drafters lose the copyright in the model
code when it is enacted, they retain a copyright in notes, comments, and other supplementary materials to the code. These
"value added" items, the court reasons, can still be the source of
profit. 30 5 I have criticized this holding for a number of reasons, the
primary one being the interdependence between enacted code and
notes, both for interpretive purposes and in the enactment process. 30 6 The Solicitor General, who was asked to submit a brief on
3

2

3

Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 798-99 (5th Cir. 2002).

30 See Ghosh, supra note 25.

-0 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
30-Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806.
30,The status of legislative history and notes is not addressed by the court and is an open
and pressing issue. If the legislature enacts SBCCI's notes or comments as part of its legislative
history, it is far from clear whether the notes or comments fall into the public domain under the
same logic as applied to the language of the code. The other possibility is that the notes or
comments retain their copyright because they have a different status from the language of the
code that is the product of the citizen author. Complicating this analysis are the arbitrary lines
often drawn by legislatures among text, notes, and legislative history. If a legislature, in enacting a model code, decides to place a provision of the code in the notes or in the legislative history, does it retain its copyright status? In other words, what exactly is the law enacted by the
legislature and drafted by the citizen author? As one commentator has stated, the decision's
"limitation is that it may force subsequent courts into a rhetorical debate about the metes and
bounds of the law." Brett 1. Miller, Can Public Law Be Private?, PA. L. WKLY., October 21,
2002, at 12. I want to thank my colleague Ken Joyce, who has worked on legislative drafting,
for pointing out these concerns. For authoritative discussions of the legislative process and the
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the case as part of the Supreme Court's review of the certiorari
petition filed in the case, concluded that financial incentives still
exist because:
professionals in the fields affected by particular standards
and codes may have ample incentive to continue to buy the
"official" sets of standards notwithstanding the potential
availability of other, unofficial editions. Even if profits from
sales of copyrighted materials were reduced, professionals in
the field and others may have many reasons to ensure that
broadly applicable standards and codes of high quality and
integrity remain available.3 °7
In other words, the loss of copyright in the draft code when enacted does not eliminate a market for the code drafter's work. This
pragmatic consideration of market effects allows for the accommodation of public values in copyright without loss of private incentive through the destruction of a private property interest.
The model code cases illustrate two aspects of my privatization thesis. The first is the thesis itself, that copyright is a privatization of a government function. In the model code cases, copyright is used to privatize the government function of law making
by allowing private code drafters to finance the creation of critical
public infrastructure - legal code. However, once the use of copyright as a means of privatization is recognized, it is possible to interpret copyright law in order to preserve the public values being
devolved. Although two courts (the Second and the Ninth Circuits) have explicitly recognized copyright in model codes and
standards, one of these two (the Ninth Circuit) placed limits on the
enforcement of the copyright. Two other courts have concluded
that copyright does not exist in model codes at all. The decisions
of these three courts serve as examples of how public values can
be preserved through interpretation of copyright law when copyright is being used to devolve a government function. °8

different treatments of text and notes across states, see ELLEN W. GIBSON, NEW YORK LEGAL
RESEARCH GUIDE 1.65-.90 (2d ed. 1998); DANIEL W. MARTIN, HENKE'S CALIFORNIA LAW
GUIDE 61-90 (5th ed. 1999); LAUREL WENDT, ILLINOIS LEGAL RESEARCH MANUAL 95-103

(1988).
307Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 18-19, Veeck, 293 F.3d 791 (No. 02-355).
308Another approach is exemplified by state legislatures dedicating state intellectual property to the public. For example, the legislature in California is considering the California Intellectual Property Rights Act, under which certain state-owned intellectual property would be
dedicated to the public domain. Assem. 1616, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
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B. Does an Author Exist?: Copyright and Faith-BasedInitiatives
Copyright has also played a role in intra-religious disputes
309
over access to religious texts allegedly protected by copyright.
The application of the privatization thesis to these cases raises issues of the proper relationship between the state and religious organizations, as well as the proper place of copyright in mediating
that relationship.
According to my thesis, copyrighting a church's religious
texts entails the devolution of a government function to a religious
organization. The difficult question is the identification of the
government function that is being devolved. There are two potentially overlapping theories of what government functions are being
devolved. The first theory focuses on the role of copyright in facilitating faith-based initiatives. The second, and more controversial, recognizes religious artifacts as cultural products that are
within the domain of the state.
The rhetoric of faith-based initiatives envisions the execution
of several government functions, such as education, redistributive
income policies, and drug rehabilitation, through religious organizations. 310 Copyright's role in the propagation of faith-based initiatives may seem tenuous until one recognizes that the sale of religious materials, including texts and icons, is an important source
of revenue for many religious organizations.3 ' Marketing of these
materials is facilitated by copyright law. The lawsuit brought by
The Gideons International, Inc., even though based in a theory of
trademark infringement, indicates the role of intellectual property
in creating valuable assets that religious organizations can exploit
for the financing of their activities.32 The Gideons International,
producers of the famous Bibles, successfully sued Gideon 300
Ministeries, a non-profit engaged in feeding the indigent and
homeless, for unauthorized use of the name "Gideons." In bring" See Cotter, supra note 26, at 325 (pointing out that the invention of printing press influreligious history and copyright development).
enced both
0
3 See MINOW, supra note 20, at 68-73 (discussing welfare reform and faith-based initiatives); John J. Dilulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1271, 1276-82 (2003) (discussing non-profits, including religions, and proxy government);
Minow, supra note 27, at 1240 (noting the increasing use of private organizations to achieve
public ends); Saperstein, supra note 27, at 1355-58 (examining the risks and alternatives to
public-religious joint ventures); Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1399 (setting up discussion of joint
ventures of religious and public-service associations).
311For a discussion of religious materials, see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989). For an excellent discussion of the new religion and the connections among the new
religion, commerce, and copyright, see Rebecca R. French, Shoppingfor Religion: The Change
in Everyday Religious Practiceand Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 188-92

(2003).1

3 2 Gideons Int'l, Inc. v. Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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ing the suit, Gideons International was trying to preserve the economic value of the name, an interest the court protected. Similarly, in Worldwide Church of God v. PhiladelphiaChurch of God,
Inc.,3 13 the issue was the commercial value of the sacred texts of
Herbert W. Armstrong, the church's founder. The ability to exploit the letters of a church's founder was also central to the dispute in Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. John Doe Nos. 1-25.314
Finally, the economic value of selling photographic images of the
church founder served as the basis for the lawsuit in SelfRealization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of SelfRealization.3 15
Copyright arguably facilitates the privatization of the government's role in providing educational and other services. Religion, however, also can be understood as a form of cultural production.3 16 This claim may be controversial because of the principle
of separation of church and state embodied, precariously, within
the principle of free exercise in the First Amendment of the
Constitution. But the notion of the separation of religion from
public, cultural, and social life has been severely criticized for
leading to both a distortion of religion and "an estrangement of law
from the general culture. 3 17 Some may counter my equating of
religion with culture by arguing that modern governments do not
have as one of their functions the creation of religious texts.3 18
The problem with this position, however, is that the government
does have the function of creating symbolic texts, whether they be
monuments or coins.319 Sometimes these symbols may have religious meanings, such as the imprinting of "In God We Trust" on
coins. 320 The function being devolved through copyright law ar313227

F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).
F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
315206 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 16
In this regard, consider the following statement by Professor Michael Brown: "In the
United States, at least, religion is arguably the final frontier of unregulated creativity." MICHAEL BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE ART? 40 (2003). Professor Brown, however, argues that
copyright and other intellectual property laws are not adequate to deal with the complex moral
and dignitary issues raised by religious texts. Although the focus of his criticism of intellectual
property is in its application to aboriginal art work, his thoughts are equally applicable to other
religious traditions.
314 172

317 WNNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1994).
31

8For a discussion of the principle of separation of church and state, see LEONARD W.

LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 144 (1994).

For

language of the separation between church and state in judicial opinions, see Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). For an analysis of the problem of symbolic endorsement of religion, see Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989).
319
See discussion of government functions, supra Part I.B.
3
2°See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984) (describing the use of "In God We
Trust" on U.S. currency).
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guably is the creation of cultural symbols as part of the cultural
infrastructure that governments are understood to provide. 32 1 This
explanation is troubling because while we do recognize that the
government may in some instances include religious symbols as
part of the cultural infrastructure, the creation of religious texts
seems outside the government's domain.3 22 The King James Bible
project could hardly have been undertaken by a democratic, religiously plural, or secular government. While religious texts do
serve secular purposes as cultural symbols, they are clearly more
than that.
The wall between church and state, however, is not impregnable. According to Justice Story, the purpose of the religion clauses
"was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or
Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude
all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment." 32 3 Articulating a Hobbesian notion of
the state, this view of the secular sovereign has taken several different forms. One view, associated with Roger Williams, depicts
the separation as protecting the church from the state.324 Conversely, Thomas Jefferson saw the separation as necessary to protect the state from the church.32 5
Alongside this view of state and religion rooted in Hobbes is
another tradition rooted in Adam Smith, who recognized the importance of religious instruction "to render people good citizens in
this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a
life to come. ,0326 The fostering of religious instruction required the
government both to leave religion alone
and to prevent encroachment of one religion upon another.3 27 Consistent with Smith's
discussion supra Part I.A.
position is based on either a strict separation position of a wall between church and
state, or a neutrality position, limiting the government's ability to take sides in religious debates.
See Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961) (attempting to measure cases against a neutral principle); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
321See

322This

Substantive and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001

(1990) (defining formal and substantive neutrality).
323JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 991

(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
324
Roger Williams, Roger Williams to the Town of Providence, in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 50, 50-51 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987); see also LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE MANAGEMENT OF

PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES 100 (2002) (citing Roger Williams as the source of the principle of a wall of separation between the church and the world).
325

See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 157-61 (William Peden

ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1955) (1784) (urging stronger assurances of religious freedom than
Virginia then had).
3 26

See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 788 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
327Id.
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view, Madison recognized "a window within the wall" between
church and state.32 8 Madison recognized the importance of religion in American life and framed the problem in terms of how religious and governmental institutions could coexist. The individual
citizen, according to Madison, had duties and obligations to his
faith and to civil society:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as subject of the Governour of
the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters
into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a
reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much more
must every man who becomes a member of any particular
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.329
Religion served as a basis for associations that existed within
the state, but was to be kept at arms' length from government institutions. These understandings of the wall between church and
state recognize the coexistence between religious and other institutions. From this coexistence flows the proposition that religion is
one aspect of culture. In fact, as Professor Hatch has documented,
an important dimension of print culture in the early American republic was the propagation of religious texts as a means of challenging traditional religious hierarchies. 330 Freedom of press, of
speech, and of religion are intimately interconnected.
Although modern democratic governance would not countenance a government project such as the King James Bible, religion
is recognized in democratic government in other, more subtle
ways. While Professor Stephen Carter mourned the devaluation of
religion in the public sphere in The Culture of Disbelief,33' he acclaims religion's role as a counter to "the dominant forces in the
culture. 332 For Carter, religion is the subculture that is most capable of resisting dominance by the majority.333 Precisely because
of religion's power to facilitate resistance, Carter extols respect for
328
BURTON, supra note 324, at 102.
329James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 324, at 82.
33°See HATCH, supra note 218, at 125-26 (discussing the nineteenth century explosion of

religious-topic popular printed material).
33'STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-

TICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 43-44 (1993) (arguing that religion domesticated by
politicians becomes trivialized).
332STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION

IN POLITICS 171 (2000).
333

See id.
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the autonomy of religious communities as a means to further dissent, and to stimulate political and social progress, the Civil Rights
movement serving as his primary example.33 4 But the Civil Rights
movement serves as only one example of religion's role in shaping
culture. Theologian Martin L. Marty talks about the importance of
religion in forming a rounded participatory citizen, one who is
"mobilized by faith. 3 35 Professor Lloyd Burton documents the
play of religion in public lands management in the United
States.336 His examples range from the Tenth Circuit's disposition
of a case involving commercial use of the Devils Tower National
Monument in favor of Native American tribes and against commercial interests,3 37 to the issues raised by preservation of the Bighorn Medicine Wheel for the United States Forest Service.33 8 Furthermore, religion has had important influences on the emergence
of commercial culture, in shaping the landscape of literary marketplaces through censorship campaigns,33 9 in defining the politics
and culture of the urban landscape in the post-World War II United
States, 34 0 and in developing the market for food and religious lifestyles. 341 Finally, looking beyond the United States, appeal to religion has become an important prong of economic development
strategy as the World Bank has moved to address the concerns of
religious groups in developing countries that challenge policies of
austerity and free markets.342
I have made the case for treating religion as a type of culture
for the purposes of my privatization thesis. But characterizing
copyright in religious texts as a form of privatization requires deal3 34

STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RE-

LIGION, AND LOYALTY 141-42 (1998).
335MARTIN E. MARTY, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A
DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGION'S ROLE IN OUR SHARED LIFE 55-72

(2000).
336
BURTON, supra note 324, at 32-34 (connecting land-management issues to American
Indian spiritual traditions).
337
Id. at 123-44 (discussing Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
338
BURTON, supra note 324, at 162-66 (discussing Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001)).
339P.C. Kemeny, Banned in Boston: Commercial Culture and the Politics ofMoral Reform
in Boston During the 1920s, in FAITH IN THE MARKET: RELIGION AND THE RISE OF URBAN

COMMERCIAL CULTURE 133, 148 (John M. Giggie & Diane Winston eds., 2002).
340
Melani McAlister, Nation Time: Black Islam and African American Cultural Politics,
1955-1970, in FAITH IN THE MARKET: RELIGION AND THE RISE OF URBAN COMMERCIAL CULTURE, supra note 339, at 199, 202.
341Etan Diamond, Beyond Borscht: The Kosher Lfestyle and the Religious Consumerism
of Suburban Orthodox Jews, in FAITH IN THE MARKET: RELIGION AND THE RISE OF URBAN
COMMERCIAL CULTURE, supra note 339, at 227,233-34.
342 Gregory Baum, Solidarity with the Poor, in THE LAB, THE TEMPLE, AND THE MARKET:
REFLECTIONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 74-77

(Sharon Harper ed., 2000).
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ing with the Constitutional limitations on the state's regulation of
religion.34 3 The Constitutional protections for religion should inform the public values of copyright when religious texts are at issue.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement of free exercise is one weakly protective of religious practices. 3 " In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that the government
need not create an exemption for religion from law that was generally applicable and neutrally applied. 345 However, exemptions will
be required if the law is designed to target a specific religious
practice. 346 The Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been
fairly muddy, with the Lemon test being the principal standard.347
Under the Lemon test, a law does not violate the Establishment
Clause if it has a secular purpose and a secular effect, and does not
involve excessive entanglement between the state and the religious
organization.3 48 The test has an inherent tension between its second and third elements: Ensuring that a law has a secular effect
often will require the state to become increasingly entangled with
the religious organization. 349 For example, in ensuring that subsidies to private and public schools do not unduly benefit religious
schools, the state will have to monitor how the subsidies are
used.35°
Because of these difficulties, the Court has also developed alternative tests for violations of the Establishment Clause that are
based on whether individuals are being coerced into participation
in religious practices and beliefs. 35' This test has had its most im3

34 For discussion of the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment

Clause, see Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1402; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 449 (2000) (questioning the effect of privatization on religion); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115

(1992) (calling the Warren and Burger courts' work in these areas confused and often counterproductive).
3
" Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (allowing denial of unemployment
benefits to workers fired for sacramental use of peyote).
345Id. at 879.

346Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993) (holding that ordinances forbidding animal sacrifice fail tests of neutrality, general applicability,
compelling government interest, and narrow tailoring to that interest).
347Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
348 d. at 612.
-4 See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech
and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (1995) (focusing on the problem of inadvertence).
350
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 795-96 (2000) (discussing divertibility of aid to
religious ends).
351See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-03 (2000) (holding that public
school prayer at football game impermissibly imposes upon the student body a majoritarian
election on the issue of prayer).
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portant applications to the question of prayer in public schools.35 2
The most recent Supreme Court ruling on the Establishment
Clause was on the constitutionality of school vouchers, which the
Court held did not violate the Establishment Clause because the
state, through vouchers, financed private citizens, who in turn decided to spend the grant on either religious or secular education.353
The decisions of the private citizens served as a circuit breaker,
preventing an unconstitutional entanglement between the church
and the state.354
When a court has to decide which sect has rights in the copyrighted text, the court is in a position of being seen as endorsing
one side of a religious dispute. General jurisprudential principles
require courts hearing an intra-sectarian dispute to decide the case
on legal principles, avoid consideration of internal religious doctrine, and defer to internal church hierarchy on questions of doctrine.355 Copyright provides legal principles on how to allocate
property rights that for the most part allow a court to avoid questions of internal church doctrine.356 For example, in a recent case
involving ownership in the writings of an Indian swami who had
founded a church in the United States, the Ninth Circuit based its
decision on the doctrine of work for hire to determine whether the
Swami had created the writings as part of his employment with the
church.357 In other cases, courts look to the doctrines of authorship
and fair use to settle the dispute, and thus questions of internal
doctrine are avoided.3 58
Even if the court looks to secular copyright law to resolve intra-sectarian disputes, the problem remains that the court must decide between two competing religious groups. If copyright is interpreted to mean that Church A has no rights in the text, this decision arguably constitutes both a violation of the free exercise
rights of the members of Church A, or an establishment of Church
352

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584-85 (1992) (affirming that no holding by the
Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise). 353
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (stating that the Establishment
Clause question of whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious
schools must be answered by evaluating all options).
354ld.
355

See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871) (holding that a civil court is
not to consider church doctrine in a property dispute).
356
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (concerning ownership of church property
after schism in the congregation).
351Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d
1322, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the writings in question were not "works for hire"
due to the lack of evidence of the church's supervision or control of the work).
35
1 See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115-20
(9th Cir. 2000).

DEPRIVA TIZING COPYRIGHT

2003]

B. Most scholars would agree that copyright is not facially unconstitutional on either Free Exercise or Establishment Clause
grounds. 359 Copyright is a generally applicable law and would
pass muster under Smith. Furthermore, copyright has a clear secular purpose and effect, and even though specific cases may require
judicial entanglement into the workings of a religious organization, this entanglement most likely would not be excessive, especially in light of the general principle of deciding intra-religious
disputes without reference to internal doctrine. Therefore, copyright on its face passes the Lemon test.
But in its applications, the constitutional values should play a
role in the adjudication of these disputes, especially if copyright is
understood as a privatization of a government function.36 ° In other
words, under my privatization thesis, courts should acknowledge
the public values underlying copyright and not simply view copyright as the enforcement of private rights against the world. Since
the religious text cases implicated values of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, these values should be part of how we apply copyright law to these cases. Therefore, even though copyright, understandably so, does not violate either the Free Exercise
or the Establishment Clause, the principles underlying these
clauses should inform how we interpret copyright law and the way
in which it carries out the government functions of cultural production.
What are the values of free exercise and establishment? The
answer depends on how one construes the relationship between
religion and state. Professor Kathleen Sullivan has suggested an
extremely useful and practical conceptualization of this relationship based on four identifiable functions of religion. 36' First, religion can be viewed as a quasi-government, carrying out many of the
functions of secular states. 362 Under this view, free exercise
should be weak to prevent balkanization, and establishment should
be strong to maintain neutrality and reduce resentment among
competing religious entities.363 Second, religion can be viewed as
a form of private expressive association, such as a university or a
country club.3 6 Under this view, free exercise and establishment
should both be strong, requiring the recognition of many religious
practices and beliefs without the sponsorship of any particular re359Cotter,

supra note 26, at 337, 366.

360 Id. at 367-68.
361 Sullivan, supra

Id. at 1403-05.
363 Id. at 1404-05.
36 Id. at 1405-07.
362

note 27, at 1401-03.
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ligion.3 65 Third, if religion is seen as a discrete and insular minority, often existing in opposition to the state, then free exercise
should be strong to protect religious practices, and establishment
should be weak to allow for secular accommodation of religious
activities.366 Fourth, and last, religion may be seen as just another
interest group, implying that free exercise and establishment
should both be weak because religion, like all other interests,
should protect itself through market and political means.367 This
last view, Professor Sullivan concludes, is the view adopted in current constitutional law jurisprudence.36 8
But the fourth view is not appropriate for copyright law.
When we deal with religion in the context of copyright, we are not
dealing with just another interest group. We are treating religion
as a private expressive association whose key form of expression
is the religious text.3 69 Professor Sullivan's schema suggests that
copyright should be based on strong Free Exercise and strong
Establishment Clause values when applied to intra-sectarian
disputes. What this means is that courts, in deciding copyright
cases between competing religious users of expression, should be
careful in not picking sides and disenfranchising one group from
the practice of their beliefs. This underlying principle is consistent
with the third function of government in cultural production, the
distributive goal of ensuring that minority voices are heard and
expression of minority culture is not disadvantaged. The other two
functions are also implicated. For in ensuring that religious groups
are not disenfranchised, courts should be aware that by the copyright grant, religious practices are being financed and cultural infrastructures for the practice of one's beliefs are being created.
These are the public values that my privatization thesis, when understood in the context of religion and the law, would seek to endow in copyright law.
The actual case law provides some examples of successes and
some examples of failures under the criteria I have developed. For
example, in analyzing authorship questions involving religious
texts, courts have rejected the argument that since the source of the
text is God, there is no human author and therefore the text is not
365Id. at

1406-07.

366Id. at 1408-09.
367Id. at
368

39

1409-11.

Id. at 1411.

6 Id. at 1405; see French, supra note 311, at 135 (discussing religion as a means of expression and culture); see also Rebecca French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional,

Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S. ConstitutionalLaw, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 81 (1999)

(discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of postmodem religious groups under the First
Amendment).
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subject to copyright. 370 This argument has been made a number of
times by defendants who seek to dismiss a copyright infringement
claim brought by the dominant sect seeking to limit access to the
work by the opposing sect. While the argument is clever and has
some appeal, it is misguided for a number of reasons.
First, by denying copyright altogether in a religious text, to
adopt a notion of the "divine author," analogous to the "citizen
author" in the Fifth Circuit, 37 1 is to deny the religious organization
any ability to manage the religious text. In other words, to deny
rights to anyone is to allow everyone to potentially copy, alter, distribute, and market the text. Such loss of control by placing the
religious text in the public domain potentially diminishes the secular value of the text to all members of the religious group, however
divided they may be as to the correct ownership and proper use of
the text.
Secondly, assessing the validity of the argument may force the
court to investigate and become entangled with religious doctrine
about human agency and divine will. Avoiding such entanglement
through a rule that authorship is satisfied through traditional copyright doctrine - in other words, that it is a human person from
whom the written text originates - seems a safer alternative. Professor Thomas Cotter has suggested that for issues of authorship in
religious texts, courts should adopt a default rule of noncopyrightability (instead of the current presumption of copyrightability) in order to respect religious beliefs about divine origin
and human agency. 37272 I agree with Professor Cotter's concerns
about free exercise values, but think there are better ways to address these values, as I discuss below. In the context of authorship, I am not convinced that his proposal would address the dangers of entanglement, and may in fact increase them. The vacuum
created by removing the presumption of copyright and the attendant notions of authorship would be filled by the pertinent assumptions of the particular religious system regarding the origins of the
text. Law would essentially be replaced with religious doctrine,
violating an important foundational principle in religious jurisprudence that courts avoid doctrinal disputes. The better approach is
370See, e.g., Penguin Books U.S.A, Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd.,
No. 96 Civ. 4126 (RWS), 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680, 2000 WL 1028634 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000)
(holding that a religious textbook was protected by copyright and was not a divine revelation),
rev'd on other grounds, 288 F. Supp. 2d 544 (2003); Cummins v. Bond, 1 Ch. 167 (1927) (holding that a text written from psychic seances was a copyrighted book); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that a book distributed as a divine revelation
was protected as a literary work).
371Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002).
372
Cotter, supra note 26, at 343-44.
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to recognize that if principles of authorship are held to be so offensive to religious beliefs concerning origins, then the disputing parties may choose to simply not have the matter resolved through
copyright doctrine and the federal courts. The plaintiff by bringing the suit is effectively denying divine authorship, and presumably is acting in accordance with its beliefs about the text. However, any evidence that the plaintiff has previously asserted that
the text is not of human authorship would be a basis for copyright
estoppel, allowing the court to dismiss the suit without entering
into the doctrinal dispute over authorship.3 73
My approach to authorship may seem unaccommodating to religious belief, but in fact I am seeking to avoid the problem of
turning a courtroom into a forum for doctrinal debates that are outside the judge's competence. Moreover, free exercise values and
establishment concerns are arguably better addressed through
copyright doctrines, such as fair use, that are intended to protect
the rights of dissident users. On this point, courts have shown
mixed success. The issue of the right to publish official and secret
church documents has been the subject of several cases, with the
courts finding fair use in two cases 37 4 and a triable issue of fact in
another.375 In some of these cases, the church documents were
leaked to the publisher or distributed on a web site by church dissidents. The conflict between the church authority and the dissidents offers an example of the strong Free Exercise and Establishment Clause values I advocate here. By protecting the right of the
dissident to use the sacred text, the court created an appropriate
exemption from copyright, protecting Free Exercise Clause values
and avoiding the endorsement of the dominant religious group
against the voice of dissidents, protecting Establishment Clause
values.
The Ninth Circuit, however, in the well-known Worldwide
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.,376 illustrates
an approach that is antithetical to Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause values. The case involved the teachings of Herbert Armstrong, a minister who founded a church called the Worldwide
Church of God in California in the 1950s. His writings contained
racist and other offensive statements that the Church expurgated in
373See, e.g., Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960); see
also Cotter,
supra note 26, at 345-47 (discussing copyright estoppel).
374
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523-26 (D. Colo.
1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 263-66 (E.D. Va. 1995).
375Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp
1361, 1380-81 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
376227 F.3d I 110 (9th Cir. 2000).
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editions of the text published after Armstrong's death. A dissenting faction of the church wanted to use the unexpurgated version
and broke away. In their practice, the dissenting faction copied
and used the unexpurgated version, creating the basis for a copyright lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit ruled against the dissenters, finding that this use was not a fair use. Central to the Ninth Circuit's
analysis were the findings that the dissenters had copied the entire
text without transforming it, and that the use by the dissenters
harmed the ability of the Church to sell the text.
Several things are questionable about this analysis. First
among them is the Ninth Circuit's underestimation of the critical
use of the text by the dissenting wing of the church. The relevant
fact, to the court, was the wholesale copying of the text without the
addition of any new or valuable textual material, either in the form
of notes, comments, or criticisms.3 77 The critical use of the text,
however, was the placing of the text in a different religious and
interpretative context. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., by way of contrast, the Supreme Court recognized
that the wholesale copying of a broadcast program that permitted
the viewing in a different context (what is referred to as time shifting) was fair use.378 Furthermore, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized that wholesale
copying is fair use if necessary to criticize or comment upon the
work. 379 Either of these cases would apply to the facts of Worldwide Church of God. Instead, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
wholesale copying outside the context in which the copies were
used.
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit framed the case as a dispute between competitors in the marketplace as opposed to one between
two religious believers. The market analysis, as is often thought to
be the case in copyright cases, may have been crucial to the outcome. 380 The potential lost revenue from sales and the ability of
the Church to alter and create derivative works from the Bible
were what concerned the court. 38' The problem is that in analyzing
the dispute solely in market terms, the court arguably disenfranchises a religious group whose practices and beliefs required the
use of the unexpurgated text. Of course, after the decision against
them, the dissenters could seek to license the text or obtain permission to use the unexpurgated text. But the facts of the case suggest
77

Id. at 1117-19.
378464 U.S. 417,442-43 (1984).
3

379796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986).
380Worldwide
381Id.

Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1120.
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that the Church was not inclined to grant such license or permission. Given the context, the court erred in analyzing the case as
largely a market issue, rather than as an issue of conflicting religious belief.
The analysis of Worldwide Church of God would have been
better informed by recognizing the arguments made here. Copyright is a means of privatizing a government function. But the privatization thesis is not as easy to apply in the religious text cases
as it is in the model code cases because of the concerns of the
proper relationship between the church and the state. This complication means that courts have to think differently about the public
values imbuing copyright disputes over the use of a religious text.
Public values in cases involving copyright and religion include the
protection of religious voice and of beliefs, both across and within
religious systems. The Worldwide Church of God decision is a
disappointment on these grounds. Instead of protecting religious
pluralism, the Ninth Circuit's decision privileged one side in a religious dispute, allowing the victor to censor portions of a religious
text and dissident voices. The result presents uncomfortable parallels to copyright's early history as a tool of censorship, and hinders
the search for public values in copyright's present.
C. The DMCA as Privatizationof Information Regulation
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was enacted in
1998 and became effective after a period of legislative and administrative review in 2000, creates a private cause of action allowing
the owner of copyrighted material which is encrypted to prosecute
anyone who has circumvented the encryption in order to access
and make use of the material.38 2 The act also allows the owner to
prosecute anyone who traffics or distributes decryption technology. 383 Furthermore, the owner is given the right to obtain a subpoena from a district court ordering an Internet service provider to
disclose the names of its subscribers if the owner reasonably believes that some of the subscribers are engaged in copyright infringement on the Internet.384 Given the broad powers granted to
private copyright owners, the act has been the subject of intense
study and criticism by academics and practitioners.38 5 The concern
is that the DMCA will allow digital materials and access to the
38217 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).

383
Id. §
3

1201(b).

94Id.
315See sources cited supra note 10; LITMAN, supra note 8, at 171-91 (arguing that the

DMCA focuses too heavily on copyright holders' rights rather than users' rights).
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Internet to be controlled by completely private governance, eliminating protective doctrines like fair use, the First Amendment, and
due process.
There are two schools of criticisms. The first characterizes
the DMCA as a privatization of copyright.386 By allowing owners
of copyrighted materials to prosecute purveyors and users of decryption technology, the act effectively allows owners to protect
their copyright through encryption technology, reducing and possibly eliminating the need to use copyright law. Privatization,
within this school of thought, has a different meaning from mine.
While I am arguing that copyright is a privatization of a government function, the position I have just described sees the DMCA
as a privatization of the government function of enforcing copyright law. However, the views of privatization are really indistinguishable once one recognizes that copyright law has always been
a means of privatization. The DMCA allows privatization of government function through technological means. To return to the
three types of government functions I described in Part I, the
DMCA permits copyright owners to earn rents that finance their
activities, governs the way in which digital cultural infrastructure,
such as e-books and other digital media, are created, and facilitates
the creation of a new national culture in the digital age. 387 The
DMCA is arguably just another example in copyright's long history of the devolution of government functions to a private right.
The second school of criticism views the DMCA as a return to
the licensing statutes of England, particularly the Licensing Act of
1662, which allowed the Star Chamber to censor publications.38 8
This view is most recently expressed by Professor Ray Patterson.
While the Licensing Act censored materials that were deemed "heretical, schismatical, blasphemous, seditious, and treasonable,"
Professor Patterson argues that the DMCA allows access to digital
works to be controlled by private, for-profit licensing arrangements. 389 This comparison, on the surface, seems to be consistent
with my privatization thesis, but there is one big difference. The
Licensing Act is clearly privatization because it was the crown's
interest in controlling seditious speech which was carried out by
devolution of the censorial power to the Star Chamber. Under the
DMCA, private parties are pursuing their interests, not a govern386

See Jackson, supra note 10, at 609-10.

37 See, e.g., LACY, supra note 217, at 139-51 (discussing the development of printed me-

dia in light of new multimedia technologies).
388
See Patterson, supra note 10, at 39-41 (comparing the DMCA to the Licensing Act of
1662).
389 Id. at

34.
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ment interest, in censoring decryption technology. Arguably,
when compared with the Licensing Act, the DMCA is not privatization at all, but a statute produced by industry capture designed to
protect purely private interests.39 °
There is no doubt that the DMCA vindicates the private interests of copyright holders. But as a statute that permits private control of information, the DMCA can be seen as yet another manner
in which privatization has occurred. The key to the privatization
characterization has to do with the continuing evolution of what
constitutes copyright. As we have seen, in eighteenth and nineteenth century England, copyright was seen largely as a matter of
literary property. This view continued in the United States. Recently, copyright has been extended to cultural property. What the
DMCA demonstrates is that copyright, in the digital age, is about
information, disembodied from artifacts like books, statues, performances, or musical scores. In the digital world, ideally, all cultural production will be digital, and culture will be disembodied
information that is controlled through code. Professor Lessig has
famously made this point, and it is a conception of digital culture
that is shared by many, both critics and defenders of the DMCA.3 9'
The parallel with English licensing is perhaps stronger than Professor Patterson believes. While he seems to suggest that the
DMCA is purely the protection of private interests, I am contending that the DMCA is no different from other forms of copyright
that entailed a devolution of a government function in cultural
production to private parties. Through licensing, the sovereign
sought to censor seditious speech and sanction speech consistent
with the state's views on culture and the polity. Similarly, the
DMCA allows limits on decryption to protect market, digital culture as defined by the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA"), the motion picture industry, and other key players. The
key change, however, is that culture is now in the form of disembodied information, rather than artifacts.3 92
I do not want to suggest that digital culture will drive out print
culture. Several scholars have written about the death of print cul39°See LITMAN, supra note 8, at 171 (arguing that current copyright holders seek to maintain their positions with new statutes).
391 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 39-42 (2000); see also

Ku, supra note 6 (arguing that exclusive copyrights create an economic disincentive for music
creation); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying,
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001) (arguing that the DMCA
exists to protect private interests).
392For an example of the transformation of cultural artifacts into information, see JOHN
SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION 65-89 (2000) (describing a

new sociology developing around the creation, processing, and dissemination of information).

2003]

DEPRIVATIZING COPYRIGHT

ture, and their work testifies to the exaggerated rumors of the
book's death.393 But the DMCA's context is digital culture, and
within the context of digital culture where all expression is pure
information, understanding the DMCA requires an important
modification of the privatization thesis. The reduction of culture
to disembodied information creates problems because even though
all culture may be a form of information, not all information is
necessarily culture. William Gass's novel The Tunnel is a cultural
artifact and it is information. But the weather report or a DNA
sequence is a piece of information, but not a cultural artifact for
the purposes of copyright law. However, that is precisely the
problem in the digital age, which blurs the distinction between cultural artifact and information.
This blurring can be seen in the many cases involving the
copyright of facts, in which the basic principle that ideas and facts
cannot be copyrighted seems to have lost its bite. Digitization reduces everything from Gass's The Tunnel to the local weather report into a string of ones and zeros, pure information not tied to
artifact. For this reason, I modify the privatization thesis slightly
in the context of the DMCA. In the digital age, copyright is devolution to private parties of the government's role in the production
and regulation of information. When understood this way, the
DMCA can be seen as increasing the scope of government powers
that have been devolved to private parties. Three cases illustrate
this point: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,394 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,395 and In re Veri3 96
zon Internet Services, Inc.
A pure example of cultural artifact as information is provided
by movies distributed on DVDs through an encryption technology
called CSS. When hackers discovered the means to decrypt CSS,
through a program called DeCSS, the motion picture studios
brought suit against the hackers and publishers of the decryption
technology under the DMCA. The suit terminated in the Second
Circuit's decision in Corley, which upheld the district court's grant
of an injunction against the publishing and dissemination of
DeCSS.3 97 What is important for the privatization thesis is how the
court decided the First Amendment claims raised by the defen93

3

See, e.g., NICHOLSON BAKER, DOUBLE FOLD: LIBRARIES AND THE ASSAULT ON PAPER

131-32 (2001) (discussing efforts to digitize paper library collections).
3-4273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
395253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
396240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
397Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
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dants. The court held that the First Amendment applied under an
intermediate standard of review because the speech at issue was
functional speech.398 The decryption program served a function; it
was like instructions used to pick a lock or build a bomb.399 Consequently, the court applied a standard applicable to regulation of
communications that are a mixture of speech and conduct to conclude that First Amendment rights were not violated. 4°° The motion picture studios could enjoin the distribution of DeCSS.
There is no doubt that the Corley decision resulted in censorship of information. The key is that the court viewed the communication of DeCSS to be different from pure political or artistic
speech that the court recognized would obtain strong protection.
The First Amendment, as the court emphasizes, protects speech as
information, and information falls under different categories for
First Amendment purposes, such as political, artistic, expressive,
commercial, and functional. 40 1 What is striking about the decision
is the reduction of cultural expression to different grades of information, illustrating my argument that culture has been transformed
into information. Although the court suggests that the equation of
culture and information has always been a part of First Amendment jurisprudence, digitalization has been a catalyst for the transformation. 4°2
While the Corley case is an example of how culture becomes
information under the DMCA, Lexmark illustrates how market privatization is at the heart of the DMCA. The case involved a suit
brought by the manufacturer of printer and toner cartridges against
a manufacturer and distributor of refurbished toner cartridges designed to operate on the plaintiff's printers. The DMCA was implicated because the refurbished toner cartridge contained a chip
that permitted the circumvention of a program embedded into the
printer that enabled the operation of toner cartridges made only by
the printer manufacturer. Effectively, the printer manufacturer had
created a system that required use of its cartridges with its printer.
The refurbisher had found a way to circumvent the system. 4°3 The
refurbisher's actions were held to be a clear violation of the
DMCA because its computer chip allowed the circumvention of
398Id. at 445.
399Id. at 439.
4w Id. at 450.
401See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275,

1292-304 (2002) (contrasting case-by-case analyses of First Amendment violations to the use of
general categories).
402Corley, 273 F.3d at 452.
4 Lexmark int'l, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 947-56.

DEPRIVA TIZING COPYRIGHT

2003]

Lexmark's copyright protected computer software. 4 In response
to the argument that the injunction would be anti-competitive, the
court responded that the refurbisher's method of competition was
not legitimate. 4°5
Lexmark is an example of copyright as a purely private right.
The argument cannot be made that the use of copyright here exemplifies the devolution of a government function. The case does
illustrate how information can readily be turned into a product that
defines and protects private property interests. To the extent that
the DMCA should be read as privatizing a government function in
the production and regulation of information, the Lexmark decision
misinterprets the meaning and purpose of the DMCA.
The most troubling example of the DMCA as privatization is
provided by a recent decision in Verizon Internet Services. The
case illustrates the application of a provision that allows a copyright owner to "request the clerk of any United States district court
to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an
alleged infringer. ''4°6 While the section does impose some formal
requirements on the copyright owner, there is no requirement of
pending litigation.7 The copyright owner does have to sign a
sworn affidavit attesting to a good faith belief that copyright infringement has occurred. °8 The RIAA obtained such a subpoena
against Verizon in order to obtain the names of subscribers to Verizon's Internet service who were believed to be engaged in illegal
copying and sharing of music files. Verizon refused to comply,
and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate
section 512(h) as a violation of Article III and the First Amendment. The court rejected Verizon's claims, holding that since the
DMCA does not regulate speech or expression and since it contains procedural protections against abuse, fraud, and mistakes,
there was no First Amendment violation. 4°9 Furthermore, since the
district court clerk was serving a purely ministerial function, Article III courts were not implicated and therefore Article III did not
apply. 410 "Under § 512(h)," the court concluded, "the clerk carries

4w
5

Id. at 969-71.

40 Id. at 973.
17 U.S.C § 512(h) (2000).
407See id. § 512(h)(4).

408Id. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v), 51 2(h)(4).
4w In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 257-68 (D.D.C. 2003). The
court had initially granted the RIAA's motion to enforce its subpoena in In re Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
410257 F. Supp. 2d at 248-57.
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out a non-discretionary duty that allows one private party to retrieve information from another private party. '4 1'
The need for section 512(h) arises from the immunity granted
to Internet Service Providers for copyright infringement under section 512(a). Copyright owners have to enforce their rights against
direct infringers of copyright - the subscribers to the Internet service. Since the identities of the subscribers are known to the providers, entities like Verizon become the least-cost providers of information to copyright owners. Whatever efficiency justifications
may exist for section 512(h), the provision illustrates further how
the DMCA acts as a privatization of government functions. The
DMCA permits private copyright holders to protect their rights
technologically through private rights of actions that are supported
by a private subpoena power to obtain information about potential
plaintiffs. Both legislative powers and judicial powers are devolved to private parties. In light of copyright's history as a means
of privatization, the current state of the world under the DMCA
should not be surprising. What is disturbing, however, is how far
we have come from the coincidence of private claims and the public good that Madison professed for copyright. The D.C. Circuit
has partly remedied the situation by reversing the district court in
Verizon. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the DMCA subpoena
power could be used only against an Internet Service Provider that
stored information about its users, not a provider that served as a
mere conduit for information. By this judicious statutory reading,
the appeals court has limited some of the private power granted to
copyright owners. 412
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY, HISTORY, AND
PRACTICE FOR POLICY

This Part focuses on how the privatization thesis elucidates
four questions in copyright: copyrightable subject matter, fair use,
the First Amendment, and copyright misuse and antitrust.
A. Is Everything Copyrightable?
The answer to this odd question may very well be yes. Section 102 defines what can and what cannot be copyrighted, and is
divided into two subsections. The first subsection states that copyrightable subject matter includes all original works of authorship

4 11

d. at 255.
See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
4 12
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413

Works of authat are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
thorship are broken down into eight categories that include literary
works, musical works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, and
architectural works. 414 The second subsection excludes ideas, pro4 15
cedures, methods, and discoveries from the ambit of copyright.
The two subsections imply several limitations on copyrightable
subject matter. The expression must be fixed, it must be original,
and it must not fall into one of the enumerated exclusions. These
limitations have increasingly been construed narrowly. The fixation requirement excludes only live or other unrecorded performances from copyright.4 16 The originality and idea/process limitations have also been narrowed for reasons I discuss below. The
result seems to be that the scope of copyright is quite broad and
includes not only traditional materials like books and songs, but
also materials like legal standards, tax maps, legal complaints, legal briefs, and price data.417
The broad reach of copyrightable subject matter reflects many
developments in copyright law. The first is the shift from culture
as artifact to culture as information.4 18 Copyright's reach into legal materials and data suggests that cultural artifacts such as books
and paintings are not the sole beneficiary of copyright protection.
The transformation of informative materials into copyrightable
subject matter reflects the reduction of books and other cultural
materials into information. 1 9 Once all cultural artifacts are information, it becomes difficult to draw distinctions between books
and data. The second development is the recognition of copyright
as a private right to secure private interests.42 ° Just as copyright
protection granted to books allows the author to secure valuable
rents, so too, the argument goes, protection should be granted to all
expression. The expansion of subject matter reflects both cultural
41317 U.S.C. § 102(a).
414

1d. §§ 102(a)(1)-(8).

4151d. § 102(b).
416See, e.g., Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation:A Copyright with Teeth for Improvi-

sationalPerformers,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1364-65 (1997) (discussing the requirements for
improvisational performances to achieve copyright protection).
417 See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A ComparativeAnalysis of the Notion
ofOriginalin'in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 949, 954-58 (2002) (reviewing
the lower courts' application of Feist to database compilations).
418See, e.g., DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: PHILOSOPHY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 86-87 (2000) (discussing the transmission and
tangibility of electronic information); Jeffrey Masten et al., Introduction to LANGUAGE MACHINES: TECHNOLOGIES OF LITERARY AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION 1, 5-6 (Jeffrey Masten et

al. eds.,
1997) (discussing the use of multimedia to teach literature).
419
See BROWN AND DUGUID, supra note 392, at 19-21.
42

°See DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 163-64 (1992) (discussing the

Industrial Revolution's impact on book copyrights).
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changes and changes in the conception of copyright as a private
right.
The privatization thesis demands a shift in how copyrightable
subject matter is understood. As emphasized before, the thesis
undermines the reduction of copyright to a private right. Furthermore, the thesis suggests that copyright serves a public purpose
and facilitates governmental functions. Several implications for
interpreting section 102 follow, and I will focus specifically on the
implications for originality and for the exclusion of ideas.
Originality means that the work in question originates from
the claimed owner of the copyright and that the work is imbued
with the creative energy of its creator. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that mere "sweat of the brow" does not support copyright. 42 1 Several scholars have emphasized how this standard
privileges the individualistic genius author and removes products
of pure physical labor from the protections of copyright law.422
Scholars differ on whether this privileging and this distinction are
desirable, but there seems to be something close to a consensus
that the Supreme Court standard for originality is unworkable.42 3
The standard in application by lower courts has been watered
down to the point that copyright seems to be protecting the sweat
of one's brow rather than the pure product of the creative mind.424
The debate over the originality standard has typically been
framed in terms of the meaning of authorship and Lockean theories
of labor.42 5 The privatization thesis offers a different tack. Once
copyright is understood as a means of privatizing a government
function, the question becomes one of whether copyright fulfills a
public function by the financing of certain creative ventures, the
creation of cultural infrastructure, or the protection of minority
voice. The implication is that copyright should attach to that subject matter which requires large investments in fixed cost and constitutes cultural architecture. Such a standard would exclude lowlevel works that do not impose high fixed costs for production (for
421Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-55 (1991).
422
See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 496-500 (1991) (discussing the moral rights an author retains in a
work after giving up economic rights).
423
See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation,17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
885 (1992) (discussing the potential that databases will receive insufficient copyright protection); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992) (arguing
that lower courts will narrow the scope of copyright protection for data compilations).
424See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (holding
that a county could hold a copyright over its tax maps).
425
See Gordon, supra note 149 (applying natural rights theory of intellectual property to
free speech); Hughes, supra note 222 (arguing that fair use should be applied to derivative
works).
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example, the Kelley Blue Book, or legal briefs and complaints).4 26
Such a standard may also exclude databases that are largely used
for private purposes, or data bases like the phone book, whose
costs of production are defrayed through taxation or other
means. 427 The privatization thesis would shift the originality inquiry from one about standards of creativity to one about the costs
of production and the public uses and needs of the creative work.
The Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International,
Inc. decision is an example of the privatization thesis in action. In
Veeck, the Fifth Circuit ruled that model codes once enacted lose
copyright status because enactment constitutes citizen authorship
of the statutes. 4 28 The result is correct even though the analysis is
wedded to the language of authorship and private property. By
recognizing citizen authorship, the court acknowledged that the
private drafting of the model code was a devolution of a government function. Citizen authorship permits the citizenry, as sovereign, to reclaim rights in the law. As a practical matter, I have
pointed out in this Article and elsewhere that the court creates a
potentially unworkable distinction between the text of the code and
notes and comments. Under the process that I advocate here, a
more meaningful approach would have been to consider the nature
of the government function and the implications of recognizing a
property right in the code. This analysis would require consideration not only of the function being privatized (here the creation of
cultural infrastructure in law), but also alternative means to satisfy
that function without copyright. Even though the court reached the
correct result of making the code accessible to the public, what is
troubling is that the court did not reach the more salient question
of whether codes should be provided through copyright rather than
through more familiar legislative processes.
I have described the originality analysis in terms that greatly
expand the scope of judicial scrutiny. But in practical terms, my
recommendation mandates a shift of emphasis in the originality
inquiry, from one of authorship to one of recognizing the need to
protect certain texts. Section 102, as drafted, is about the text and
not about the author. The focus of authorship in interpreting section 102 reflects the prevalence of a Lockean theory of copyright
that rests on the protection of labor. But what is more relevant is
426

For a case involving the copyrightability of Blue Book values, see CCC Info. Servs.,
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
427See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66. U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 153 (1997) (arguing that
American and European copyright reforms inadequately address fair use).
428293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002).
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the nature of the product being protected by copyright. Ignoring
the text ignores the social, economic, political, and cultural differences among books, music, software, legal code, religious texts,
digitized information, data, databases, and legal materials. Understanding these texts solely in terms of a general theory of the author ignores the contexts in which texts are created and used. The
privatization thesis shifts the focus from author to text. The question is not whether an author needs an incentive to produce the
text, but whether the text, given how it is created and used, needs
to be protected. For example, the legal codes, according to this
theory, are not copyrightable because they are created for the purpose of public deliberation and application. Religious texts are
copyrightable, under this theory, because of the needs of a church
to define the meanings and uses for a particular congregation.
Similarly, movies and books are copyrightable because of the market system that has certain desirable features for the creation and
dissemination of these texts. The privatization understanding of
copyright forces a consideration of context and use in the analysis
of copyrightability.
Of course, copyrightable subject matter is just one doctrinal
point. When I say that religious texts or movies or books are
copyrightable, I do not mean that a purely private right to exclude
exists. Under the privatization thesis, copyrightability does not
mean broad excludability. The thesis has important implications
for other doctrines in copyright, and can reinvigorate public protecting doctrines such as fair use and the First Amendment. I turn
to each of these next.
B. The Problem of Fair Use as a PrivateRight
Fair use, as the name suggests, may serve as a means of restoring public values to copyright. But too much should not be
made of the name. In practice, fair use, originally called privileged use, has been interpreted as vindicating private rights of authors in an infringement suit. 429 As Judge Pierre Leval, a Second
Circuit judge influential in the area of copyright, explains, fair use
is privileged use that allows an author who has transformed a
copyrighted work in the course of infringing it to be absolved of
liability. 430 The doctrine recognizes that transformations of c ipy429

See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (recognizing fair use as privileged use); Gordon, supra note 35; cf Lunney, supra note 58 (analyzing the market effects of
Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
430
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110-11
(1990).
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righted work, such as parodies and criticism, should not be enjoined, nor should they subject their creators to liability in an infringement action. This definition rests on the assumption that fair
use is a private right of the infringer. Recent judicial decisions
have construed fair use in a narrow way to protect the rights of the
copyright owner.43 ' In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., for
instance, the Ninth Circuit held that a use is not justified, even if it
is transformative, if the use interferes with the copyright owner's
rights of entry into a market.4 32 Against this background of construing fair use largely in terms of private rights, the privatization
thesis serves to resurrect public values in the fair use doctrine.
A point of contention among copyright scholars is the status
of the fair use doctrine as a rule of equity. A recently published
hornbook on intellectual property states that fair use tends to be
seen as an equitable rule.433 Justice Story, in Folsom v. Marsh,4 34
a case involving copyright in George Washington's letters, introduced fair use into copyright jurisprudence as a justification for
infringement.435 However, Judge Leval's account of its history
436
shows that fair use sounded in a court of law, not equity . 6 Congress's codification of fair use in the Copyright Act of 1976 settled
the doctrine's status as a legal one. The codification reduced the
fair use analysis into a multi-factor balancing test that permits the
assessment of a particular use as fair in terms of four factors: the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted
work used, the amount taken from the copyrighted work, and the
effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted
work.43 7
Even though fair use is a rule of law rather than an equitable
rule, equitable principles often inform the manner in which the
doctrine is applied. Prior to the codification of fair use in 1976,
courts would often refer to fair use as an equitable rule of reason,
contrary to the history of the doctrine. 38 What this meant is that
there is discretion in how the law is to be applied, and this discre431See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115
(9th Cir. 2000); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).4
32239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).

4 33

See

ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW

PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 216-17 (2003).
OF COPYRIGHTS,
4
49

F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

435Id. at 350.
43
6 See Leval, supra note 430, at 1127-28.
43717 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
438

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (referring to fair use as equitable rule of reason with reference to previous cases).
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tion could be formed by public values. In the famous case of
Time-Life v. Geis, involving unauthorized reproductions of stills
from the Zapruder film, the court held, expressly on equitable
grounds, that the public interest in having access to information
about the President Kennedy's assassination outweighed the interests of the copyright owner. 439 Even after the codification of fair
use in 1976, courts still on occasion refer to copyright as an equitable rule of reason, and scholars attempting to revive fair use as a
means
of limiting private rights discuss fair use as a rule of eq440
uity.
The tension between law and equity in fair use is one of determining how to interpret the 1976 codification of the doctrine in
public minded terms. Several cases illustrate this point. The Supreme Court held that unauthorized publication by The Nation of
excerpts from President Ford's unpublished autobiography was not
a fair use. 44 The Court applied the fair use factors from the 1976
Copyright Act in a fairly mechanical manner. Characterizing the
publication by The Nation as "news scooping," the Court held that
The Nation lost on all four factors. Particularly salient was the fact
that The Nation's scooping caused Ford's publisher to lose a valu442
able contract with Time Magazine to publish the excerpts first.
Notice that the Court framed the fair use largely in terms of the
conflict between The Nation's right to scoop and Ford's right to
publish first.
Judicial considerations of fair use and parody also frame the
analysis in terms of conflicting private rights. The rap version of
the Roy Orbison song, Oh, Pretty Woman, created by Luther
Campbell, was the subject of a suit brought by the song's copyright holder." 3 Campbell's version of the song transformed Orbison's work while maintaining some of the musical and literary
elements. The Supreme Court, while not directly ruling on the issue of fair use, emphasized Campbell's transformative efforts as
key elements in determining whether his use of Orbison's work
constituted fair use. 444 Once again, the Court worked through each
of the fair use factors and suggested that Campbell's use was excused because the rap version was highly 445
creative and did not insong.
his
for
market
Orbison's
with
terfere
439

Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
44o See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 433, at 216 nn.8- 10.
441Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
442 Id. at 542.
44
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
444
Id. at 579.
44.Id. at 578-94.
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The Ninth Circuit's analsis in The Cat in the Hat case was
The court held that the use of maless favorable to the parodist.
terials from Dr. Seuss was not a parody, but a satire that was created by misappropriating elements from an author without sufficiently transforming them." 7 Whatever difference in result for
would-be parodists, the two cases share a conception of fair use as
a conflict between two private authors trying to establish rights in
their respective works.
A final example of the private property values permeating fair
use analysis is provided by the Napster case." 8 The dispute pitted
copyright owners in music who were defending established methods of producing and distributing music against the creator of a
new method of distribution. The Ninth Circuit applied the fair use
factors and found against Napster, concluding that users of Napster
did not transform the work in any creative way, and that the new
method of distribution interfered with the market rights of the
copyright owner not only to sell their songs through conventional
channels, but also through digital ones. 449 As the court stated,
Napster infringed on the music copyright owner's rights of first
entry into the digital download market for their songs. Napster did
not pit author against news-scooper or author against creative
transformer, but it did entail a conflict between private parties in
the control over a new market created by the Internet. 45° Once
again, the fair use analysis is framed in terms of a conflict between
private rights holders.
To reduce a fair use analysis to a matter of conflicting private
rights ignores the public values that fair use should vindicate. Justice Story's characterization of fair use as a justification for interfering with a private right suggests that more is at stake than a vindication of purely private claims. 45' The work at issue in Folsom
was the multi-volume compilation of President Washington's letters that were edited and published under Washington's authorization. The alleged infringer had published an abridged version of
the compilation for wider distribution and readership. Justice
Story's concern was with the proper treatment of Washington's
letters, not with which of two editors should have the right to the
text. In analyzing the equities in allowing the edited version of the
446Dr.

Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997).

447
Id. at 1400-01.
448
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2001).

9
44
1d. at 1015-24.
4
5Id. at 1026-27; see Ghosh, supra note 69, at 578-80 (arguing that business method patent protection would give creators of file sharing systems a proprietary interest in the system).
451
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345-46 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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letters, Justice Story emphasized the effects on the complete, unedited text.45 2 These effects were not isolated to harm to the author
in the marketplace, but extended to harm to the text itself as a definitive collection of Washington's letters and an important cultural artifact. Justice Story's approach is echoed in that of the Geis
court that found public value in dissemination of stills from the
Zapruder film. Once again the focal point of the analysis was the
cultural and public value of the text, rather than the economic and
property rights of the author.4 53
The two examples provided by Folsom and Geis illustrate
possibilities for a public minded fair use doctrine. The privatization thesis supports and necessitates such an approach. The support comes from the conceptualization of copyright, under the thesis, as the devolution of a government function. The devolution
implies that fair use should not be seen in terms of a private conflict between two authors. The necessity of fair use arises from the
dangers of privatization. By devolving a function to a private
party, the government runs the risk of losing control over how the
function is carried out. Fair use is one way the state can monitor
the private execution of the government function. Fair use limits
private rights by ensuring that the public purpose of copyright is
not being hindered.
The problem with pursuing a public minded fair use doctrine is
that one must deal with Congress's codification of the doctrine.
While my analysis would support a redrafting of the provision, it is
unlikely that my proposal would be enacted legislatively for the simple reason that this issue is not on the current agenda. However, the
issue of fair use under the DMCA is an open question, and my suggestions here may have some legislative play in that context. Nonetheless, the fair use factors can be described as canonical, and any
legislative action on fair use under the DMCA may very likely borrow from these factors. The next critical question is how to incorporate public minded copyright into current statutory fair use analysis.
Current analysis begins with a characterization of the use followed by a consideration of the fairness of allowing the use, assessed in light of the aforementioned factors. The problem is that
this use is often characterized in terms of private, creative or transformative activity, such as news scooping or parody. The fairness
is assessed in terms of how this private activity conflicts with the
rights of the copyright owner in the marketplace. However, the
use need not only be understood in private terms. For example, in
4.2
4-3

id. at 348.
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Worldwide Church of God,454 the relevant use of the text was for
religious service and dissent. Seen only in private terms, the dissident's use would be described as pure copying and not transformative. In Veeck, the Fifth Circuit precisely described the defendant's use as slavish copying and non-transformative, ignoring the
use of the text to inform citizens about the law. 455 The first step in
reforming fair use is to recognize broader categories of use, which
requires appreciating the broader context in which the copyrighted
text will be used. If this seems like a radical step, consider that the
Supreme Court implicitly had a broader notion of use in the Sony
case, which found the wholesale reproduction of broadcast programs, activity that was clearly not transformative, to be fair
use. 456 The Court recognized the use in question, time shifting, in
a broader social context of television viewing.
Broadening the concept of use is just the first step. The four
factors should also be applied in a way that recognizes the broader
public benefits of the use pitted against the private rights of the
copyright owner. This analysis is not a pure utilitarian balancing
of costs and benefits. Applying the four factors, under my proposal, requires an understanding of the institutions and contexts in
which the use is made and the specific threat posed to the copyright holder. Such an understanding should inform each of the
four factors.
The purpose and character of the use should not be analyzed
solely in terms of transformative value added by the defendant.
Rather the use should be understood in as broad a social context as
possible. Furthermore, the nature of the copyrighted work should
not be determined in terms of categories like fiction or fact, and
informative or entertaining, the approach adopted by current
courts. Instead, the nature of the copyrighted work should be analyzed in terms of why the work was created and how it has come to
be used. Consideration of the amount taken by the defendant may
appear to be a non-discretionary factor, but, as many courts have
shown, can also be informed by context. For example, in the
copyright dispute between Hustler and Jerry Falwell, the Ninth
Circuit held that Falwell's message required the wholesale copying
of Flynt's work.457 In other cases, such as in The Nation case,
4

5 Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir.
2000).
455 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 823-25 (5th Cir. 2002).
456 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 424-44 (1984). But
cf id. 465-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that the making of a single copy for
private consumption, with no educational or other purpose, cannot be a basis for fair use).
457Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986).
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courts recognize that the expression of the defendant's message
did not require wholesale copying.45 8 A truly dynamic, contextual
consideration of the fair use factors will permit a public minded
fair use doctrine.
Broader consideration of the fourth factor, market effects, will
also facilitate public values as a check on private rights. The public minded copyright law that I am advocating does not lead to the
rejection of markets as a means of distributing copyrighted materials. The privatization thesis supports a pragmatic appreciation of
markets as social and public institutions that permit dissemination
of copyrighted materials to the public on the basis of willingness
to pay. This pragmatic appreciation recognizes the limits of markets, and situates markets with respect to other institutions, such as
libraries and universities, that disseminate cultural artifacts. The
key is not to assume markets as the sole, or necessarily most desirable, means of dissemination. It is one option among many. For
example, in Veeck, the model code drafters made the argument that
Veeck's use could not be fair because it impeded their ability to
market the code and generate revenues to fund the code drafting.459
The relevant question is whether the sale of the code is the appropriate way to fund the drafting of code that is enacted by a state,
and how this method compares with general taxation as the means
of funding law making. In Napster, instead of appealing to a right
of first entry into any market for the copyrighted work, the court
should have considered the effects of restricting entry on the relevant market for digital downloads. 4 6 In a separate paper, I analyze
the effects of limiting entry through copyright (and conclude that
Napster may have been correctly decided while other cases clearly
were not). 461 The privatization thesis supports a more contextual
analysis of markets that requires a comparison of market-based
distribution of cultural artifacts with other institutional arrangements. Markets are not seen as purely private arrangements, but as
social ones that are informed with public values and assessed by
comparison to other possible arrangements.
A public minded fair use is possible even within a contemporary fair use doctrine that some argue to be purely legal, and not
equitable. Such a transformation is necessary in light of fair use's
framing of a conflict as between two sets of private interests, those
458
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561-62 (1985).
459Veeck, 293 F.3d at 824.
4w A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
46'See Randall C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case for DigitalDistribution,47

ANTITRusT BULL. 423 (2002) (arguing that copyright and antitrust law may not be adequate to
protect free entry into the online distribution industry).
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of the owner and those of the user. By recasting copyright as
originating in a government function, the public mindedness of fair
use becomes secured and can be structured appropriately.
C. The FirstAmendment and Copyright
Whether copyright law abridges freedom of speech continues
to be a question of great scholarly and practical controversy.46 2
Much of the current debate centers on the question of whether 463
to
characterize copyright within First Amendment jurisprudence.
The privatization thesis sheds light on the proper relationship between copyright and the First Amendment by expanding the inquiry beyond a question of how to characterize copyright as speech
regulation. The thesis supports the broader approach
suggested by
464
Ashcroft.
v.
Eldred
in
dissent
his
in
Breyer
Justice
1. CurrentDoctrine on the FirstAmendment and Copyright
The Supreme Court, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, affirmed the long
established view that the First Amendment does not provide an
independent limit on copyright. 4 5 The view is based on the historical background to the enactment of copyright law and the rati462"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .
U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
463The seminal articles on the relationship between the First Amendment and Copyright
are Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (identifying instances when copyright can stifle speech and suggesting that fair use might mediate
between copyright and the First Amendment), and Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180
(1970) (answering "no" to the question in his title, and arguing that there is no independent First
Amendment limitation on copyright). For the recent debate, see C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002) (examining the implications of the
speech clause and the press clause for determining the permissible and appropriate extent of
copyright law); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on
the Protectionof Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979) (attempting to determine which First
Amendment challenges to copyright deserve consideration and which should be cast aside);
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property
Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing that while copyright law restricts speech, permanent
injunctions in copyright should be constitutional; preliminary injunctions should only be
constitutional in cases of clear copying); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (enumerating changes in copyright law
since 1970, and arguing that copyright law should be subject to rigorous intermediate scrutiny);
L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) (arguing
that copyright's constitutional purpose is best served by encouraging a distribution of the
works); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that copyright's prohibition of unauthorized derivative works is
unconstitutional, but could be saved if damages and injunctions were replaced by an action for
profit allocation). Two prominent copyright scholars recently described copyright law as a form
of "free speech policy" and argued that the Statute of Anne vindicated free speech values that
are embodied in the First Amendment. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 168, at 945.
4m See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243-66 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
465 Id. at 218-19.
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fication of the Bill of Rights. According to the Court, Congress is
presumed to have understood the potential First Amendment problems with copyright and resolved them within the statutory
scheme. Courts repeatedly refer to the First Amendment safeguards built into copyright, such as fair use and the
466
Despite these safeguards, the probidea/expression distinction.
lem of the First Amendment and copyright is recurring, as copyright owners seek to enjoin infringers in a way that resembles state
censorship of books and movies. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit, in
2001, deviated from the traditional constitutional jurisprudence by
holding that an injunction against the publication of The Wind
Done Gone, an allegedly infringing book that riffed on Gone With
the Wind, was a prior restraint of speech and removed the injunction.467 Cracks continue to appear in the structure of constitutional
jurisprudence holding that the First Amendment offers no check on
copyright other than what has been established statutorily.
However, the lack of a persuasive theory of the First Amendment hampers the development of a more robust free speech jurisprudence in copyright. The Blackstonian perspective, that free
speech rights primarily forbid prior restraints, informs analyses of
injunctive remedies in copyright, such as the one at issue in The
Wind Done Gone case. 468 Beyond the injunction context, no coherent theory of the First Amendment exists in the area of copyright. The problem is that copyright is a form of speech regulation, and understanding the proper role of the First Amendment as
a limit on copyright runs up against assumptions about the proper
balance between property and regulation. 469 As I show below, the
privatization thesis revives arguments for some types of First
Amendment limits on copyright, and provides a critique of the
contemporary approach.
Current First Amendment doctrine is built on a categorical
approach that distinguishes among different types of speech and
different types of regulations.47 ° Categories of protected speech
include political speech, which obtains a high level of protection,
commercial speech, which obtains an intermediate level of protec466 d. at 192-220.

467Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1ith Cir. 2001).
468

See Hannibal Travis, Piratesof the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright
and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 789-804 (2000).
469

See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology

Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2003).
Upgrades
470
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265

(1981); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671 (1983).
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tion, and obscene speech, which obtains no protection. Since
copyrightable expression spans all of these categories, from political pamphlets to mass market magazines and advertisements, the
speech categories are not all that helpful for understanding the
First Amendment limits on copyright. 47' The focus, therefore, has
been on the categories of regulation. The distinction is made between content-based regulations, which receive a high level of
scrutiny under the First Amendment, and content-neutral regulations, which receive an intermediate level of scrutiny. Scholarly
debate revolves largely around which of these two categories appropriately describes copyright.4 72
The distinction between content-neutral and content-based
regulations, a distinction that profoundly determines the scope of
First Amendment protection, has largely been an incoherent one.
As the Supreme Court has stated, the distinction rests on the question of "whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. 473
The definition focuses on the message, rather than on the media
through which the message is conveyed. For example, in an important case involving the regulation of cable, the Court found the
regulation to be content-neutral largely because the regulation
governed the media rather than the message.4 74
However, the test's focus on the government's reason for the
regulation suggests that the distinction rests on something more
than the difference between the media and the message. For example, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court was confronted with the
question of whether a regulation prohibiting "speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility" was
content-based or content-neutral.47 5 The regulation fairly clearly
was meant to protect access to abortion clinics and other health
care facilities, which were targeted as sites for protest. The majority held that it was content-neutral because the statute did not prohibit the speech based on the content of the speech since abortion
defenders and abortion supporters were equally restricted under
the language of the regulation.4 76 The dissenters, on the other
hand, contended that the regulation was content-based since the

471See Netanel,
47

supra note 463, at 19.

2Id. at 47-49; see also Baker, supra note 463, at 908-09; Lemley & Volokh, supra note

463, at 186; Rubenfeld, supra note 463, at 6 n. 18.
473Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
474Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994).
475530 U.S. 703 (2000).
4 76
Id. at 723.
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government's motive in enacting the restriction was to protect
seekers of abortions from abortion protestors. 47
The privatization thesis suggests that the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral is frustratingly irresolvable and
wrongheaded when applied to copyright. The problem posed by
copyright is determining when content distinctions are being made.
Certainly, the individual copyright owner makes content-based
distinctions in determining when to sue for infringement and when
to license her copyrighted expression. For example, the decision
not to license the creation of a sequel or a movie is a decision
based on the content of the proposed sequel or movie. But this
content distinction is a private decision. Under this characterization, copyright law is seemingly content-neutral when seen from
the perspective of the government actor. On the other hand, not all
expression is treated equally under copyright law. Some expression gets no protection and others get quite a bit. These are content-based distinctions that imply different First Amendment
treatment. As I explain in the next subsection, the distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations suffers from
an insufficient definition of the word content.
2. Problems with the Content-Based, Content-NeutralDistinction
What constitutes "content"? In the Hill case, the majority implied that the regulation was not based on content because the language of the statute referred to broad categories, such as oral protest, education, and counseling.47 8 The dissenters, however, emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to regulate antiabortion speech, and therefore, despite the broad categories enumerated in the statute, it pertained to specific speech in practice,
namely speech that was meant to interfere with the exercise of the
right to an abortion. For the majority, content is determined categorically; for the dissenters, through use of context. The Supreme
Court itself is divided on what constitutes content.
The meaning of the word content is even more inscrutable in
the context of copyright. Copyright, so the mantra goes, protects
expression, not ideas. If content means only ideas, then the categorical approach does not apply at all. This tack seems to be the
one adopted by a Supreme Court that sees no independent First
Amendment limit on copyright.47 9 If content means expression and
ideas, then the First Amendment would be applicable to copyright,
477 Id. at 744-46.
478

Id. at 719.

479 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
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but we are left with the quandary of whether copyright was480 enacted "because of disagreement with the message it conveys.
The centrality of government motive in the categorization of
regulation for First Amendment purposes turns the inquiry into one
of attitudes towards the substantive law. 48' As applied to copyright, the test could turn either way. The argument for content
neutrality rests on copyright law's lack of reference to the content
of the speech. The mantra in copyright is that it protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. In other words, copyright protects the media in which the idea is protected. Under this
conceptualization, content-neutral treatment is appropriate (as Professor Netanel has concluded).4 82 Additional support for content
neutrality comes from recognizing that Congress's purpose in enacting copyright was based not on the content of speech, but on the
goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 4 83
by securing rights of the copyright holder in the publishing and
marketing of her expression.4 84 Under this view, copyright law is
about regulating the medium of speech through market and other
channels by which speech is disseminated.
Of course, copyright can also be characterized as contentbased. The enforcement of copyright requires consideration of the
content of speech to gauge whether it is original and whether it is
not unprotected material under section 102(b). The infringement
inquiry also requires extensive content-based judgments both in
determining the metes and bounds of protected expression, and in
determining whether the alleged infringer's work falls within the
metes and bounds of the owner's work. Furthermore, application
of defenses like fair use mandates an examination of the content of
both copyright owner's and infringer's speech to determine
whether the infringer's speech is sufficiently transformative to
avoid the imposition of liability.
Close readers of Supreme Court opinions will point out that
my arguments here are not sufficient or necessary for categorizing
copyright as a content-based regulation. In fact, my arguments
would support content-based categorization for any regulation that
requires an enforcer or adjudicator to consider the content of
480Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
481See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249

(1995) (arguing that the First Amendment has become superficial and incoherent, and will continue that way until it is focused on the constitutional significance of particular social practices).
482 See Netanel, supra note 463, at 48.
483U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8.
484 See Netanel, supra note 463, at 49-50 (arguing that copyright is content-neutral because
it provides an economic incentive).
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speech. The correct inquiry is on the government's purpose in enacting the regulation. 485 But a consideration of motive only
strengthens the case for content-based treatment of copyright.
Traditionally, copyright protection has extended to only certain
categories of expression. The first copyright statute applied to
books, maps, and charts.486 The choice to include certain types of
expression, and exclude others, was a content-based judgment that
one type of expression required or deserved the market exclusivity
granted through copyright and other types did not. Even though
contemporary copyright is more expansive in subject matter, this
differentiation based on content is continued through the originality requirement and the fair use standards.48 7 Originality rests on48a8
judgment of creativity, as the Supreme Court has held in Feist.
The decision to protect creative expressions and not uncreative
ones under copyright law suggests that the government's motives
were based on the content of speech. Similarly, for fair use, the
conclusion that transformative, critical, or scholarly use is protected, while non-transformative, non-critical, or non-scholarly use
is not, reflects a motive based on content. Therefore, the case for
content-based treatment of copyright has been made and seems
equally as strong as the case for content-neutral treatment.
If the meaning of content is incoherent and if we cannot say
whether copyright law is about the media or the message, then we
need some other theory to aid in understanding the relationship
between the First Amendment and copyright. The privatization
thesis offers a possible approach.
3. Recognizing Public Values in Copyright Through the First
Amendment
Although the question of the appropriate theory of the First
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article, the privatization
thesis of copyright has important implications for independent
First Amendment scrutiny of copyright. Copyright is speech regulation, and is also a devolution of a government function to private
parties. Through copyright law, the government is regulating
speech indirectly through the private enforcement of rights. Be485Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. But see United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803
(2000) (holding that a statute requiring providers of adult content to filter out sound is a contentbased 4regulation).
86Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (entitled "An Act for the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned").
487See Rubenfeld, supra note 463, at 16-21.
488Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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cause, under the terms of the privatization thesis, the enforcement
of private rights facilitates the execution of a government function,
the First Amendment should serve as a limit on the scope of these
rights. Absent the First Amendment limits on copyright, the government would be able to abridge speech indirectly in ways that
would be impermissible through direct regulation. The First
Amendment limit on injunctive relief provides an example. Congress cannot impose a prior restraint on the publication of a book
through direct regulation. Similarly, it should be prevented from
imposing a prior restraint indirectly through injunctive relief for
violation of copyright law. The principle applies beyond injunctive relief. For example, damage awards in copyright do not prohibit speech from occurring, but impose a burden on speaking.
The burden imposed by copyright damages should be subject to
from the prior reFirst Amendment scrutiny, although differently
489
straint standard applied to injunctive relief.
Not only does the privatization thesis highlight copyright
law's status as speech regulation, but it also explains why the content-based/content-neutral distinction is unhelpful. The categorization can be played in either direction. Since private parties are
enforcing copyright law, content decisions are arguably made by
private parties, and therefore the state's devolution is contentneutral. On the other hand, the government is devolving its functions to private parties, and the execution of these functions requires content-based decisions, making the case for content-based
categorizations.
The Supreme Court's decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. illustrates this dilemma. 490 At issue in the case was a
suit brought against the planners for a series of athletic competitions for gay athletes. The planners described the games as the
"gay Olympics."
The United States Olympic Committee
("USOC"), a private corporation to whom Congress delegated
rights in the term "Olympics" for the purpose of organizing the
official Olympics games in the United States, sued for trademark
infringement. The planners of the "gay Olympics" raised a First
Amendment defense. The Supreme Court held for the USOC,
finding there was no violation of the First Amendment. The Court
held that the USOC was a private organization not subject to Constitutional restrictions. 49 1 In response to the argument that Con489
See Rubenfeld, supra note 463, at 56-57; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (holding that a public official's libel action for damages violates the First Amendment
unless actual malice is shown).
4-483 US. 522 (1987).
491Id. at 544.
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gress's delegation to the USOC of exclusive rights in the word
"Olympics" was a First Amendment violation, the Court held that
this delegation constituted a reasonable restriction on speech because Congress was allowing USOC to capture the returns from
managing and utilizing the word "Olympics" in the organizing of
the games.492 The lone dissent written by Justice Brennan illustrated an approach similar to the one proposed here. According to
the dissent, by denying a gay group use of the term "Olympics,"
the Congressional delegation to a private corporation permitted
impermissible content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment.49 3
The majority in the gay Olympics case viewed the regulation
as content-neutral; the dissent as content-based. The majority and
dissent differed on how the government decision was characterized. For the majority, Congress's delegation was the relevant
government action, and that decision was made in content-neutral
terms. For the dissent, the delegation to a private party of rights in
a word and the execution of those rights in a discriminatory manner were the relevant government action. The privatization thesis
would support a more straightforward analysis: If Congress directly could not prevent a private citizen from using the word
"Olympics," then Congress cannot prevent this from happening
indirectly by delegating its function to a private entity like the
USOC.
The privatization thesis supports the need for First Amendment limits on copyright and provides a basis for an alternative to
the categorical approach. Justice Breyer's dissent in Eldred v.
Ashcroft addresses the constitutionality of copyright in a way that
harmonizes many of the arguments I make here. Under this approach, a copyright statute "lacks the constitutionally necessary
rational support if: (1) the significant benefits that it bestows are
private, not public; (2) it threatens to seriously undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) it
cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective. ' 494 Although Justice Breyer's test is meant to answer the
question of when Congress has properly exercised its power under
the Intellectual Property Clause, the three-pronged test is designed
to take account of First Amendment values under an analysis of
Congressional power. The first part of the test recognizes the public values underlying copyright by asking whether the relevant
492

Id. at 540-42.

493Id. at 563-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
494Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244-45 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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provision of the copyright law bestows a private rather than a public benefit. The second part emphasizes the expressive values in
copyright of promoting speech. The last part looks to other copyright ends, such as the securing of authors' rights for a limited time
and promoting progress in science. In contrast to the categorical
approach, Justice Breyer's test takes into consideration the myriad
objectives of copyright, with emphasis on the public values of free
expression and dissemination.
In conclusion, the contemporary approach to the First
Amendment and copyright does not adequately address the range
of expressive and public values that should inform both areas of
law. Instead, First Amendment rights and copyright are viewed as
purely private rights, the first necessary to facilitate exchange in
the marketplace of ideas, the second in the marketplace of expressions. Attempts to create First Amendment limits on copyright
flounder on the difficulties of defining content and identifying
copyright as media or message. The privatization thesis, by recognizing copyright as a devolution of a government function, permits a proper balance between First Amendment and copyright,
one that recognizes the need for a First Amendment curb on copyright based on a full consideration of public values, as exemplified
by Justice Breyer in his Eldred dissent.
CONCLUSION

This Article presents a quest for public minded values in
copyright law. Starting from Madison's appeal to the public good
and modern theories of public goods and democracy, the quest
proceeds through a re-examination of copyright history in England
and the United States and an analysis of three compelling areas of
contemporary copyright doctrine, and finishes with ideas for rethinking copyrightable subject matter, fair use, and the First
Amendment. In the end, the quest leads to Justice Breyer's dissent
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, which recognizes the intimate connection
between public values and private property in copyright law.
To deprivatize copyright entails recognizing that copyright is
not solely a private right that is enforced through the mechanisms
of copyright law. The tendency to see copyright as a reflection of
purely private interests ignores copyright's history in licensing,
and assumes that the creation of authors' rights through the Statute
of Anne entailed the establishment of copyright as property, akin
to the creation of interests in real property. The privatization thesis acknowledges that copyright creates a private right, but a private right imbued with a public purpose. By placing copyright
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within the framework of privatization, it is possible to revive public values in copyright policy and engage the current debates over
copyright in the contexts of model codes, religious texts, and the
DMCA.
Recognizing the public in copyright law responds to those
who would see copyright solely as a private property right. There
is superficial appeal in viewing copyright as private property, especially on the grounds that the government should remain outside
the realm of cultural production. But analogizing copyright to private property, particularly real property, raises the important legal
realist critique of real property as instrumental to social and political ends rather than as an essentialist, pre-political and pre-social
right. The central lesson of this Article is that copyright is like
real property in the realist sense of an instrument to obtain certain
ends. Copyright, however, diverges from real property in terms of
the ends it is designed to achieve. I have shown how copyright
serves as a means of privatizing government functions of cultural
production. But to conceive of copyright as privatizing government functions does not mean that the state need take over the
realm of cultural productions. Instead, my purpose is to bolster the
view of copyright as public minded and regulatory, as a means of
attaining the public good, appealed to by Madison. This reconceptualization provides a basis for rethinking copyright doctrine and
the links between copyright law and the First Amendment.
While the focus of this Article has been on copyright, my argument extends to patent as well, even though, as I have stated
earlier, patent has been problematic in a different way from copyright. Future research will specifically explore the privatization
thesis in the context of patent, and develop a democratic theory of
patent law and science policy. My argument here, however, has
immediate implications for how to think of intellectual property
more broadly as the vindication of purely private interests. To
think of rights in cultural artifacts or scientific and technical
knowledge as fixed and stable property rights ignores the progress
of culture and science. To reduce the output of cultural and scientific ventures into fixed rights is to potentially ossify the processes
of creation and invention. The privatization thesis developed
through exploration of theory, history, and doctrine in this Article
liberates copyright (and indirectly patent) from the restrictions of
property and truly promotes progress and the public good, as
Madison envisioned and modern democratic societies desire. The
thesis I espouse in this Article offers an important perspective on
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copyright's present and, it is hoped, a needed compass for copyright's future.

